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PREFACE
In response to escalating rates of reported criminal 
activity and acts of civil disobedience during the I960's, 
the Congress, in June, 1968, enacted the Safe Streets Act as 
part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1 9 6 8. With President Johnson's approval of this legislation, 
the Federal government began, for the first time in this na­
tion's history, to provide significant financial assistance 
to state and local governments for improvement of their 
criminal justice systems.
An important provision of the 1968 Safe Streets Act 
requires that the bulk of the Federal aid be awarded to the 
States on the basis of each State's total population. In 
fiscal year 1970 this amounted to about $l85 million.
Within the next few years. Federal law enforcement assistance 
is expected to increase to approximately $1.5 billion, at 
which time the Federal government will have assumed twenty 
percent of the criminal justice costs which formerly were 
the sole responsibility of state and local governments.
This study analyses the manner in which state law 
enforcement planning agencies have allocated the $l85 million
iii
in fiscal 1970 Federal funds made available to the states in 
the form of block grants. The influence of interstate vari­
ances in selected social, economic and political system 
characteristics on the outputs of the law enforcement plan­
ning process are investigated. Multi-variate statistical 
techniques, including factor analysis, stepwise regression 
and residual analysis are employed. Consideration is given 
to the issues related to Federal law enforcement assistance, 
the probable impact of this assistance on reported crime 
rates and on the American tradition of local control of law 
enforcement. The larger implications of this major national 
effort to reduce crime and civil disorder by more effective 
law enforcement are also dealt with.
Although this study deals primarily with statistical 
data provided by various governmental agencies and by 
earlier studies of the policy process in the American states, 
considerable insight regarding the law enforcement planning 
process was gained through personal interviews. From June 
through August, 1970 the law enforcement planning agencies 
of Kansas, Oklahoma, Maryland, Virginia and Massachusetts 
were visited by this researcher. Informative discussions of 
the law enforcement planning process were held with the staff 
director and several of the supervisory board members in each 
of the states visited. In all cases the staff personnel and 
board members interviewed were most cooperative and willing 
to contribute information asked for.
iv
In addition to the field visits outlined above, a 
number of visits were made to the Office of Law Enforcement 
Programs of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in 
Washington, D.C. Again, individuals interviewed were help­
ful in providing information and data on law enforcement 
planning, and in making available the comprehensive law en­
forcement plans of all states. Several visits were also 
made to the Federal Bureau of Investigation headquarters in 
Washington, D.C. for the purpose of obtaining data on crime 
statistics. As in the other visits, a high degree of co­
operation was received from the Chief of the Uniform Crime 
Reporting Section and his staff.
The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable 
assistance of his dissertation committee: Dr. Hugh G.
MacNiven, Chairman; Dr. Richard E. Hilbert; Dr. Samuel A. 
Kirkpatrick; Dr. F. Ted Hebert; and Professor Samuel G. 
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LAW ENFORCEMENT PLANNING IN THE AMERICAN STATES 




This study seeks to improve our understanding of how 
policy outcomes in the American states are influenced by en­
vironmental and political system differences among the states. 
To this end the relationships between selected policy de­
cisions related to criminal justice administration and indi­
cators of the socio-economic and political characteristics of 
each of the forty-eight states are explored.
The method of investigation is that of multivariate 
statistical analysis using a systems model. Techniques em­
ployed include simple correlation, multiple stepwise regres­
sion, factor analysis and residual analysis. The results of 
earlier investigations of the policy process in the American 
states and the outcome of the law enforcement planning process 




The findings of other researchers incorporated in 
this study include those reported by Dye, Fenton, Fry and 
Winters, and by Sharkansky and Hofferbert. In addition, ex­
tensive use is made of the report of the President's Commis­
sion on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, and 
of the reports of the Congressional committees that were in­
strumental in the initiation of this first national program 
to improve all phases of the criminal justice process.
One of the questions in the study of public policy 
that has generated considerable controversy in recent years 
is whether political or environmental variances are the more 
important as policy determinants. Prior to about 1957 and 
the advent of Easton's systems approach,^ there existed little 
doubt in the thinking of most political scientists that state 
political systems have a distinctive imprint on patterns of 
public policy.2 This generalized assumption of the importance 
of the political process appears to have been due to the 
methodology then employed— case studies, community power ap­
proaches, and investigations of the environment and govern­
ment structures. The main thrust of these approaches dealt 
with government structure as a key variable.
^David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Po­
litical Systems," World Politics, 9 (1957), 383-^0.
2Based on Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, 
"Dimensions of State Politics, Economics and Public Policy," 
American Political Science Review, LXIII (September, 1969), 
867-79.
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Following the publication of Easton's A Systems Anal­
ysis of Political Life  ̂ in 1965? some scholars adopted his 
input-output model in their investigations of influences 
which determine policy outcomes. Aggregate census data began 
to be used to reflect environmental characteristics while of­
ficial revenue and expenditure data became the chief indi­
cators of public policy outputs. As Clarke describes the 
effects of this change to the systems approach,
The most interesting and, for some, unsettling 
finding to emerge from these studies is that policy 
outcomes are most closely associated with the environ­
mental rather than the political characteristics of 
the units of analysis. This finding, of course, is at 
odds with the substantial body of community research 
which preceded the output studies. Both the case study 
and community power literature focused on decision­
making structures and thus in those studies dealing 
specifically with the determinants of public policies, 
political process variables were found to be ex­
ceedingly important.2
As suggested by Clarke, a number of recent studies 
employing the systems approach have concluded that policy out­
comes are most closely associated with environmental rather 
than political characteristics of the units of analysis.
These include:
- Dawson and Robinson's 1963 examination of the rela­
tionship between interparty competition and welfare
1
(New York: John Wiley and Sons
2
David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life
■James W. Clarke, "Urban Policy Output Models," a 
paper presented to the American Society for Public Adminis­
tration Conference (Philadelphia, April 7-8, 1970), p. 6 
(mimeo).
policies^ as evidenced by a group of state tax and expendi­
ture measures which the authors labeled "welfare orienta­
tion. " Although Dawson and Robinson found that interparty 
competition, as an indicator of the political system, was re­
lated to welfare orientation in the states, this relationship 
fails to persist when controls for per capita income are in­
troduced.
2- Hofferbert’s 1966 analysis which refined the def­
inition of welfare orientation used by Dawson and Robinson 
and added a number of political system indicators. Hoffer­
bert 's results, which tended to confirm the findings of 
Dawson and Robinson, showed no independent impact on welfare 
policies for any of the political variables considered.
- Dye's 1966 study^ of the influence of urbanization, 
industrialization, income and education and the political 
variables of interparty competition, voter participation, and 
malapportionment on a variety of expenditure and tax meas­
ures. Dye's findings were that for forty-seven of fifty-four 
tax and expenditure measures, socio-economic variables had
Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter- 
Party Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policies 
in the American States," Journal of Politics, XXV (1963) 
265-289.
^Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public 
Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in 
the American States," American Political Science Review, LX 
(March, 1966), 73-82.
^Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public: 
Policy Outcomes in the States (Chicago; Rand McNally,
19 6 6).
5
more influence on policy outcomes than did political vari­
ables.^
In contrast to the foregoing, Sharkansky's 1968 
analysis^ of state government expenditures tends to support 
the earlier arguments that politics or political systems are 
the key to policy outputs. These findings are supported by 
those of James Q. Wilson-^ and Duane Lockard.
In the controversy over the nature of public policy 
determinants there exists yet another set of recent aggre­
gate studies. These point to a middle ground where there 
lies no single answer to the question of whether the socio­
economic or the political variables of the American states 
has the greater impact on policy outputs:
- Sharkansky and Hofferbert,^ who dealt with factors 
and not with isolated variables in their investigation of 
which dimensions of policy respond to what dimensions of 
politics and economics, found that different social and
For a more complete discussion of this literature 
see Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure, 
and Power: An assessment of Changes in the Study of State
and Local Politics," Journal of Politics 30 (May 1968), 
510- 538.
pIra Sharkansky, Spending in the American States 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968).
^James Q. Wilson, City Politics and Public Policy 
(New York: Wiley, 1968), Chapter 1.
1+Duane Lockard, "State Party Systems and Policy Out­
puts," in Oliver Garceau (ed.). Political Research and Po­
litical Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968),
pp. 190-220.
^Sharkansky and Hofferbert, op. cit.
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economic characteristics have different relevance for pol­
icies, and their relevance varies between substantive areas 
of policy. The authors stress the importance of the multi­
dimensionality in state economics, politics and public 
policy.
- Cnudde and MbCrone,^ who employed causal inference
techniques to investigate the impact of party competition on
the struggle between the "haves" and the "have nots," con-
2elude, as Key might have predicted, that different models 
are required for the explanation of different policies.
- Clarke,3 who investigated the correlates of 
charter-reform activity in forty-three third-class cities in 
Pennsylvania between 1957 and 1966, reported:
What this analysis has demonstrated is not that 
environmental variables are unimportant, but rather 
that their importance must be assessed in combination 
with relevant and meaningful political variables; 
that is, political process variables which are often 
recognized but rarely included in comparative urban 
research.^
Of particular usefulness to this investigation is 
the work of David Easton and Thomas R. Dye concerning the use
1Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Com­
petition and Welfare Policies in the American States," 
American Political Science Review, LXIII (September, 1969), 856-866.
2V. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York:
Vintage Books, 19^9), p. 307*
^James W. Clarke, "Environment, Process and Policy: 
a Reconsideration," American Political Science Review, LXIII 
(December, 1969), 1172-11 8 2.
S b i d .. p. 1 1 8 2.
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of systems models in the analysis of the policy process. The 
findings of Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert are used 
extensively as a systems model is applied to law enforcement 
planning as an example of the state-level policy process.
In view of the fact that police power in the United 
States is reserved to the States, it can be argued that 
State policy on law enforcement has been in existence since 
the birth of the nation. The implication here is that the 
mere formalization of the law enforcement planning process 
for the purpose of obtaining Federal funding assistance does 
not constitute the formation of policy. However, the thrust 
of the legislation which authorizes Federal assistance for 
law enforcement at both the state and local levels is toward 
the improvement of all criminal justice functions— police, 
prosecution, judicial, correctional (penal), probation, and 
parole— with emphasis on state-wide planning and coordination. 
Thus, while the state-wide law enforcement planning process 
does represent formalization of policy, it can be argued that 
an element of policy formation must necessarily take place.
The foregoing suggests that in somewhat parallel 
fashion the national effort to standardize the accounting of 
criminal activity and to quantify the effectiveness of law 
enforcement by the computation of "clearance rates," repre­




An excellent opportunity for comparative analysis of 
the policy process is provided by the American States, each 
having a common institutional framework and function within 
the same federal system. The fact that all States share the 
same national language, symbols and history facilitates com­
parison, as does uniformity in the division of authority 
within each state between executive, legislative and judicial 
branches. As Dye observes, "This background of institutional 
and cultural uniformity in the American states makes it 
easier to isolate causal factors in our analysis of public 
policy outcomes."^
In this analysis of one policy process we seek to de­
termine how state social and economic factors are associated 
with political system differences in the influencing of state­
wide law enforcement planning. The general hypothesis of this 
study is that law enforcement planning at the state level is 
influenced to an important degree by the social, economic and 
political characteristics of each state. Three propositions 
are implicit in this hypothesis.
1 . That although the American States are alike in 
many respects, as noted above, there exists in each State a 
unique combination of social, economic and political char­
acteristics .
1Dye, op. cit., p. 11
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2. This combination of characteristics interacts 
with the state's pattern of criminal activity to produce a 
distinctive criminal justice system and style of law en­
forcement.
3 . State-wide planning for law enforcement, or the 
administration of criminal justice, is influenced by those 
elements described in the first two propositions.
Under the 1968 Safe Streets Act, state-wide law en­
forcement planning is funded chiefly by the Federal govern­
ment for the purpose of improving the administration of 
criminal justice state-by-state throughout the United States 
in order to better control criminal activity. Three types 
of criminal activity are specifically mentioned by the Con­
gress as being in need of control emphasis: street crime,
organized crime, and civil disorders and riots.^
The approach used in this investigation consists of 
two main phases: 1) an aggregate analysis of the interrela­
tionships between the various social, economic and political 
characteristics of each state; and 2 ) the application of the 
aggregate analysis findings in which the hypotheses developed 
are tested for validity and usefulness. Throughout this 
analysis a system model comparable to that used by Dye in his 
study of public policy outcomes in the American States is
pemployed.
^U.S., Congress. House, The Ommbus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968. Pub. L. 90-3^1, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 
1 9 6 8, H.R. 5 0 3 7, Title I.
2Dye, OP. cit.. Chapter I.
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Our conceptualization is taken from the work of David 
Easton.”* The essential variables of political life, accord­
ing to Easton, include a capability to allocate values for a 
society, and to induce most members to accept these alloca­
tions as binding, at least most of the time. Applying a 
systems concept, political life can be viewed as that com­
plex set of processes through which demands and support from 
the environment, called "inputs," are converted into authori­
tative policies, decisions and implementing actions which are 
called "outputs."
2Political life forms an open system, one that has 
been analytically separated from other social systems and is 
therefore exposed to influences from the other systems in 
which it is imbedded. That political systems do survive is 
an indication that they have made adaptive responses to buf- 
fetings from their environment. In this adaptive process 
political systems accumulate large repertories of mechanisms 
through which they seek to cope with their environments.
In Easton's conceptualization, the effects of en­
vironmental influences are transmitted into the political 
system in the form of two major input indicators: demands
and support. These are the key indicators of the way that
The description of the political system which fol­
lows is based on Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political 
Life, op. cit., pp. 17-29*
2As defined by Easton, a system is any set of vari­
ables regardless of the degree of interrelationship among 
them. This definition avoids the argument of whether a po­
litical system is or is not really a system.
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environmental Influences and conditions modify and shape the 
operations of the political system. Comparable to these in­
puts the consequences flowing from the behavior of the mem­
bers of the system, as evidenced by their decisions and im­
plementing actions, are called outputs. The significance of 
outputs is not only that they influence events in the broader 
society of which the political system is a part, but that in 
so doing they help to determine each succeeding round of 
inputs that finds its way into the political system. This is 
accomplished through a feedback loop, which includes the 
production of outputs by the authorities, a response on the 
part of the members of the society with respect to these out­
puts, the communication of information about this response to 
the authorities, and possible succeeding actions on the part 
of the authorities.
In short, Easton's interpretation of the political 
process is that of a continuous and interlinked flow of be­
havior which takes in demands and support as they are shaped 
in the environment and produces something out of them called 
"outputs" which return to haunt the system.
In his discussion of model-building for policy re­
search, Dye refers to the responses of the political system 
as policy outcomes viewing them as the "value commitments of 
the political system, and as such they are the chief output 
of that s y s t e m . E a s t o n  emphasizes that we must "distinguish
^Dye, op. cit., p.
12
the outputs from their consequences or what we may call, 
their outcomes," because, "Failure to do this would lead us 
to consider the infinite chain of effects that might flow 
from an authoritative allocation as part and parcel of that 
allocation."^ Easton’s terminology has been adopted in this 
regard since the effects of the policy process with which we 
are concerned in this analysis are those authoritative de­
cisions concerning the allocation of resources for criminal 
justice functions; this inquiry does not seek to determine 
the effect of the outputs.
The systems model which we have developed for this 
investigation is illustrated in Figure 1. It provides for 
the grouping of state indicators in three main divisions: en­
vironmental inputs, the political system, and policy outcomes. 
Within our model particular attention is focused on the crime 
environment of each state and on governmental efforts to 
control certain types of criminal activity. These efforts 
are measured primarily by comparison of interstate differ­
ences in expenditures of public funds for criminal justice 
functions. The policy outcomes of primary interest are those 
related to law enforcement planning under the Safe Streets
PAct. Specifically we are interested here in the interstate 
variances in the allocation of Federal block grant funds for
ctt., p « 3 51 • 
2
^Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, op.
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Figure 1.— Systems Model
14-
fiscal year 1 9 7 0, the latest year for which allocation data 
is available.
Phase One— Aggregate Analysis 
In Chapters III, IV and V, which follow, each of 
variables to be considered is described in terms of its re­
lationship to other variables within the same division or 
subdivision. In several instances groups of variables are 
subjected to factor analysis in order to reduce the number 
dealt with and to thereby achieve a degree of parsimony. As 
the relationships among certain variables become relatively 
clear, hypotheses are developed— to be tested later.
Two types of indicators are dealt with during the ag­
gregate analysis. The first type are indicators of single 
state characteristics, such as "population increase" or "con­
tributions claimed." The second type are multi-characteristic 
factors which either have been derived by other investigators 
or by the author using factor analysis techniques. In the 
case of the single-characteristic indicators the most recent 
complete data available from years 1967 through 1969 ere used. 
The multi-characteristic factors are generally reflective of 
conditions existing in the late 1 9 5 0's.
Although this study does not seek to explain differ­
ences in patterns or intensity of criminal activity, such 
differences are important to our systems approach, for they 
comprise an important aspect of the "environment" dealt with 
by state law enforcement planning agencies. For this reason.
15
Indicators of reported criminal activity are used to measure 
the ’’crime environment" of each state. It is recognized that 
there occurs an unknown volume of criminal activity not ac­
counted for by the data available. This "unknown" does not 
detract from the analysis, however, because this inquiry is 
concerned with the influence of reported crime rates on the 
allocation of resources to the several major components of 
the criminal justice system.
Limitations
It is appropriate here to set forth the limitations 
of the research upon which this report is based, and to in­
dicate those factors not analyzed which are important to a 
full understanding of interstate variances in the administra­
tion of criminal justice. Sharkansky and Hofferbert set the 
scene for this discussion by observing that:
The effort to explain why politics and policies differ 
from one state to the next may be helped considerably by 
examining the dimensions laying beneath readily meas­
ured variables. But no amount of archival search and 
factor analysis will account for the contributions made 
to the institutions of policies of individual states by 
dynamic personalities or the force of strong traditions. 
The study of elite and organizational behavior, plus 
exploration of the values that prevail in the cultural 
environments of the individual states may be essential 
for a thorough understanding of inter-state differences 
in politics and public policy.1
One method by which an investigation of this nature 
can arrive at a foregone conclusion is through a strategy of 
omission, either in the selection of data used, or in
1Sharkansky and Hofferbert, 1969, op. cit.. p. 879.
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interpretation of the results of the analysis. In this study 
no strategy of omission has been consciously employed. This 
is not to imply that all possible factors have been con­
sidered, but only that failure to include important indica­
tors which might increase the explanatory power of our the­
oretical models, or the accuracy of the operational models, 
can be attributed to limitations in two areas: the resources
and skill of this researcher, and the availability, reli­
ability and currency of the data used.
Concerning the first of these limitation areas, with 
added resources and skills it would have been feasible to 
analyze in greater detail the fiscal 1970 allocation decisions 
of the forty-eight^ state law enforcement planning agencies 
(SPA’s) and to have provided a different, and perhaps more 
suitable, breakdown of these allocations. In short, limita­
tions in this area have affected primarily the flexibility 
with which the outputs of the law enforcement planning proc­
ess are analyzed.
Other data limitations which have constrained the 
research design adopted for this study can be attributed to 
factors other than the researcher’s limitations. The ac­
curacy of the criminal justice expenditure data, for example, 
is dependent on the response of state and local government to 
surveys conducted by the Bureau of the Census. The first of
Hawaii and Alaska are not included in this study be­
cause data is not available for these two states with regard 
to several of the socio-economic and political variables 
dealt with.
17
these surveys to include estimates of local government ex­
penditures for criminal justice functions was not available 
to the public until published in December, 1970. Since 
there exist no comparable reports for periods prior to fiscal 
1 9 6 8 -1 9 6 9 (contained in the 1970 report), it is unfeasible to 
derive any trends in criminal justice expenditures that in­
clude the most important category— local government expendi­
tures.
Historical data concerning allocations of block grant 
funds prior to fiscal year 1970 is limited to that for fiscal 
year 1969 in which only $29 million was allocated by the 
SPA’s of all fifty states. Since the total allocated in 
fiscal 1970 was about $l85 million, or 6.4 times that of the 
previous year, no attempt was made to derive any trends over 
the brief period covered (1969 and 1970). With regard to the 
allocations of the fiscal 1970 funds, it is assumed that the 
actual spending of Federal law enforcement assistance funds 
has been in accordance with the 1970 plans. This assumption 
is adequate since the thrust of this investigation is to in­
vestigate factors influencing allocation decisions by SPA’s, 
and not the outcome or effects of such decisions.
The fact that the available crime statistics pertain 
only to the seven serious crimes, so designated by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as those most likely to be re­
ported to the police, constitutes another limitation of this 
study. Since these seven offenses are most often committed
18
by the poor, the black, and the young, the effect of concen­
trating on these offenses is to slant this investigation away 
from consideration of "middle class" or "white collar" crime 
which, admittedly, are classes of crime far less likely to be 
reported to police authorities.
Finally in this brief summary of data limitations, it 
is important to note that the data upon which several of the 
primary indicators (those derived by Sharkansky and Hoffer­
bert) are based is that of about i960. The changes experi­
enced by the American states during the past ten years neces­
sarily renders these indicators less accurate than is de­
sirable.
Phase Two— Application 
The second phase of this study, presented in Chapter 
VII, consists of the application of the aggregate analysis 
findings. Retaining the framework of the systems model, a 
total of six operational models are constructed using the 
findings of the aggregate analysis and, where appropriate, 
incorporating some indicators of state characteristics which 
were not identified as being predominant during the aggregate 
analysis phase.
The six models are then tested through application to 
data representative of the forty-eight states. In this proc­
ess, those sets of state characteristics most often associ­
ated with interstate variances in governmental response to
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the problem of crime control and the maintenance of order are 
identified.
In addition to providing a vehicle for the evaluation 
of our aggregate analysis, the application phase serves to 
identify particular states wherein the governmental response 
or output in the administration of criminal justice cannot be 
explained satisfactorily by the models employed. In these 
instances the need for a more detailed analysis which looks 
at factors not dealt with in this study becomes evident.
Hopefully, the application phase will refine and 
sharpen our understanding of how changes in one area of so­
ciety, including changes in patterns of criminal activity and 
in style of law enforcement, tend to influence changes in 
other areas of the society.
Chapter VIII, which concludes this report, summarizes 
the chief findings of the inquiry and discusses some of the 
unanswered questions related to law enforcement planning in 
the American States.
We turn now to the initial descriptive chapter of this 
report dealing with the origins, purposes and issues related 
to the 1968 Safe Streets Act.
CHAPTER II
THE SAFE STREETS ACT: ORIGINS,
PURPOSES, ISSUES
Title I of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act is known as the Safe Streets Act. It is 
precedent-setting in two ways: 1) it provides for the first
Federally-funded national effort to improve all aspects of 
criminal justice administration at both the state and local 
governmental levels; and 2) it is the first major program of 
Federal assistance to be enacted with a "block grant" fund­
ing provision wherein decisions on the allocation of Federal 
funds are made primarily at the State level.
This chapter introduces the concept of Federal law 
enforcement assistance and examines the main issues raised 
thereby. The purpose is to provide a background upon which 
the reader can evaluate the analysis of social, economic and 
political-system interrelationships presented in the chapters 
which follow.
Purposes of the Safe Streets Act
Upon signing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 on June 19, President Johnson explained
20
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that he was approving the legislation in spite of serious
reservations about certain provisions,^ because "it responds
to one of the most urgent problems in America today— the
problem of fighting crime in the local neighborhood and on
2the city street." Less than a month earlier, on May 23rd, 
after the Senate voting on the Omnibus Crime Control Act was 
concluded. Senator Mike Mansfield (Dem.) of Montana, rose to 
say,
Mr. President, with a loud and clear voice the Senate 
has said, "Let us reverse the growing crime rate; let 
us give our law-enforcement officers the help and as­
sistance they need." The cry of "crime in the streets" 
is not by any means a false alarm; it exists and it is 
about time the Congress faced the issue squarely. With 
the passage of this measure, the Senate has responded.
I think this entire body may be proud of such an 
achievement.^
The foregoing rhetoric describes the purposes of the 
Safe Streets Act in rather broad terms and reflects the mood 
of the Congress. More specifically, the purposes of the Act 
are set forth in Title I of public law 90-351 as follows:
The President called on the Congress to repeal 
Title III which provides for the use of wiretapping and 
electronic surveillance techniques by law enforcement agen­
cies. For analysis and criticism of this and other Titles 
of the Omnibus Crime Control Act see Richard Harris, The 
Fear of Crime (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), and
Adam C. Breckenridge, Congress Against the Court (Lincoln, 
Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1970).
2From the text of President Johnson's remarks upon 
signing the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 
published in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 28,
1968, pp. 1632-33.
^Congressional Record. 90th Cong., 2nd sess..
May 2 3 , 1968, 11+799-
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1. To encourage States and units of general local 
government to prepare and adopt comprehensive plans 
based upon their evaluation of State and local 
problems of law enforcement.
2. To authorize grants to State and units of local 
government in order to improve and strengthen law 
enforcement; and
3. To encourage research and development directed toward 
improvement of law enforcement and the development
of new methods for the prevention and reduction of 
crime and the detection and apprehension of crim­
inals .
Roots of the Safe Streets Act
The 1963 report of the Attorney General's Committee
on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice
is generally credited as being the source of the 1968 Safe
Streets Act. The Attorney General's Committee was headed by
Francis A. Allen, Dean of the University of Michigan Law
School. The Committee's report demonstrated that the effects
2of poverty on crime were far greater than any had suspected. 
On March 8, 1963? President Kennedy sent to Congress a bill 
incorporating the Allen Committee's recommendations, which
The term "law enforcement" as used in the Safe 
Streets Act, was initially defined as meaning "all activities 
pertaining to crime prevention or reduction and enforcement 
of the criminal law." In 1970 this definition was modified 
to include specific mention of the activities of the criminal 
courts and related agencies, corrections, probation and parole 
authorities, as well as police efforts. Throughout this study 
we employ the term "law enforcement" as defined in the Safe 
Streets Act, and reserve the term "police activities" for the 
more limited meaning, i.e. actions in the criminal-justice 
process which are preliminary to prosecution for violation of 
criminal law.
2This discussion is based on Richard Harris, "Annals 
of Legislation: The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968," in The New Yorker. Nov. 8, 1969, pp. 131-32.
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led to the Criminal Justice Act of and the creation of
the Office of Criminal Justice within the Department of Jus­
tice. This Office was responsible for preparation of the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965?'' a $7 million (annual)
project which was the forerunner of the 1968 Safe Streets
2Act.
Under the 1965 Law Enforcement Assistance Act, the 
Attorney General was authorized to make grants to, or to con­
tract with, public or private non-profit agencies for projects 
intended to improve law enforcement and correctional person­
nel, to increase the ability of state and local agencies to 
protect persons and property from lawlessness, and to instill 
greater public respect for the law. The major objective of 
the 1965 legislation, as described by President Johnson, was 
to "provide an infusion of ideas and support for research, 
for experiments, for new programs," and to give the policeman 
"modern training, organization, and equipment if he is to 
succeed in saving our cities from the malignancy of crime.
The 1965 Act was administered through the Justice 
Department's Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA), a
^Public Law 89-197, 8 9th Congress, H.R. 8027, 
September 22, 1965*
^Although the 1965 Act "broke the ice" with regard to 
Federal law enforcement assistance, the recommendations of 
the National Crime Commission, to be discussed later, led to 
the enactment of the 1968 Safe Streets Act.
^Statement by President Johnson following the signing 
of Public Law 89-197, 8 9th Congress, H.R. 8027, September 22, 
1965.
2k
forerunner of the present Law Enforcement Assistance Admin­
istration (LEAA). Congress appropriated a total of about 
$22 million during the three years from 1965 to 1968, or 
about 52 percent of the total requested by the Attorney Gen­
eral for support of projects under the 1965 Act. As ad­
ministered by OLEA, about 66 percent of the funds went to 
projects involving police departments, 15 percent to cor­
rectional institutions, 11 percent for crime prevention 
studies, and 8 percent to courts and prosecution projects.^ 
Several of the projects funded by OLEA were directly asso­
ciated with research and investigations related to the work 
of the then very active President's Commission on Law En­
forcement and Administration of Justice. Also, some of the 
earliest OLEA projects were funded to support the staff work 
of the President's Commission on Crime in the District of 
Columbia.
The results of the 1965 Act, as summarized in the
2Third Annual Report of the OLEA, were as follows:
- 27 states established new criminal justice planning 
committees or broadened the activities of previously 
existing groups;
- 17 states began police science courses and college 
degree programs;
- 20 states started planning for statewide integrated 
in-service correctional training systems;
- 33 large cities developed or improved police- 
community relations programs;
U.S., Department of Justice, Third Annual Report to 
the President and the Congress on Activities Under the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Justice, 1968), p. 4.
2Ibid.. pp. 6 -2 5 .
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-10 medium-sized city and county police departments set 
up full-time planning and research units.
An indication of the degree of interest in obtaining
Federal assistance was reflected in the 1,200 requests from
state and local law enforcement agencies totaling more than
$85 million as of April, 1968."'
The National Crime Commission 
One of the outgrowths of events which brought the 
theme of "law and order" into the national political arena, 
including Senator Barry Goldwater’s 196^ campaign emphasis, 
was the creation in mid-1965 of the President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (hereinafter 
referred to as the "National Crime Commission"). In estab­
lishing this Commission, President Johnson appointed his then 
Attorney General, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach as chairman and 
James Vorenberg, Professor at Harvard Law School, as Execu­
tive Director.2 The President also listed four tasks to 
which the Commission should address itself:
^Ibid.. p. 5-
p In addition to chairman Katzenbach, the Commission's 
membership included: Genevieve Blatt, Charles D. Breitel,
Kingman Brewster, Garrett H. Byrne, Thomas J. Cahill, Ctis 
Chandler, Leon Jaworski, Thomas C. Lynch, Ross L. Malone, 
James B. Parsons, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William P. Rogers, 
Robert G. Storey, Julia D. Stuart, Robert F. Wagner, Herbert 
Wechsler, Whitney M. Young, Jr., and Luther W. Youngdahl. In 
addition to Vorenberg, key members of the Commission's staff 
included Henry S. Ruth, Jr., deputy director; Gene S. 
Muehleisen, Elmer K. Nelson, Jr., Lloyd E. Ohlin, and Arthur 
Rosett, associate directors; David B. Burnham, Bruce J. 
Terris, Samuel G. Chapman, Howard Ohmart, Vincent O'Leary, 
and Charles H. Rogovin, assistant directors; and Alfred 
Blumstein, director of science and technology.
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- The problem of making our streets, homes and places 
of business safer;
- The special problems of juvenile crime;
- The administration of justice in our overcrowded lower 
courts; and
- The means by which organized crime can be arrested by 
federal and local authorities.^
In the President's view, "No agency of government has ever
in our history undertaken to probe so fully and deeply into
2the problems of crime in our nation."
The National Crime Commission began its work in 
September, 1965 by concentrating on four major areas: police,
courts, corrections, and assessment of the crime problem.^ 
Assisted by a number of full-time staff members and con­
sultants and advisers, a panel of Commission members concen­
trated on each of these areas. Later, special task forces 
or working groups were formed to give greater attention to 
organized crime, juvenile delinquency, narcotics and drug 
abuse, drunkenness, and science and technology.
The full-time staff of the Commission, which in time 
grew to number more than forty persons, consisted mostly of 
lawyers, but also included police officials, correctional 
personnel, prosecutors, sociologists, psychologists, systems
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1965, P- 1396, re­
print of President Johnson's March 8, l9o5 message to the 
Congress on crime.
^Ibid.
^A Report by the President's Commission on Law En­
forcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of 
Crime in a Free Society (Washington, B.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 196?), pp. 311-312; hereinafter cited as 
National Crime Commission, The Challenge of Crime.
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analysts, juvenile delinquency prevention planners, and pro­
fessional writers and editors.^ The Commission's overall 
expenditures during the eighteen-month period has been esti­
mated at approximately $1 A  million.^
The Commission obtained its information on the na­
tion's crime problem in a number of ways. Surveys were con­
ducted on police-community relations, professional criminals, 
unreported crime, and correctional personnel and facilities 
(the latter two being the first nation-wide studies ever 
made in those areas). Over 2,200 police departments were 
asked by questionnaire what field procedures they had found 
especially effective against crime (however only k-l4- depart­
ments responded) The Commission also had the benefit of 
data and suggestions from various governmental agencies at 
the federal, state and local levels, and from officials in 
some foreign countries. In addition, professional organiza­
tions contributed information in several areas related to 
crime.
A number of conferences concerning matters such as 
mentally disordered offenders, riots and their control.
Ibid., p. 311"
2Personal interview June 18 , 1971 with Mr. William 
Caldwell, who served as Administrative Officer (Business) for 
the National Crime Commission.
^National Crime Commission, Task Force Report; The 
Police (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1967), p. ^6.
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correctional standards, plea bargaining, and the Federal 
role in crime control were sponsored by the Commission.
The full Commission met seven times, for two or three 
full days each time. In addition. Commission members par­
ticipated on a continuing basis in preparing materials and 
developing the final report which was issued in February, 
1 9 6 7.”' In its general report. The Challenge of Crime in a 
Free Society, the Commission called for a revolutionary 
change "in the way America looks at crime," in addition to 
"basic changes in the operations of police, schools, prose­
cutors, employment agencies, defenders, social workers, 
prisons, housing authorities, and probation and parole of­
ficers.
Seven major objectives were adopted by the National 
Crime Commission as a means of achieving a "significant re­
duction in crime in America":^
First, society must seek to prevent crime before it 
happens by assuring all Americans a stake in the bene­
fits and responsibilities of American life, by strength­
ening law enforcement, and by reducing criminal op­
portunities .
Second, society’s aim of reducing crime would be 
better served if the system of criminal justice de­
veloped a far broader range of techniques with which to 
deal with individual offenders.
The complete report consists of the Commission's 
general report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 
plus nine task force reports, all published by the U.S. 
Government Printing Office in 1967»
2National Crime Commission, The Challenge of Crime, 
OP. cit.. p. V.
^ I b i d ., p. Vi.
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Third, the system of criminal justice must elim­
inate existing injustices if it is to achieve its ideals 
and win the respect and cooperation of all citizens.
Fourth, the system of criminal justice must attract 
more people and better people— police, prosecutors, 
judges, defense attorneys, probation and parole of­
ficers, and corrections officials with more knowledge, 
expertise, initiative, and integrity.
Fifth, there must be much more operational and basic 
research into the problems of crime and criminal ad­
ministration, by those both within and without the sys­
tem of criminal justice.
Sixth, the police, courts, and correctional agencies 
must be given substantially greater amounts of money if 
they are to improve their ability to control crime.
Seventh, individual citizens, civic and business 
organizations, religious institutions, and all levels 
of government must take responsibility for planning and 
implementing the changes that must be made in the crim­
inal justice system if crime is to be reduced.
Each of these major objectives is supported by a num­
ber of specific recommendations which spell out the actions 
required by agencies, institutions and individuals in order 
to achieve these objectives. The recommendation which is of 
primary interest in this study, and which led to the 1968 
Safe Streets Act, falls under the heading, "What the Federal 
Government Can Do":
The Federal Government can make a dramatic new contri­
bution to the national effort against crime by greatly 
expanding its support of the agencies of justice in 
the States and in the cities.'
The Crime Commission's rationale for Federal support 
of the magnitude visualized includes the following two argu­
ments: 1) crime is a national, as well as a State and local
phenomenon and failure of the criminal justice institutions
in one State may endanger the citizens of others.
Ifbid., p. 283.
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Additionally, the Federal Government already has assumed 
much of the responsibility in such fields as education and 
welfare, employment and job training, housing and mental 
health, which bear directly on crime and its prevention; 2) 
there are important needs that individual jurisdictions can­
not or should not meet alone in terms of economy of effort 
and of feasibility such as research, availability of informa­
tion on criminal matters, and pooling of resources and serv­
ices among local jurisdictions."*
It was clearly the opinion of the National Crime 
Commission and its staff that Federal assistance must be pro­
vided to state and local agencies "if they are to have an op­
portunity to gain on crime, rather than barely stay abreast
2of it, as is now the case."
The Commission was well aware of the precedent- 
setting nature of its recommendations as the following state­
ment indicates:
In proposing a major Federal program against crime, 
the Commission is mindful of the special importance of 
avoiding any invasion of State and local responsibility 
for law enforcement and criminal justice, apd its recom­
mendation is based on its judgment that Federal support 
and collaboration of the sort outlined below are con­
sistent with scrupulous respect for— and indeed streght- 
ening of— that responsibility.^
Supporting this concern for the preservation of local control
of law enforcement, the Commission's Task Force on the Police
Ifbid., pp. 284-285. ^Ibid., p. 284.
3lbid.. p. 285.
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recommended that state commissions on police standards and 
training be established and empowered to establish mandatory 
standards for local police departments. In this manner, the 
state commission could "help to establish adequate personnel 
selections standards, to strengthen training procedures, to 
coordinate recruitment, and to improve the organization and 
operations of local departments,"^ without removing control 
of law enforcement from local agencies.
Evaluating the Crime Commission's Work 
In the opinion of many the work of the National Crime 
Commission is impressive. James Q. Wilson of Harvard Uni-
2versity termed the Commission's Report a "landmark event," 
while the editor of the Congressional Quarterly Service study 
Crime and Justice in America described the Commission's work 
as being "perhaps the most significant development involving 
the growing Federal role in the crime problem.
In spite of accolades, criticism of the Crime Commis­
sion's efforts are by no means lacking. Herbert L. Packer, 
Professor of Law at Stanford University, is critical of what 
he terms the "utter failure" of the Commission to come to
National Crime Commission, Task Force on the Police, 
Task Force Report: The Police (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1 9 6 7), p. 216.
2James Q. Wilson, "What Makes a Better Policeman," 
The Atlantic Magazine, March, 1969, P* 13^*
^Joseph Foote (ed.). Crime and Justice in America 
(2nd ed.; Washington, B.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service,
1968), p. 3 .
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grips with the simple proposition that all uses of the crim­
inal sanction are not equal. In Packer's judgment,
The prospect of spending billions of dollars, as the 
federal government now seems prepared to do, on im­
proving the capacity of the nation's system of criminal 
justice to deal with gamblers, narcotics addicts, 
prostitutes, homosexuals, abortionists, and other pro­
ducers and consumers of illegal goods and services would 
be seen for the absurdity that it is if we were not so 
inured to similar spectacles. Our national talent runs 
much more to "how-to-do-it" than to "what-to-do.
As noted earlier, the Crime Commission's Report calls 
for major and fundamental change. However in the opinion of 
Isidore Silver, the Commission fails to propose the "signifi­
cant reshaping of our institutions" demanded by the call for
2fundamental change. This criticism is in accord with the 
observations of Albert K. Cohen who contends that some of our 
seemingly localized and uncomplicated problems may be in­
capable of solution within the framework of existing insti­
tutions.^
Another important omission of the National Crime Com­
mission, according to Silver, is that it did not raise such 
fundamental questions as the nature of "crime," the nature of
^Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanc­
tion (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968),
p. 3 6 6 .
2Isidore Silver, "Crime and Punishment: Analysis of
Report," Commentary, March, 1968, p. 73* See also Warren 
Lehman, "Crime, the Public, and the Crime Commission: A Crit­
ical Review of The Challenge of Crime in a Free So^cietv, 
Michigan Law Review 6 6 , No. 7 (May, 1968), 1^87-15^0.
^Albert K. Cohen, "Multiple Factor Approaches," in 
Marvin E. Wolfgang, Leonard Savitz, Norman Johnston, eds..
The Sociology of Crime and Delinquency (New York: Wiley and
Sons, 1 9 6 2), p. 7 9 .
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the "criminal," or the nature of the society that fosters 
them. Instead, says Silver, "the report simply tends to as­
sume that crime is an alien phenomenon, a disease of so­
ciety.
Issues Influencing Passage of 
the Safe Streets Act
The enactment of the 1968 Safe Streets Act was in­
fluenced by four central issues. One of these issues is that 
of "law-and-order," the 1964 revival of which stimulated pres­
sure for greater involvement by the Federal Government in 
crime control.^ This pressure prompted a second issue— the 
controversy over the tradition of local control of law en­
forcement.3 These two issues led to a third— that of the 
block grant funding provision with its promise of increased 
state control of all criminal justice functions. A fourth 
issue stems from the generally unstated assumption, implicit 
in both the national Crime Commission’s Report and in the
^Silver, op. cit., p. 69*
Writing in mid-1969, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, who 
served as chairman of the National Crime Commission, com­
ments: "When President Johnson appointed his Crime Commission
to study and make recommendations to him on the 'challenge of 
crime,' he did so in the consciousness of a growing fear of 
crime and a growing political issue. His hope was that this 
group of well-known citizens with the highest quality of pro­
fessional help could depoliticize the problem. Despite the 
thoroughness of its study, the unanimity of its views, the 
concreteness of its recommendations, it failed in this pur­
pose." (Introduction to Richard Harris, The Fear of Crime, 
op. cit., p. 10.
^This is not to suggest that the tradition of local 
control of law enforcement is limited to the United States.
A number of other Western democracies also observe this tra­
dition, one notable exception being France.
3^
Congressional hearings, that there exist certain "causes'* of 
crime, the identification of which is important to any im­
provement in the control of crime.
The Law-and-Order Issue 
While the roots of the Safe Streets Act can be traced 
to the 1963 report of the Attorney General's Committee on 
Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice, 
it was the 196^ revival^ of the law-and-order issue in na­
tional politics that enriched the political climate and stim­
ulated the outcropping of a major Federal program of financial 
assistance to state and local law enforcement.
The law-and-order issue appears to have played a key 
role in both Presidential and Congressional actions which 
culminated in the June, 1968 enactment of the Omnibus Crime 
Control Act. Examples of the influence of the law-and-order 
issue on the Congress are found in the report of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on the anti-crime legislation. For ex­
ample, Senator Hugh Scott (Rep.) of Pennsylvania, a member of 
the original U.S. Crime Commission headed by Governor 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, maintained:
^See Robert M. Cipes, The Crime War (New York: New
American Library, 1968), p. 13* Cipes contends that the law- 
and-order issue was quiescent at the national political cam­
paign level between 1928 and 1964. The revival in 1964, 
claims Cipes, was due to the Republican need for a campaign 
issue that would arouse the voters without also arousing 
their anxieties about candidate Barry Goldwater, who suc­
ceeded in projecting white anxiety about the Negro into a 
fear of Negro criminality.
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It should be clear to all that this country has failed 
in the first order of business— the maintenance of law 
and order. This failure threatens to rend the very 
fabric of American life as we know it.1
Senator James C. Eastland (Dem.) of Mississippi indicated
that he was strongly in favor of Federal financial assistance
for local law enforcement agencies, and that in his judgment,
"the sharp and steady increase in violent crimes against
persons and property, which results in a constantly spiral-
ing rate of crime, constitutes our most serious domestic
crisis.
The impact of the law-and-order issue was felt 
throughout the election year of 1968. President Johnson 
began the year by sending the Congress a special message on 
crime. Although he stressed that homicide rates in the late 
1960's were lower than in 1930, Vice President Humphrey "cam­
paigned from the assumption that the crime rate is getting 
out of hand. George Wallace almost always warned his 
listeners "they might get hit on the head on the way home by
a thug who would probably be out of jail before they got out
1+of the hospital." A stock punch line of Mr. Nixon’s
U.S., Congress, Senate, Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1967. S. Kept. 1097 to accompany S.917? 
90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, p. 209»
^Ibid., p. 220.
^Fred P. Graham, "A Contemporary History of American 
Crime," in Hugh D. Graham and Ted R. Gurr (eds). Violence in 
America (New York: Bantam Books, 1969)? P* ^86.
^Ibid.
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all-purpose campaign speech was that "Crime is rising nine 
times faster than the population."^
Underlying the law-and-order issue is the suscepti­
bility of the law to politics, especially in the broad sense
in which "politics reflects the prevailing customs and prej-
2udices of the established classes of the society." This 
makes the law-and-order issue highly attractive to the po­
litical candidate who would seek to oust an incumbent op­
ponent by showing that the incumbent is "soft" on crime and 
criminals. In essence, this amounts to the politicizing of 
essentially non-political acts when the "crime" involved is 
not that of illegal political protest.
This politicizing of criminal activity appears to 
have intensified America's racial crisis with the consequent 
spontaneous eruption of violence in skirmishes and riots in 
our Negro ghettoes.^ This, claims William Stringfellow, "has 
questioned the function of the police in American society in 
a most acute form."^ Employing Murray Edelman's useful con­
cept, it is profitable to view the law-and-order issue as a
''ibid.
pWilliam Stringfellow, "Unresolved Issues in the Al­
location of Justice: An Existential View," in James R.
Klonoski and Robert I. Mendelsohn, eds., The Politics of 
Local Justice (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), p. 235*
^U.S. Congress, Senate Report 1097, op. cit., takes 
the position that riots are war regardless of the underlying 




major ’'condensation symbol"— one that "evokes the emotions 
and condensed anxieties, remembrances of past humiliations, 
and promises of future greatness."**
What are the implications for law enforcement plan­
ning under the Safe Streets Act of this revival of the law- 
and-order issue in national politics? At best the revival 
makes more difficult the bringing about of a change in the 
way "America looks at crime," which the Crime Commission 
strongly recommended. At worst, this revival could lead us 
far down the road to totalitarianism. James Q. Wilson deals 
with the first of these implications as follows:
Now that "crime in the streets" has become a major issue, 
it is probably too much to expect that public officials, 
sensitive to this popular concern, will be much inclined 
to encourage police administrators to do better those 
things the police can do (maintaining order) and look 
elsewhere (primarily to the correctional agencies) for 
help in doing those things that the police cannot do 
(reducing the incidence of those crimes committed by 
repeaters)
A more serious implication of this revival of the
law-and-order issue is described by James B. Kelley:
If he is defeated this fall, a mayor who has tried to 
understand the people of the ghetto— who may even feel 
that they deserve a disproportionate amount of his time 
because for so long they received no part of anyone's 
time— will be said to have been defeated because the 
people want law-and-order.
 ̂Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics 
(Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 6.
2James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 296.
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The law and order being thus sought is the kind the 
S.G. troops and the Gestapo brought to Germany."'
In close agreement with Kelley, Richard Harris con­
cludes that the law-and-order debate had created in some
people more fear about the fear of crime than about crime it­
self:
In their view, once the people were sufficiently aroused 
over the threat of being engulfed by criminality and 
public disorders, they might be persuaded to set aside 
their own Constitutional safeguards as the only way to 
preserve society, and thereby utterly destroy it.^
Ramsey Clark, then U.S. Attorney General, observed 
that "the ironic and profound tragedy threatened by the pre­
vailing fear of violent crime" is that "those who suffer the 
least would deprive those who suffer most of the very pro­
grams that would attack the underlying causes of crime. "8
The foregoing illustrations point up the ambiguity
of the term "law-and-order" and the fact that "law" and
"order" are frequently found to be in opposition. As 
Skolnick explains, "law implies rational restraint upon the 
rules and procedures utilized to achieve order" while "order" 
implies the "threat of coercion and summary judgment."^
^James B. Kelley, "Law and Order Equals Status Quo?", 
America, October 1 8, 1969, p. 326.
^Richard Harris, Justice: The Crisis of Law, Order,
and Freedom in America (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co.,
1970), p. 13.
8Ibid., p. 28 (Clark is quoted by Harris).
^Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law En­
forcement in Democratic Society (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 9-
39
However the law is not as free from ambiguity as Skolnick 
would have us believe. In his perceptive analysis of the 
forms and meanings of political language, Murray Edelman 
finds that legal language is "in fact almost completely am­
biguous in meaning." According to Edelman this ambiguity 
serves a number of purposes. It gives lawyers, judges, and 
administrators a political and social function, and it fa­
cilitates the symbolic satisfaction of reference groups with 
conflicting interests.^
Federal Assistance and Local Control 
A second important issue which influenced the enact­
ment of the Safe Streets Act concerns the implications of 
Federal law enforcement assistance for the traditional prin­
cipal of local control of law enforcement. While the law-and- 
order issue provided strong arguments for increased Federal 
involvement in crime control, some critics saw the proposed 
direct funding provisions as the first move toward a national 
police state. In their rationale for block grant funding to 
state governments versus categorical grants to units of local 
government, Senators Dirksen, Hruska, Scott and Thurmond 
argued:
It is the purpose of these amendments to insure that 
federal assistance to state and local law enforcement 
does not bring with it federal domination and control 
nor provide the machinery or potential for the estab­
lishment of a federal police force. Frankly, we fear 
that S. 917 without such (block grant) provisions.
1 Edelman, op. cit.. pp. 130-151*
^0
could well become the vehicle for the imposition of 
federal guidelines, restrictions and eventual domina­
tion.1
The President and his spokesmen stressed repeatedly 
the importance of the local-control principal, and assured 
all concerned that the Federal government was interested 
only in providing assistance, not in taking control.
For purposes of discussion, the principal of local 
control of law enforcement can be conceived of in three ways :
- As a bulwark against the trend toward a police 
state, or
- As a defense against the "modernization" thrust in 
American government, with its emphasis on technical profes­
sionalism, or
- As the preserve of personalized government and its 
corollary, "local justice."
The common element in these conceptions is resistance against 
greater centralization of power in the Federal Government.
A brief review of the structure of law enforcement 
agencies in the United States provides à basis for this dis­
cussion of the several concepts outlined above. As in most 
Western democracies, law enforcement in the United States al­
ways has been under the control of local units of government. 
Among the estimated 40,000 police agencies in the United 
States, there are only 50 law enforcement agencies on the
^U.S. Congress, Senate, Report 1097. op. cit..
p. 227.
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Federal level, and 200 at the state level.”' The remaining 
39,7^0 police agencies are at the local level. According to 
the National Crime Commission's Task Force on the Police,
"The great majority of police forces— 33,000— are distributed
pthroughout boroughs, towns, and villages.”
Several reasons for the extreme decentralization of 
American law enforcement have been suggested. The most 
deeply rooted reasons reflect the basic nature of the federal 
system and the concept of federalism prevalent in American 
political thought and the Constitution. With certain func­
tions allocated to the central government, with state powers 
defined negatively by prohibitions and with the remainder of 
power left to the states as a residual, the criminal justice 
function in the United States has developed primarily within 
this residual context. Federal criminal law is not as highly 
developed as state law; furthermore, there is in concept no 
federal police force. This tendency is evident in Knudten's 
reflection on the "traditional reluctance of the American 
people to give potentially coercive power to a centralized 
police force.”3 As the National Crime Commission's Task
National Crime Commission, Task Force on the Police, 
Task Force Report; The Police, op. cit., p. 7, based on 
A. C. Germann, Frank D. Day, and Robert R. J. Gallanti, 
Introduction to Law Enforcement (Springfield, 111.:
Charles C. Thomas, 1966), p. 32.
^Ibid.. p. 7-
^Richard D. Knudten, ed.. Criminological Controver­
sies (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, l9o8), p. 11^.
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Force on the Police observed, "because local police depart­
ments have traditionally maintained law and order within their 
jurisdictions and because thousands of violations occur daily 
in all parts of States, the responsibility for preventing 
crime has been delegated by States to the local governments 
in which the violations occur."”'
Another view of the reasons for the decentralization 
of American law enforcement is that of Richard Quinney who 
maintains that "In a sense there are as many systems of law 
enforcement as there are communities," for "Each police de­
partment must operate within a community." This leads to
"differences in law enforcement which can be attributed to
2the concrete social setting in which police operate."
As a bulwark against the 
police state
The potential of Federal law enforcement assistance 
to influence a trend toward a national police state, as noted 
above, was well recognized prior to the enactment of the 1968 
Act.
Proponents of the Safe Streets Act repeatedly 
stressed the importance of preserving the local control of 
law enforcement. The President's Crime Commission, for ex­
ample, recognized that the prevention and control of crime is
^National Crime Commission, Task Force on the Police, 
Task Force Report, op. cit., p. 8.
2Richard Quinney, The Social Reality of Crime (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1970), p. 113*
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basically a State and local government responsibility. The 
Commission urged, however, that crime reduction also be con­
sidered a national problem requiring help from the Federal 
Government.^
In his February, 1967 message to the Congress, "Crime 
in America," President Johnson characterized the Federal 
Government's overall role as involving stimulation and sup­
port rather than control and coercion, promising that "The 
Federal Government must not and will not try to dominate the 
system."2 Attorney General Ramsey Clark testified before 
both the Senate and House Subcommittees to the effect that 
"law enforcement is a local responsibility" and that "we 
would have it no other way.
Members of Congress concurred with the Administra­
tion spokesmen on this point. Congresswoman Edna F. Kelly 
(Dem.) of New York stated, for example:
I believe the prevention, regulation, and control of 
crime is and should be a local problem and thus remain 
under the control of local authorities. However, now 
that crime has become a nationwide problem it is up to 
us in Congress to meet the issue head on.^
^National Crime Commission, The Challenge of Crime, 
op. cit.. p. 284.
2U.S. Congress, Senate, Report 1097, op. cit., p. 29.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Controling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement, 
Hearings, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Pro­
cedures, on S.300 and 15 other bills, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 
1967, p. 148.
^U.S., Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Anti-Crime Program. Hearings, before Subcommittee No. 5,
90th Cong. 1st sess., 1967, p. 282.
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Senator Hiram L. Fong (Rep.) of Hawaii stressed that the 
Constitution "confers no general police power on the Federal 
Government." "The denial of such power," said the Senator,
"is soundly predicated on the fear that a too-powerful central 
government will become despotic.
As defense against 
modernization
As seen by Matthew Holden, Jr., the Crime Commission's 
emphasis on making uniform the criteria of public order "may 
appropriately be seen as a part of a broad 'modernization' 
thrust in American government." This, says Holden, is part 
of a historical trend toward "increasing the capabilities of 
government to control inter-personal violence and illegal 
transactions in p r o p e r t y . A s  a result of this moderniza­
tion thrust, with its emphasis on technical professionalism, 
the personnel of law enforcement agencies will have a 
heightened sense of common interest and will be drawn into 
national politics as a lobby by virtue of their professional
L.interest in the subject." Holden's main concern is with an
expected growth in electronic surveillance into non-criminal
matters in a way such that fundamental changes in the opera­
tetions of the polity may be anticipated.
"'individual views of Senator Fong, Senate Report 
1097. on. cit., p. 1 7 9.
2Matthew Holden, Jr., "Politics, Public Order, and 
Pluralism," in Klonosky and Mendelsohn, The Politics of 
Local Justice, op. cit., p. 252.
^Ibid. ^Ibid. ^Ibid.. p. 2 5 3 -
^5
While not as sinister as the implications of wide­
spread electronic surveillance, it appears that efforts to 
improve the coverage and accuracy of crime statistics, under 
the direction of the FBI (or any other agency that might be 
assigned to the task) holds a "spill-over" potential of im­
portant dimensions. As Alvin W. Gouldner points out, "in­
formation-gathering systems . . . always premise the exist­
ence and use of some system of social control."^ The volun­
tary system of reporting criminal activity administered by
the FBI now finds about 8,500 jurisdictions in the fifty
2American states cooperating by submitting data. This system 
has the potential for influencing many law enforcement agen­
cies that is perhaps unrecognized. Because the FBI makes 
public the percent of various crimes that are "cleared" by 
the nation's major police departments, the quality of the re­
ports submitted to the FBI should be of interest and im­
portance to most police administrators.
Thus, the collection of crime statistics has the po­
tential of influencing the operation of our "locally con­
trolled" police departments. Any significant improvement in 
the degree of accuracy of the voluntary Uniform Crime
^Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western 
Sociology (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), p. 50•
2U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of In­
vestigation, Uniform Crime Reports. 1969 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969),p. 52; hereinafter 
cited as FBI, Uniform Crime Reports.
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Reporting System^ seems to portend important implications for 
increased social control.
As the preserver of person­
alized government
In a third view, the principal of local control of 
law enforcement is seen as the preserver of personalized gov­
ernment, and of a style of "local justice" that opposes in­
dividualism and subverts the concepts of contractual rela­
tions and constitutionalism in the opinion of Robert C.
Wood.2 The small towns for which the multitude of American 
police departments provide varying degrees of police protec­
tion are frequently credited with supporting a milieu in 
which the American aims of equality and liberty are best se­
cured. However, according to Wood, the proudly displayed 
equality of the American small town operates in an anti- 
individualistic way. It liberates only when the individual 
is part of the majority, says Wood. "When he dissents, equal­
ity is as likely to display as intolerant a disdain for pri­
vate opinion as does the autocratic s t a t e . T h e  most sig­
nificant political feature of the town protected by the small
Under this national voluntary system each contribut­
ing law enforcement agency is wholly responsible for compil­
ing its own crime reports and is supplied with Uniform Crime 
Reporting Handbook, published by the FBI which outlines in 
detail procedures for scoring and classifying offenses.
^This discussion is taken from Robert C. Wood, 
"Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics," in Klonoski and




police department is, in Wood's terms, "the frequency with 
which legal and procedural requirements are overlooked and 
ignored." The smaller the town, the more justice is a matter 
of personal opinion in the community itself, "rarely formal­
ized, rarely examined, rarely permanently established, de­
pending on the sentiment of the moment."”*
This "personalized government" can be both effective 
and beneficial. The small-town way of life and the sense of 
fraternity it fosters has definite advantages, including the 
promise of security in a group of like persuasion, the fos­
tering of a sense of belongingness, the bolstering of falter­
ing egos, and the banishment of an awful sense of loneliness, 
observes Wood. But it also moves counter to the tradition 
of law and constitutionalism. The notion of contractual re­
lations is replaced by the reality of personal relations, who 
belongs and who does not.
The future of local control
Although the stated purpose of the Federal Govern­
ment's action to provide assistance to state and local law 
enforcement, implementation of the Safe Streets Act suggests 
strong emphasis on coordination among law enforcement agen­
cies within each state under the doctrine of comprehensive 
planning. Emphasis is placed on treating the several phases 
of the criminal justice process as a "system," and on the
^Ibid.. pp. 62-6 3.
48
need for improved "coordination" of all law enforcement func­
tions .
While the traditional principal of local control is 
preserved in writing, the emphasis outlined above plus the 
delegation to state government of the authority to allocate 
Federal funds under the block-grant provision, may, in time, 
shift at least part of the control of law enforcement from 
the local to the state level. As Edelman suggests, "It is 
not uncommon to give the rhetoric to one side and the de­
cision to the other.
Although not wholly attributable to Federal assistance 
under the Safe Streets Act, the recent development of com­
puterized law enforcement information systems at the state 
level is an indication of the type of increased control by 
state government that we foresee. The most recent Uniform 
Crime Reports,̂  published in August, 1970, for example, an­
nounces a second step in the development of a national system 
of police statistics: the FBI ceased the collection of data
directly from municipalities and counties in New Jersey and 
California. The Uniform Crime Reports for these two states 
are now obtained from the New Jersey State Police and the 
California Department of Justice, respectively. As the state­
wide programs for the collection of crime statistics develop 
in other states, they too will be channeling crime reports
1Edelman, op. cit., p. 39*
2FBI, Uniform Crime, Reports, 1969, op. cit., p. 50.
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to the FBI, provided that their programs conform to the na­
tional Uniform Crime Reports standards.^
Federal Assistance in the 
Form of Block Grants
A third issue of importance to the passage of the
Safe Streets Act concerns the method of allocating Federal
funds appropriated for law enforcement assistance.
Conceptually, the provision of Federal funds to state
and local governments can be viewed as one device by which
the national government seeks to influence the balance of
2program levels in states and cities. That is, through 
grants-in-aid the nature of those trade-offs that a sub­
national government sees as available to it in program de­
velopment are altered. Thus, with appropriate design, the 
apparent budget constraints are adjusted in a manner that 
leads the state or city to "develop programs of national con­
cern while at the same time pursuing its own best interests.
Once the basic decision to render federal financial 
assistance to state and/or local governments for any purpose 
has been made, then questions arise concerning the method of 
disbursement and the limitations of purpose for which the
1%bid. Ten conditions for state participation are 
outlined here.
2Based on Selma J. Mushkin and John F . Cotton, Func­
tional Federalism; Grants-in-Aid and PPB Systems (Washington, 




federal ftinds may be used. In 19^9 the first Hoover Com­
mission urged that "a system of grants be established upon 
broad categories— such as highways, education, public as­
sistance, and public health— as contrasted with the present 
system of extensive fragmentation.""* In the two decades
which followed, this recommendation was virtually ignored as
2the number of categorical programs continued to increase.
Indications of Congressional disenchantment with the 
categorical grant approach became evident with the 1966 
passage of the Partnership for Health Act^ in which a dozen 
specific categorical grants were combined into a single grant 
for comprehensive public health service.
As submitted to the Congress by President Johnson in 
early 1967, the Safe Streets Act continued the pattern of 
direct, categorical grants, with state governments treated on 
the same basis as their more populus political subdivisions. 
The Administration's rationale for bypassing the states in 
dealing with large cities was founded on the view that most
Commission on the Organization of the Executive 
Branch of the Government, Overseas Administration, Federal- 
State Relations, Federal Research, Report to Congress (Wash­
ington, B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19^9),
pp. 31-32.
pSee U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations, Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System,
2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1967), ,1:165.
3Public Law 89-7^9. In addition the Social Security 
Act amendments of 1967 (P.L. 90-248) consolidated a number 
of sections of the Social Security Act dealing with child 
health, thereby permitting greater state control over the 
selection of projects to be funded.
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states lacked experience in all phases of law enforcement, 
especially in providing police protection in urban areas, and 
had spent considerably less than their local jurisdictions 
for this purpose.
The original version of the Safe Streets Act pro­
vided that only those localities having an individual or com­
bined population of 5 0 ,0 0 0 or more would be eligible for 
Federal grants. This would serve to limit the number of 
direct federal-local contacts, and would encourage inter­
local cooperation and coordination in applications for law 
enforcement assistance funds. The role of the state, as 
described by Attorney General Ramsey Clark, would be con­
cerned primarily with planning for improvement of corrections 
and courts, and should not involve local law enforcement—  
other than in setting state-wide standards, and in providing 
training opportunities for local police in small jurisdic­
tions . ̂
In spite of the Administration’s efforts to retain 
the categorical and direct grant methods, the House of Rep­
resentatives on August 8 , 1 9 6 7, approved, by a vote of 256 to 
a "block grant" amendment to the Safe Streets Act of­
fered by Representative William T. Cahill (Rep.) of New 
Jersey. This amendment provided that seventy-five percent
%.S. Congress. House of Representatives, Committee 
on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 5, Anti-Crime Program 
Hearings, p. 36.
2Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st sess.,
August 8, 1967, 21859-6 0.
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of the law enforcement assistance action funds be awarded to 
state governments, with a mandatory "pass through” of at 
least fifty percent to units of local government. The re­
maining twenty-five percent would constitute a discretionary 
fund for use by the Attorney General in law enforcement as­
sistance. On May 23, 1968 the Senate, by a vote of 48 to 
29^ accepted a similar amendment offered by Senator 
Everett M. Dirksen (Rep.) of Illinois. The major change of 
the Dirksen amendment increased the block grant portion from 
7 5 percent to 85 percent and the "pass through" percentage 
from 50 percent to 75 percent. Two weeks later, without re­
sorting to a conference committee, the House adopted a reso-
2lution agreeing to the Senate's amendment.
Arguments employed by advocates of the block grant 
funding method have been summarized by the Advisory Commis­
sion on Intergovernmental Relations as follows:
They claimed that a Federal-State-local partnership in 
the program was the most effective strategy for fighting 
crime in the streets since courts and correctional in­
stitutions, as well as police departments, required up­
grading. This was also the most efficient way to ad­
minister Federal aid, they asserted, because States 
were more aware of urgent local problems than the Federal 
Government and they could better apply funds to meet 
these needs, thereby avoiding waste, duplication, and 
nationwide competition for Federal dollars. Block grants 
were also considered to be an appropriate means of re­
inforcing traditional federal principles and of braking
^Congressional Record. 90th Cong., 2nd sess.. May 23, 
1968, 14711.
Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., June 6 , 
1 9 6 8, 16271-3 0 0.
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the escalation of ’’creeping federalism" to "galloping 
federalism.
The strong majority by which the block grant amend­
ments to the Safe Streets Act were approved in both the House 
and the Senate suggests that the Congress was quite willing 
to delegate control of federal law enforcement assistance 
funds to the states, and to keep the LEAA staff relatively 
small. For example, Congressman John J. Rooney (Dem.) of 
New York, chairman of the appropriations subcommittee re­
viewing LEAA’s proposed budget took the position that the
2agency could function with "six persons and a checkwriter." 
However, while the Congress may limit the federal role, it 
also holds federal officials accountable for expenditures 
at the state level.
In his review of block grant funding under the 1968 
Safe Streets Act, Douglas Harman stresses the importance of 
the cross pressure generated by state and local public in­
terest groups.3
The representatives of the cities have a vested interest 
in proving that the bloc grant approach fails to achieve
U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Re­
lations, Making the Safe Streets Act Work (Washington, D.C.: 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, June, 
1970), p. 15> based on Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd 
sess.. May 23, 1968, 1^751-71*
2U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, 
Hearings on Departments of State, Justice and Commerce, The 
Judiciary and Related Agencies (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 1040.
^Douglas Harman, "The Bloc Grant; Readings from a 
First Experiment," Public Administration Review, Vol. XXX, 
No. 2 (March/April, 1970), 1^1-153*
5^
meaningful results and does not direct funds to the 
cities. The representatives of the states wish to 
demonstrate that the bloc grant has been a successful 
experiment. ”*
Accordingly, the National Governors' Conference has devoted 
a great deal of attention to the administration of law en­
forcement assistance, while the National League of Cities 
and other organizations representing the interests of the
nation's largest cities have been critical of the way that
2the block grant funds have been distributed.
Harman points out that the federal government's role 
in law enforcement assistance remains strong because of the 
pressures of Congress and urban organizations, even though 
the block grant concept was intended to reduce federal con­
trol and transfer responsibilities to state governments.^ 
Harman also observes that intergovernmental competition has 
resulted from the block grant method, and that controversy 
surrounding this program has been "particularly acute because 
the greatest crime problems are found in central cities, and
the block grant is not an administrative device capable of
L lfunneling large amounts of money directly into cities."
Harman's conclusion is that.
If Congress had intended to develop a system of aiding 
the large cities with serious crime problems, a direct, 
categorical grant system would have been appropriate.
^Ibid.. p. 1̂ 3 .
See Harman, op. cit., pp. for further dis­
cussion of the state-versus-city controversy.
^Ibid., p. 1^6. ^Ibid., p. 152.
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In this instance, Congress has another principal ob­
jective: the transfer of grant-in-aid powers to state
governments and the promotion of interjurisdictional 
law enforcement planning. . . .
In the final analysis, the ability of state gov­
ernments to apportion funds wisely and to respond to 
urban needs will determine the success or failure of 
the bloc grant. 1
That the block grant method has been at least par­
tially successful can be argued on the basis of President 
Nixon's recent message to the Congress urging the sharing of 
revenues for purposes of fighting crime. On March 2, 1971 
the President proposed the first of his six Special Revenue 
Sharing programs which would require "no matching funds, no 
maintenance of effort, no prior project approval and, within 
the six broad areas, recipients would have the authority to 
spend these funds on programs which are of the highest pri-
pority to them." The program proposed on March 2, 1971, is 
designed to assist states and cities in meeting their prob­
lems in the area of law enforcement. The President supported 
his program in this area with the following statement:
This program is based on the assumption that those 
who bear responsibility at the State and local level are 
best qualified to identify their enforcement problems, 
and to set the priorities and develop the means to solve 
these problems. It is designed particularly to encourage 
and provide for experimentation and innovation in the 
search for more effective solutions to the crime problem. 
With less assistance each State has developed, in part­
nership with local governments, a comprehensive
''ibid.
2Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, March 5, 1971,
p. 5^0.
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statewide approach to improving law enforcement and re­
ducing crime. . . .
I think it is clear that LEAA has assumed a vital 
and effective role in this area of Federal, State and 
local concern. But, I believe it can must be made more 
effective. 1
The Causes of Crime
The fourth issue to be considered here concerns the 
implicit assumption dominating the work of the Crime Com­
mission and the action of the Congress on the Safe Streets 
Act; that it is possible to identify certain "causes" of 
crime, and that this identification is important to the con­
trol of crime.
Some observers question this assumption. Morris and 
Hawkins, for example, argue that there are "no more causes of
pcrime than there are causes of human behavior." In their 
opinion, any search for crime causation is essentially il­
lusory, "not unlike the l8 th century chemists' search for the 
elusive hypothetical sybstance, phlogiston . . . the principle 
of fire and the cause of combustibility in all inflammable 
bodies."3
This view is in line with that of the nineteenth cen­
tury French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, who argued that 
crime is both normal and necessary to society. "Crime is
h b i d .
2Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins, The Honest Poli­
tician's Guide to Crime Control (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970), p. *+7*
3%bid., p. ^5-
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normal," said Durkheim, "provided that it attains and does 
not exceed, for each social type, a certain level, which it 
is perhaps not impossible to fix in conformity with the pre­
ceding r u l e s . D u r k h e i m  continues:
To make progress, individual originality must be 
able to express itself. In order that the originality 
of the idealist whose dreams transcend his century may 
find expression, it is necessary that the originality 
of the criminal, who is below the level of his time, 
shall also be possible. One does not occur without the 
other.
. . . Crime implies not only that the way remains 
open to necessary changes but that in certain cases it 
directly prepares these changes. Where crime exists, 
collective sentiments are sufficiently flexible to take 
on a new form, and crime sometimes helps to determine 
the form they will take.
. . . Crime, for its part, must no longer be con­
ceived as an evil that cannot be too much suppressed. 
There is no occasion for self-congratulation when the 
crime rate drops noticeably below the average level, 
for we may be certain that this apparent progress is 
associated with some social disorder.^
Restating Durkheim, Isidore Silver maintains that,
Americans will have to accept the inevitability of a 
certain amount of crime despite even a maximal effort 
to suppress it. Crime is endemic to a rapidly changing 
Society, and America has always been precisely that.3
Other concepts of crime causation are too numerous
kfor detailed consideration, however, there are three
^Emile Durkheim, pie Rules of Sociological Method 
(1 8 9 5 ) 5 excerpt from pp. 65-73 reprinted in Marvin E. Wolf- 
gang, Leonard Savitz, and Norman Johnston (eds). The Sociol­
ogy of Crime and Delinquency (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1962), p. 10.
^Ibid.
^Isidore Silver, in "Afterword" to Crime Commission's 
general report. Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (New 
York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1969), p. 7^7•
kSee Martin R. Haskell and Lewis Yablonsky, Crime
58
perspectives on the cause of crime which merit our attention 
at this time; 1 ) the "cause of crime" is the law itself;
2 ) defective human nature causes most crime; and 3 ) crime is 
the result of societal defects.
The first of these perspectives was well stated by
Robert Maclver about thirty years ago when he argued that
"it is vain to seek the causes of crime as such."
Crime is a legal category. The only thing that is 
alike in all crimes is that they are alike violations 
of law. In that sense, the only cause of crime as
such is the law itself. 1
Recently, Richard Quinney has extended and updated 
Maclver's argument by contending that crime is a political 
construct. Certain activities are defined as criminal, says 
Quinney, by those persons in positions of power as a means 
of protecting their interests. This view, that criminal law 
stems from the conflict of interests of different groups,^ 
is regarded by Sutherland and Cressey as correctly describing 
a part of the process of law-making, but a failure in ac­
curacy regarding other aspects of the law.^
and Delinquency (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970) for an excel­
lent bibliography of writings on crime causation.
^Robert Maclver, Social Causation (Boston: Ginn and
Co., 19^3), p. 8 8 .
2See Quinney, The Social Reality of Crime, op. cit., 
p. 303 ff.
^Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, Prin­
ciples of Criminology. 7th ed. (Philadelphia and New York:
J. B. Lippincott, Co., 1966), p. 11.
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A second perspective of interest to our brief look 
at concepts of crime causation is that "defective human na­
ture" is the cause of crime. This concept groups those views 
which attribute high crime rates to "criminality" or the in­
born traits of certain "crime-prone" or "delinquent" persons. 
At times this view is extended to suggest that a significant 
percentage of Negroes possess a criminal nature. In gen­
eral, this concept absolves society of any important responsi­
bility for crime causation, hence it tends to be popular with 
those whose main concern is to preserve the status quo.
In large measure these concepts have been rejected
2by contemporary social scientists: however, the notion per­
sists among many Americans and their representatives in 
Congress that a chief cause of crime is the "criminality" in 
certain persons.
A third concept of crime causation, and one that has 
received the greatest public attention in recent years.
See Judith A. Wilks, "Ecological Correlates of Crime 
and Delinquency," in National Crime Commission, Task Force on 
Assessment, Report: Crime and its Impact (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 196?/, P* 1^9 for summary of 
findings on the relationships between race and crime.
pCesare Lombroso, leader of the Italian positivist 
school, contended that criminal tendencies were hereditary, 
and that the "born criminal" is an atavist— a throwback to an 
earlier, more primitive species of man. In 1901 Dr. Charles 
Goring, an English prison official, tested Lombroso's theory 
by comparing 3,000 criminals with 1,000 Cambridge University 
students, and found no significant differences in physical 
types. In the 1950's the Gluecks revived interest in William 
Sheldon's theories that certain physical types of children 
are more crime-prone than others. (Based on Haskell and 
Yablonsky, op. cit., pp. 3^5-3^8.)
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including that of the National Crime Commission, gives credit 
to the defects of society. This concept finds expression in 
a number of ways: historical development, heterogeneity and
mobility of population, dehumanization of mass culture, the 
impact of the mass media, technological change, cultural lag, 
and efforts to correct societal defects.
A broad historical element which undergirds the pro­
pensity for violent crime is that described by Thomas Rose, 
who maintains that a major feature of American history is 
that Americans force others to be as they want them to be. 
Thus, a governing minority has always imposed its will on 
the majority by force and violence, saying that "what is 
good for us is good for you.
In an extensive survey of factors influencing crime
and delinquency prepared for the National Crime Commission's
Assessment Task Force, Judith Wilks reports on a number of
earlier studies. In her judgment,
. . . the frequent finding that offenses and offenders 
tend to be concentrated in areas characterized by low 
income, physical deterioration, mixed land usage, non- 
traditional family patterns . . . and racial-ethnic 
concentrations . . . is a gross oversimplification of 
the interrelationship of area attributes and crime and 
delinquency rates.2
After an exhaustive analysis of how processes such as urban­
ization, technological change and industrialization are
^Thomas Rose, Violence^in America: A Historical and
Contemporary Reader (New York: Random House, 1969), P* xx.
2Judith A. Wilks, " 
p. 1̂ -9 (emphasis supplied).
p Ecological Correlates," op. cit..
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related to crime rate changes over time, Wilks concludes that 
"change, particularly technological change, is associated 
with high rates of c r i m e . W i l k s  also concludes that in 
order to predict and explain an area’s crime rate it is neces­
sary to he aware of the "existing social structure, ongoing 
social processes, the population composition of the area, and 
the area's position within the larger urban and societal
pcomplex."
Another societal defect that frequently is credited 
with causing crime is the heterogeneity of most metropolitan 
areas, which today is largely ascribed to the increased mo­
bility (both geographic and social) afforded minority groups 
in our "affluent society." Both mobility and the hetero­
geneity it fosters can be viewed as "defects" of the society 
only if we accept, contrary to Durkheim, et al., the propo­
sition that factors associated with criminal activity are de­
fects which require correction. For many individuals, of 
course, mobility is a positive value, not something to be 
denied them in the interest of low crime rates. The vision 
a crime-free society presents to us is that of an extremely 
closed, brittle and non-mobile social structure.
Not all observers agree that heterogeneous communi­
ties experience higher crime rates than do homogeneous com­
munities. Nathan Goldman, for example, contends that hetero­
geneity leads not to higher actual crime rates, but to the
Ibid.. p. 156. Sfilks, on. cit., p. 1^9*
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reporting of higher percentages of those crimes that occur. 
In the homogeneous community, says Goldman, a wide scope of
1law-violating behavior is handled informally by the police.
These brief comments on mobility would be incomplete
without recognition of the vast and continuing migration of
millions of Negro citizens from Southern rural areas to the
great metropolitan centers. One disruptive by-product of
this historic migration has been the increasing clamor for
recognition of constitutional "civil" rights, accompanied by
both violent and non-violent demonstrations on behalf of
minorities. In the opinion of some observers, an important
role change which the Supreme Court adopted more than thirty
years ago can be given credit for much of the turmoil in
American society today. This role change is well described
by Pritchett and Weston:
Since 1937 the Court has replaced its property 
agenda with central constitutional preoccupation with 
issues of status— problems of minority rights; of 
liberty involving freedom of expression and associa­
tion; and of justice or due process.^
These authors hold that this change in the Court's role has 
contributed to rising expectations, "with the resultant in­
crease in frustration and violence as more and more
‘Quoted in Quinney, op. cit., p. 1 1 6 .
2C. Herman Pritchett and Alan F. Weston, The Third 
Branch of Government (New York: Earcourt. Brace & World,
19é3), p. 3.
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Americans begin to insist on their constitutional rights, as 
interpreted by the Court.
Three elements— self-respect, poverty, and aliena­
tion combine with the "American Gospel of Success," to form 
yet another concept of crime causation. In order to think 
well of themselves, middle-class Americans demand a high 
standard of living. This demand is exploited through the 
mass media to the degree that "it is impossible for the poor
to retain any self-respect unless they become alienated from
2the society and reject its reward system." The "Gospel of 
Success"^ tells every man that he is a failure unless he is 
a success in terms of climbing the American ladder toward 
ever-increasing material gain. As Gorer points out, "every­
thing that an American has, or is responsible for, becomes 
important as an index of his status and position, because of 
the relative uniform structure of American society, and be­
cause success in America is defined only in relative, and not 
absolute, t e r m s . A t  the root of this great emphasis on 
success lies the statement, "We hold these truths to be
Ifbid.
pEdgar Z. Friedenberg, "Hooked on Law Enforcement," 
in The Nation. Oct. 16, 196?, p. 36^.
^See Moses Rischin, The American Gospel of Success; 
Individualism and Beyond (Chicago; Quandrangle Books, 19^5)•
^Geoffred Gorer, The American People: A Study in
National Character (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 196^j
rev. ed.), p. 1 8 7.
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self-evident, that all men are created e q u a l , f o r  this 
doctrine of equality for all men implies the obligation to 
be equally successful.
This brief review of several concepts of crime cau­
sation concludes with a summary statement from the National 
Crime Commission's general report:
Society insists that individuals are responsible for 
their actions, and the criminal process operates on 
that assumption. However, society has not devised ways 
for ensuring that all its members have the ability to 
assume responsibility. It has let too many of them 
grow up untaught, unmotivated, unwanted. The criminal 
justice system has a great potential for dealing with 
individual instances of crime, but it was not designed 
to eliminate the conditions in which most crime breeds.
It needs help. Warring on poverty, inadequate housing 
and unemployment, is warring on crime. A civil rights 
law is a law against crime. Money for schools is money 
against crime. Medical, psychiatric, and family- 
counseling services are services against crime. More 
broadly and most importantly every effort to improve 
life in America's "inner cities" is an effort against 
crime. A community's most enduring protection against 
crime is to right the wrongs and cure the illnesses that 
tempt men to harm their neighbors.2
Legislating the Safe Streets Act 
The House and Senate together took sixteen months in 
which to process the anti-crime legislation stemming from the 
work of the National Crime Commission, and from Congressional 
reaction to recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of 
procedural rights in the criminal process.3 What emerged in
^The Declaration of Independence. 1776.
2National Crime Commission, The Challenge of Crime. 
op. cit., p. 6.
^For informative accounts of the legislative action 
on anti-crime legislation in 1967 and 1968 see Breckenridge,
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June, 1968 as the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
is considerably different from the president's proposal of 
February, 1967, which was based on the recommendations of 
the National Crime Commission.^
2The essential features of the president’s proposal 
can be summarized as follows:
1) To provide planning and program grants to the 
states and local governments "for new approaches and improve­
ments in law enforcement and criminal justice";
2) To establish, in the Department of Justice, a 
director of a new Office of Law Enforcement and Criminal 
Justice Assistance;
3 ) To provide grants to states, cities, and regional 
and metropolitan bodies to assist them in developing plans to 
improve their police, courts, and correctional systems ;
*+) To authorize the attorney general to make re­
search grants or contract with public agencies, institutions 
of higher education, or other organizations; and
5) To authorize grants for the construction of sig­
nificant new types of physical facilities, on a regional or
op. cit., and Harris, The Fear of Crime, op. cit.. p. 32. 
Harris maintains that underlying the Southern Democratic 
effort to sharply reduce the power of the Supreme Court in 
criminal cases was an effort to give the Court "a thrashing 
for its decisions on civil rights cases, particularly the 
1 95^ decision to desegregate public schools."
1 Seven of the eight major recommendations of the Na­
tional Crime Commission were dealt with in this Act.
^H.R. 5037. introduced on February 8, 1967*
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metropolitan basis, such as crime laboratories, community 
correction centers, and police academy-type centers.
The president also urged passage of gun control 
legislation previously submitted, extension of immunity to 
witnesses in crimes associated with racketeering (organized 
crime), a unified corrections system (federal), the Right of 
Privacy Act of 1967 (to outlaw all wiretapping except that 
necessary where the security of the nation is at stake), and 
to establish in the Department of Justice a National Insti­
tute of Criminal Justice. The cost of these programs was 
estimated to be $ 50 million in fiscal year 1 9 6 8, increasing 
to $30 0 million in fiscal 1 9 6 9.
The legislation that was finally approved by the 
Congress in June, 1968 retained most of the president’s pro­
posals, but it had grown into a much broader piece of legis­
lation than he had asked for. The major changes and additions 
can be summarized as follows:
Block grants.— The method of distribution of the 
Federal funds for law enforcement assistance was changed from 
that of direct grants to units of local government to the 
block grant method whereby eighty-five percent of the action 
funds are awarded to state governments. Seventy-five percent
^Based on Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report of 
February 10, 196?, p. 199, and on Breckenridge, op. cit.,
pp. 2 -3 .
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of these funds must then be "passed-through" to local gov­
ernments or combinations thereof.^
Supreme Court decisions.— Title II of the 1968 Act
seeks to overturn several important Supreme Court decisions
related to confessions and other rights of accused persons.
2These decisions include Mallory versus the United States 
(arraignment must be made without unnecessary delay);
Miranda versus Arizona^ (an accused must be advised of his
Ifrights before interrogation); and United States versus Wade 
(an accused has the right to counsel in police line-ups).
The chief advocates of this Title were Senator John L. 
McClellan (Dem.) of Arkansas and Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. 
(Dem.) of North Carolina.
Wiretapping.— Title III of the 1968 Act greatly 
broadens the authorized use of wiretapping and is in direct 
contradiction to the Administration's Right of Privacy Act.^ 
Instead of limiting the use of wiretaps to only those cases 
where the security of the nation is at stake, Title III au­
thorizes wiretapping by officials upon the approval of judges 
at virtually any court level wherever state laws permit such
 ̂Changes to the 1968 Act which were approved by the 
Congress in late 1970 are noted in the next section.
^3$4 U.S. 449 (1957). ^384 U.S. 436 (1966).
^388 U.S. 218 (1967).
^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 7, 1968,
p. 1433.
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interception. In addition, under "emergency conditions," 
officials may employ wiretapping for up to forty-eight hours 
without a warrant.
Gun control.— Title IV prohibits the sale of pistols 
and revolvers by interstate mail order to any individual who 
is not a dealer, and the sale of handguns over the counter 
to anyone who is not a resident of the state where the sale 
takes place, or is under the age of twenty-one, or is a fug­
itive or a felon. Rifles and shotguns are exempted from
control, thereby weakening the Administration's proposal for
1meaningful firearms control.
Organized crime and disorder control.— Emphasis on 
the control of organized crime and civil disorders (riots),
pwas added by the Congress. The House added $25 million spe­
cifically for riot control; the Senate increased this amount 
by another $10 million.
The Safe Streets Act (H.R. 5037) was passed by the 
House of Representatives on August 8, 1967, six days after 
debate began. The major change enacted by the House was the 
substitution of block grant funding for the categorical grant
In the Senate Judiciary Committee the key vote on 
gun controls came in the wake of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s 
murder on April 4-, 1968. Two days later, by a vote of 9 to 7, 
the Committee approved Senator Dodd's amendment on gun con­
trol, but only after exempting rifles and shotguns.
pCongressional Quarterly Almanac. 1967. p. 851.
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approach asked for by the Administration.'* On the final vote 
for passage, 17 members of the House voted against the Safe
pStreets Act, while 369 voted for the Act.
Although the Senate subcommittee hearings under the 
direction of the chairman. Senator McClellan, were concluded 
on July 12, 1967, it was not until May 1, 1968 that the 
Senate leadership called up S. 917, Title I of which con­
tained the President's proposals that had been reflected in 
H.R. 5037* S. 917 also included Titles II, III and IV de­
scribed above, the first two of which were strongly opposed 
by President Johnson. Final action in the Senate came on 
May 2 3 , 1 9 6 8, when S. 917 passed by a vote of seventy-two to 
f o u r T h e  editors of the 1968 Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac describe the final Senate action in this manner:
The showdown came on the votes to restrict the 
jurisdiction of the (Supreme) Court itself, and it was 
then that the conservative coalition came unstuck. As 
Southern Democrats held fast. Republicans defected in 
large numbers to join Northern Democrats on three 
crucial roll calls. The votes deleted from the bill 
provisions denying the Court jurisdiction to review 
state court determinations on the admissibility of vol­
untary confessions and of eyewitness testimony, and 
state court criminal convictions where such review was 
by means of a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, the heart 
of the conservative attack on the Court was cut out of 
the bill.4
 ̂On a roll call vote the block grant provision won 
256 to 1 4 7.
2Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June l4,
1 9 6 8, p. 1 5 0 0.
^Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess.. May 23,
1968, p.
1+Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1968, p. 822.
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The immediate question faced by the House was whether 
to call for a conference, since the legislation passed by the 
House the previous August did not include the controversial 
Titles II and III, nor the gun control measure. Title IV. 
Representative Emanuel Celler, chairman of the House subcom­
mittee which had held extensive hearings on H.R. 5037? urged 
a conference because of his disagreement with Titles II and 
III.^ However, this protest was voiced on June 5? 1968, when 
Senator Robert F. Kennedy had been fatally wounded in Cali- 
f ornia.
The mood of the House was against Representative 
Cellar's plea. The vote was not even close— 317 to 60 against 
a conference. The following day, June 6, 1968, the House 
voted 369 to 17 to accept in toto the Senate version, includ­
ing Titles II, III and IV that had never been debated in the 
House.2
On June 19? 1968, President Johnson signed the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, having delayed 
his approval until the last day in which he could have vetoed 
the bill. Richard Harris observes that when a week had 
passed without presidential action, speculation arose that he 
would either veto it or let it become law without his
Based on the Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd 
sess., June 5? 1968, pp. 16065 ff. For informative discus­
sions of the Congressional action see Harris, The Fear of 
Crime, op. cit., pp. 72-109? and Breckenridge, op. cit., 
pp. 7 3 - ^
2Congressional Record, June 6, 1968, op. cit., p.
16300.
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signature. In Harris' opinion, "in view of the President's 
earlier failure to take a public stand against the bill, it 
seemed unlikely that he would now deprive members of his 
party of the chance to claim credit for doing something 
about crime when they went home to face the electorate— a 
claim that would have been greatly weakened either by his 
veto, even if it was later overriden, or by his refusal to 
sign the measure. . . . Finally, on June 19th, the last day 
left for his approval. President Johnson, saying that the 
bill 'contains more good than bad,' signed it— an act that 
the (New York) Times described as "a surrender to public 
hysteria.
Implementing the Safe Streets Act 
The Safe Streets Act provides for the establishment 
of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) 
within the Department of Justice, as the agency responsible 
for implementing the Act. As established, LEAA has been 
headed by an Administrator of Law Enforcement Assistance and 
two Associate Administrators, all three of whom shall be ap­
pointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate. As interpreted by the Attorney General, the 
three Administrators of LEAA have been virtually co-equal.
Harris, The Fear of Crime, op. cit., pp. 109-110. 
For the text of the President's remarks upon signing the 
1968 Safe Streets Act, see Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report. June 28, 1968.
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which has meant that all policy decisions within LEAA must 
have the concurrence of all three AdministratorsJ
As administered by LEAA, the Safe Streets Act pro-
2vides five basic type of Federal financial aid:
- Block planning agency grants to states for creation 
of state-wide comprehensive law enforcement improvement 
plans. The Federal share for planning programs is 90 per­
cent while state and local governments provide 10 percent.
- Block action grants to states to carry out specific 
improvement plans. Eighty-five percent of LEAA action grant 
funds are given to state governments in this form, with the 
provision that 75 percent of the block action grants be made 
available to units of local government or combinations of 
such units (the pass-through requirement).^ It is the admin­
istration of these "block grants" by state law enforcement 
planning agencies that is the subject of this investigation.
Ifhe Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 (Public Law 
91-6V^) amends the Safe Streets Act of 1968 in a number of 
ways, as described in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report of December 25, 1970, p. 3055* With regard to the 
"troika" arrangement of three co-equal administrators, under 
the 1970 Act the Administrator of LEAA is designated execu­
tive head to exercise all substantive powers with the concur­
rence of one or both assistant administrators.
^This description is based on the 1971 LEAA bulletin, 
"A Program for a Safer, More Just America," pp. 3-6.
^The pass-through requirement was modified by Public 
Law 9 1-6^^ which requires that effective July 1, 1972 each 
state pass on that part of the block grant which corresponds 
to the part of total-statewide law enforcement expenditures 
for the preceding year funded and spent by local units. .
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- Action funds given at LEAA's discretion for anti­
crime programs with emphasis on special aid to cities. These 
are called "discretionary grants" and comprise 15 percent of 
the action funds distributed by LEAA.
- Research and development grants and contracts to 
devise more effective techniques and equipment for the crim­
inal justice system.
- Grants and loans to finance college studies by law 
enforcement personnel and promising students preparing for 
law enforcement careers.
The $268 million received by LEAA for fiscal year 
1970 was distributed as follows: action grants, $215 million
(85 percent in the form of block grants to state government 
and 15 percent in the form of discretionary grants to 
cities); planning grants, $21 million; research and develop­
ment, $7 . 5  million; academic assistance, $l8 million; tech­
nical assistance and training, $1.2 million; statistics and 
information service, $1 million; administration, $k-.3 mil­
lion.
Both planning and action grants are awarded under 
the block grant provision on the basis of population. In 
fiscal 1970 action grants ranged from $17,287,000 to Cali­
fornia to a minimum of $ 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 to the states with the least 
population. A summary of the allocations of both planning 
and action funds for fiscal years 1969 and 1970 is presented 
in Table 2 -1 , taken from the 1971 LEAA bulletin cited above.
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TABLE 2-1.— Allocation of Planning and Action Grants by LEAA 
During Fiscal Years 1969 and 1970 (amounts in thousands)
Fiscal Year 1969 Fiscal Year 1970
STATE Planning Action Total Planning Action Total
Alabama ................. $ 338 $ 434 $ 772 $ 369 $ 3,175 $ 3,544
Alaska ..................... 118 33 151 121 249 370
Arizona ................... 210 201 411 228 1,503 1,731
Arkansas ................. 232 242 474 252 1,787 2,039
California ............... 1,388 2,352 3,740 1,566 17,287 18,853
Colorado ................. 233 243 476 258 1,863 2,121
Connecticut............. 297 360 657 326 2,669 2,995
Delaware................. 135 64 199 141 480 621
Florida..................... 504 737 1,241 575 5,597 6,172
Georgia ................... 404 555 959 450 4,127 4,577
H aw aii................... - 150 91 241 159 699 858
Idaho ....................... 147 86 233 154 639 793
Illino is..................... 833 1,339 2,172 938 9,877 10,815
Indiana ................... 436 614 1,050 487 4,565 5,052
Iow a......................... 285 338 623 312 2,501 2,813
K ansas..................... 253 279 532 275 2,065 2,340
Kentucky................. 315 392 707 347 2,906 3,253
Louisiana................. 346 449 795 384 3,344 3,728
Maine ..................... 165 120 285 175 882 1,057
M aryland................. 347 451 798 384 3,349 3,733
Massachusetts .......... 465 666 1,131 516 4,902 5,418
M ichigan................. 678 1,055 1,733 763 7,817 8,580
Minnesota ............... 340 439 779 380 3,302 3,682
Mississippi............... 258 289 547 280 2,117 2,397
Missouri................... 409 565 974 452 4,155 4,607
Montana ................. 147 82 229 153 627 780
Nebraska ................. 197 176 373 211 1,310 1,521
Nevada..................... 130 55 185 134 405 539
New Hampshire . . . . 146 84 230 154 634 788
New Jersey.............. 571 860 1,431 641 6,372 7,013
New M exico............ 168 123 291 176 896 1,072
New Y ork ............... 1.333 2,251 3,584 1,490 16,392 17,882
North Carolina........ 439 619 1,058 492 4,625 5,117
North D akota.......... 143 78 221 148 562 710
O hio......................... 803 1,284 2,087 911 9,563 10,474
Oklahoma ............... 267 306 573 294 2,291 2,585
Oregon..................... 234 246 480 253 1.806 2,059
Pennsylvania............ 882 1,427 2,309 998 10,591 11,589
Rhode Island........... 161 111 272 169 819 988
South C arolina........ 274 318 592 304 2,406 2,710
South D akota.......... 145 83 228 151 599 750
Tennessee................. 362 478 840 402 3,562 3,964
Texas ....................... 831 1,334 2,165 942 9,926 10,868
U tah ......................... 169 126 295 179 929 1,108
Vermont ................. 128 51 179 133 387 520
V irginia................... 405 557 962 452 4,150 4,602
W ashington............. 308 380 688 352 2,971 3,323
West Virginia .......... 221 221 442 239 1,640 1,879
Wisconsin................. 382 515 897 422 3,795 4,217
Wyoming................. 121 39 160 125 290 415
D.C............................ 154 99 253 161 723 884
American Samoa . . . . 102 4 106 102 28 130
G uam ....................... 106 12 118 108 90 198
Puerto R ico............. 281 330 611 308 2,454 2,762
Virgin Islands.......... 104 7 111 104 50 154
TOTALS ............. $19,000 $24,650 $43,650 $21,000 $182,750 $203,750
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The requirements for matching funds from state and 
local government established in the Safe Streets Act vary 
depending on the use to be made of the block grant funds.
With the priority given by the Congress to the control of 
organized crime and civil disorders, LEAA-administered funds 
pay up to 75 percent of costs for projects in these areas.
The matching requirement for construction of law enforcement 
facilities is 50 percent. For other action projects the 
Federal share is 60 percent, while the state and local share 
is 40 percent.
The relative size of Federal law enforcement assist­
ance under the Safe Streets Act can be appreciated by looking 
at estimated national expenditures for all criminal justice 
functions. These expenditures by Federal state and local 
government agencies are estimated at about $7*^ billion for 
fiscal year 1 9 6 8-1 9 6 9 .̂  During fiscal year 1970 the Safe 
Streets Act added $268 million. For fiscal years 1971 through
1 9 7 3, expenditures of $650 million, $1.15 billion and $1.75
2billion respectively have been authorized. It is
U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assist­
ance Administration, and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau 
of the Census, Expenditure and Employment Data for the Crim­
inal Justice System. 1968-69 (Washington. D.C.; U.S. Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1970), pp. 1-2. (Hereinafter referred 
to as LEAA-Bureau of the Census, Expenditure and Employment 
Data. 1 9 6 8—6 9 ).
2Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report of December 25, 
1 9 7 0, p. 3 0 5 5 . Public Law 91-6V+ provides that no less than 
20 percent of the fiscal 1972 and 1973 funds used for law 
enforcement grants be used for corrections.
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anticipated that within a period of five years the Federal 
government will have begun to assume approximately 20 per­
cent of the criminal justice costs which formerly were the 
sole responsibility of state and local governments, with the 
latter bearing the major portion of the fiscal load ($^.7 
billion versus $1.9 billion in fiscal 1968-69).
Having outlined the origins and purposes of the 1968 
Safe Streets Act, and having discussed a number of the issues
which were related to the 1967-1968 legislative action on the
Act, we return, in the chapters which follow, to a consider­
ation of the environmental, political system, and policy out­
come indicators which comprise the systems model upon which
this investigation is based.
CHAPTER III 
ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS
As described in Chapter I, this study employs a sys­
tems model, as depicted in Figure 3-1, which groups indica­
tors of state characteristics in three main divisions: en­
vironment, the political system, and policy outcomes. This 
















Figure 3-1*— Systems Model 
77
78
the environmental division of our model, including indicators 
of both the socio-economic and crime environments of the 
forty-eight states.
In subjecting twenty-one ecological variables to a 
factor analysis for each census year from 189O to I960, 
Hofferbert^ derived two factors. Industrialization and Af­
fluence which are representative of the major environmental 
variances which distinguish the individual American states.
PHofferbert's two factors have been adopted as the primary 
indicators of the socio-economic environment. Five other 
variables have been added to supplement and update Indus­
trialization and Affluence. Four crime-environment factors, 
which we derive from the 1966-1969 FBI reports, complete our 
list of eleven environmental indicators, as shown in Fig­
ure 3 -2 .
Figure 3-2.— Environmental Indicators 
Socio-Economic Environment Crime Environment
Industrialization
Affluence
Population Increase, 1960-70 
Percent Negro, 1968 
Negro Increase, 1950-68 
Non-white Migration, 1950-60 
Contributions Claimed, as 
Percent of Personal Income
Low Rape and Property 
Crime Rates 
Low Murder-High Suicide/ 
Homicide Ratio 
Rape and Property Crime 
Rate Increases 
Murder and Auto Theft 
Increases
Richard I. Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions of 
the American States: 1890-1960." in Midwest Journal of
Political Science. 12 (Aug. i9 6 0 ), 401-4l8.
2In adopting these factors only the factor scores 
for i960 have been used.
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Factor scores or other appropriate data for each of 
the indicators described in this Chapter are located in Ap­
pendix A of this study.
Indus tri ali z ati on
The factor Industrialization, as described by 
Hofferbert, reflects patterns of economic and occupational 
activity which are distinguished by the proportion of the 
population engaged in manufacturing employment, and the value 
added per capita by manufacturing at the positive end of the 
scale. At the negative end are moderately strong loadings 
recorded by states with large average farm size and with a 
high percentage of owner-occupied homes. Industrialization 
is not predominantly ethnicity, wealth, education or popula­
tion change, nor has Industrialization occurred at a uniform 
rate in all states. Those states that ranked near the 
bottom of this scale at the turn of the century have experi­
enced a greater increase in Industrialization than states 
which where then relatively Industrialized. In testing the 
stability of Industrialization over time, Hofferbert found
it to be "fairly volatile in terms of its relation to all of
2the indicators of policy."
Our reasons for including Industrialization as one 
of two principal environmental indicators lie primarily in
pp. 1-413.
^This description is based on Hofferbert, op. cit..
^Ibid., p. 4l6.
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the relationships between the socio-economic variables which 
load heavily on Industrialization, as shown in Table 3-1? and 
the inter-state variances in criminal activity to be intro­
duced later. Earlier researchers have examined relationships 
between the distribution of criminal activity and urbaniza­
tion,^ industrialization,2 population density,3 and economic 
kstatus. Each of these environmental characteristics is an 
important contributor to Hofferbert's Industrialization 
factor. Since the subject of our inquiry, law enforcement 
planning, deals primarily with the control of criminal activ­
ity, it appears that Industrialization is a potentially im­
portant environmental indicator.
A secondary reason for including Industrialization 
in this analysis is to test its value in explaining differ­
ences in policy outcomes related to the administration of 
criminal justice.
States ranking highest in Industrialization include 
New Jersey, Connecticut, New York, and Massachusetts. The
Judith A. Wilks, "Ecological Correlates of Crime 
and Delinquency, " op. cit., pp. llfO-l'+S.
^Karl Schussler, "Components of Variation in City 
Crime Rates," Social Problems, 9 (Spring, 1962), p. 325*
^Sarah L. Boggs, "Urban Crime Patterns," American 
Sociological Review, 30 (December 1965)? PP* 899-908.
^Calvin F. Schmid, "Urban Crime Areas: Part I,"
American Sociological Review, 25 (August I960), pp. 527-5^2, 
and Calvin F. Schmid, "Urban Crime Areas: Part II,"
■toerican Sociological Review, 25 (October, I960), pp. 655- 678.
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TABLE 3-1.— Loadings of Socio-economic Variables on Indus­





Value added by manufacturing/capita .907 .015
Percent employed in manufacturing .877 -.132
Value/acre of farm land and buildings .831 .024
Population per square mile .775 .008
Percent foreign .703 .230
Total population .672 .045
Percent urban .657 .522
Telephones per 1,000 population .650 .675
Average number of employees per 
manufacturing establishment .638 -.351
Personal income per capita .573 .730
Percent failures of business 
and commercial establishments .421 .287
Value of real property per capita .132 .792
Percent Negro, i960 . 066 -.752
Percent illiterate .039 -.737
Percent increase in population -.006 .551
Median school years completed -.026 .909
Percent farms operated by tenants -.266 -.468
Percent housing owner occupied -.316 .240
Divorce rate -.325 .430
Acerage per farm -.503 .488
Motor vehicle registrations per 100,000 population -.568 .703
Percent of total variance 32.4 25.3
Source: Richard I. Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimen­
sions of the American States : 1 8 9O-I9 6O," 
Midwest Journal of Political Science. Vol. 
XII, No. 3 (August, 1 9 6 8), 406 and 409.
82
four states with lowest scores in this factor include New 
Mexico, South Dakota, Wyoming, and North Dakota.
Affluence
Hofferbert's Affluence factor is our second principal 
environmental indicator. In his terms. Affluence is re­
flective of high educational attainment, the general cul­
tural deprivation of non-white Americans, the value of real 
property per capita, and per capita personal income. "Per­
cent foreign born" is a positive element of this factor for 
the reason that a major portion of the immigrants into the 
United States in the earlier decades covered by Hofferbert's 
study settled in the states which already were "culturally 
enriched"”' in terms of wealth, educational attainment, etc. 
This dimension is obviously heavily regional, along North-
South lines, with a "distinct clustering of southern states 
2at the bottom." In Hofferbert's judgment, the features 
which are heavily loaded on this factor are the character­
istics of "modern affluent cultures." The loadings of the 
twenty-one variables on Affluence are recorded in Table 3-1•
In his 1968 article, Hofferbert labeled Affluence as 
"Cultural Enrichment." In later articles he shifts to Af­
fluence as being a more appropriate description of this 
factor. pStates occupying ranks 38 through k-8 in 1960 in­
clude: Virginia, Kentucky, West Virginia, Georgia,
Tennessee, Louisiana, Arkansas, Alabama, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Mississippi. The five top-ranked states 
are Nevada, California, Wyoming, Colorado and Oregon.
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In testing the stability of Affluence over time, 
Hofferbert finds that it is "much less volatile than Indus­
trialization in terms of its relation to policy outputs," 
which leads him to conclude that Affluence is "more pervasive 
and comprehensive in its impact upon the decisions of policy 
makers within the states than is Industrialization."”*
Our reasons for including Affluence as an environ­
mental indicator in this study of law enforcement planning 
outcomes are similar to those outlined above with regard to 
Industrialization. We note first that both Affluence and 
Industrialization correlate positively with personal income 
per capita and percent urban, both of which have been the 
subject of earlier investigations referred to with regard to 
"urbanization" and "economic status" by Wilks and Schmid re­
spectively. Concerning other elements of Hofferbert's Af­
fluence factor, earlier researchers have reported on the re­
lationships between crime environment and affluence in terms
2of the availability of goods to be stolen, racial composi­
tion,8 and education.^ Thus, based on our earlier rationale.
^Hofferbert, op. cit., p. 4iy.
2Task Force on Assessment, Crime and its Impact, 
op. cit., p . 2 7 .
^Earl R. Moses, "Differentials in Crime Rates Between 
Negroes and Whites," American Sociological Review, 12 
(August 19^7 ), pp. 411-420, and C. V. Willie and A. Gershen- 
vitz, "Juvenile Delinquency in Racially Mixed Areas," Ameri­
can Sociological Review, 29 (October 1964), pp. 740-44.
^Daniel Glaser, "Correctional Institutions in a 
Great Society," Criminologica, III, Nos. 2-3 (August- 
November, 196)), 3-^«
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Affluence is as potentially important to our inquiry as is 
Industrialization. To not include both of these factors 
•would be indeed remiss.
Population Increase, 1960-1970
As a means of determining the influence of popula­
tion shifts during the I960*s on law enforcement planning, 
we include Population Increase, 1960-1970, as a supplemental 
indicator of the environment.
In a discussion of why California leads the nation 
in reported crime rates, while at the same time being the 
recognized leader in the field of police professionalization, 
the Task Force on Assessment of the National Crime Com­
mission observes that California has been "the recipient of 
one of the great migrations in history. And whether migra­
tion is itself as important a cause of crime as is sometimes 
asserted or not, in large quantities it is clearly unset­
tling and disruptive of the social order.Concerning the 
increases in reported crime rates of our major cities over 
the past thirty years, the Task Force on Assessment states:
The dramatic and turbulent changes which America's 
cities have been ■undergoing throughout this period are 
well known. They were bound to have an impact on the 
amount of crime in the city. One of the most signifi­
cant facts has been the simple one of growth.2
"'Task Force on Assessment, Crime and its Impact,
op. cit., p. 3 4.
Zjbid.. p. 35.
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In view of these citations it appears that our in­
clusion of Population Increase, 1960-1970, as an environ­
mental indicator is justified. In effect this variable up­
dates the "percent increase in population" variable employed 
by Hofferbert, which loads .551 on Affluence and -.006 on 
Industrialization, and reflects state population increases 
of the 1950's. Our data is derived from the i960 and 1970 
Census of Population reports."'
Percent Negro. Negro Increase, 
and Non-White Migration
Three indicators of shifts in racial distribution 
are covered in this section, all of which reflect the degree 
to which changes have occurred in the interracial balance of 
the American states during the past two decades. To an im­
portant degree the increases in reported crime rates which 
played a key role in the 1968 enactment of the Safe Streets 
Act appear to be related to white reaction to the civil 
rights movement.
It has been estimated that between 19̂ +0 and 1963 ap-
Pproximately 3-3 million Negroes left the South, and have 
migrated northward, most of them being absorbed in the
1u.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1970 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19705 , p. 12; and
The Washington Post, December 1, 1970, p. A9.
pU.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statis­
tics, The Negroes in the United States: Their Economic and
Social Situation ^Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1966), p. 2.
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metropolitan areas of the North-east and North-central regions 
of the nation.”* Ploski and Brown have described the migration 
of Negroes from the South in the twentieth century as "the
2most extensive movement of a single group in U.S. history."
A number of earlier studies which have sought to de­
termine the relationships between race and criminal activity 
have been reviewed by Wilks who states:
From these findings we may conclude that the racial 
composition of an area does have an impact upon the 
area's crime rate, but this relationship is not a simple 
one. That is, we cannot unequivocally assert that 
certain nationality or racial groups have high rates of 
crime regardless of their geographical location nor can 
we state that the geographical location exclusively de­
termines the crime rates of such groups. It is neces­
sary to consider the area's ongoing social processes 
and the social and cultural structure of the residential 
area in order to understand the relationship between 
geographical location, racial composition, and area 
crime rate.3
Analysis of arrest rates reported in the Uniform Crime Re­
ports indicates that Negroes become involved in violent per-
ksonal crime much more frequently than do non-black Americans. 
Explanations of this apparent racial bias include minority
”*Harry A. Ploski, and Roscoe C. Brown, Jr., The 
Negro Almanac (New York: Bellwether Publishing Co., 1 9 6 7 )5
p. 2 1 9 .
^Ibid.. p. 2 2 3 .
3wilks, OP. cit., p. 1*+6. For additional studies on 
the relationships between race and crime rates see Alphonse 
Pinkney, Black Americans (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentlce-
Hall, Inc., 196 9 )5 Chapter 6.
^In 1969s for example, Negroes made up 62 percent of 
the arrests for murder, and 55 percent of the victims, ac­
cording to Unifoim Crime Reports, 1969s P* 9«
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-1status pressures, lack of opportunity to develop stable com-
2munity relations or improved occupational status, and social 
frustration.3 The potential effect on crime rates of cur­
rent efforts to improve the educational and occupational 
status of those living in delinquency areas is well summar­
ized by Wilks who sees such efforts as being directed toward
L.the solution of the "American Dilemma":
The American dilemma is a resultant of the belief 
that all men are created equal (or perhaps more ac­
curately, that all men have not only an opportunity 
but an obligation to be successful) in conjunction 
with the reality that some individuals in our society 
are disadvantaged, they do not have equal opportunities 
to succeed. Thus, most current attempts at delinquency 
and crime prevention are directed toward opening the 
opportunity structure.
There is no doubt that some, even many, individuals 
will be "saved" by such procedures. Many individuals 
will probably have better "life chances" as a result 
of such programs, particularly if educational and vo­
cational programs are directed toward the mutual prob­
lems of increasing skill dilution, increasing skill ob­
solescence, and increasing occupational specialization.
But it still remains to be determined whether or 
not there will be a decrease in the rates of crime and 
delinquency as a result of such programs. It must be 
recognized that a new differential patterning of crime 
and delinquency rates over geographical areas may de­
velop as a result of these programs.5
Our primary interest in variables which reflect 
shifts in racial balance is to determine how the American
"'waiter C. Reckless, The Crime Problem (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 3rd ed., 1 961 ), p. 70.
2Moses, on. cit.
^Schuessler, on. cit., p. 325*
^Gunnar %'rdal, An American Dilemma (New York: 
Harpers, 1962, revised edition).
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states have responded to these shifts in terms of criminal 
justice administration— especially whether the impact of 
racial shifts is reflected in the allocation decisions of 
the state law enforcement planning agencies.
Percent Negro, 1968 
In order to update Hofferbert's variable, "percent 
Negro, i9 6 0," which loads -.752 on Affluence and -.006 on 
Industrialization (Table 3-1), we have computed "Percent 
Negro, 1 9 6 8" from Bureau of the Census reports"* of I960 and
1970 .
Negro Increase 
As used in this study, Negro Increase refers to the 
estimated increase between 1950 and 1968 in the percent of 
each state's population that is Negro. Data is taken from 
two sources: the 1950 Negro population data is that recorded
by the Bureau of the Census during the 1950 Census of Popu­
lations; the 1968 figure is the Percent Negro 1968 variable 
described above. The differences between the 1950 and 1968 
percentages are divided by the 1950 percentage to obtain the 
percent of Negro population increase in each state for the 
eighteen-year period, 1950 to 1 9 6 8.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
U.S. Census of Population: I960, General Population Char­
acteristics, U.S. Summary, Final Report PC (l)-1B (Washing- 
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), Table




The i960 Census of Population Reports include data 
on non-white migration for each of the states. We have in­
cluded this variable as a partial "cross check" on the va­
lidity of the Negro Increase variable described above.
Contributions Claimed 
The percent of personal income claimed as contribu­
tions by the citizens of each state in their 1968 individual 
income tax returns is included as an indicator of the socio­
economic environment of each state. Data for this variable, 
which we have designated "Contributions Claimed," are de­
rived from the 1970 report of the Internal Revenue Service^
and from Bretzfelder and Dallavalle's estimate of 1968 per-
2sonal incomes.
This measure of the propensity of individuals to 
make and to claim tax-deductible contributions is included 
here as an indirect measure of the influence of organized 
religion within each state, which we believe has some in­
fluence both on patterns of criminal activity and on efforts 
to control that activity.
About twenty years ago Porterfield analyzed rela­
tionships between social factors and crime rates within
^U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue 
Service, Pub. 79 (9-70), Statistics of Income, 1968 (Wash­
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 171
pPublished in Survey of Current Business, August,
1969, p. 13.
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census tracts in Fort Worth, Texas.^ His findings suggest 
that church membership is an important indicator of propen­
sity toward certain types of crime, especially homicide and 
suicide. Extending Porterfield's approach, we have included 
Contributions Claimed as an environmental indicator in order 
to "get at" the state-wide influence of organized religion 
on both crime distribution and on criminal justice practices, 
including outcomes of the law enforcement planning process.
We recognize that Contributions Claimed is influenced 
by factors other than those which stem from religious insti­
tutions, and we make no claim that this variable is an ade­
quate indicator of the influence of organized religion within 
each state. Were other more direct measures of organized 
religion's influence on a state-by-state basis available, we 
would use them. Our investigation reveals, however, that the 
only available data on state-wide church membership that is 
reasonably comparable is that published by the Bureau of the 
Census about thirty-five years ago. The changes which have 
occurred since then render such data obsolete for our pur­
poses. A recent analysis of Contributions Claimed does in­
dicate, however, that approximately sixty percent of this
pamount goes to organized religion, hence there appears to
Austin Porterfield, "Suicide and Crime in Folk and 
Secular Society," American Journal of Sociology. 57 (Janu­
ary, 1952), pp. 3 3 1-3 3 8 .
2U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income; Individual Income Tax Returns, 
1962 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
196^), p. 6.
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be a reasonable basis for including Contributions Claimed 
as an indirect indicator of the influence of the church in 
each of the states.
Crime Environment Indicators .
An important environmental component of the systems 
model used in this analysis is the interstate variance in 
criminal activity— the crime environment. Data on criminal 
activity is taken from the reports of approximately 8 ,5 0 0  
law enforcement agencies. These reports are compiled and 
published by the FBI,^ which act as the national clearing­
house for crime statistics.
In discussing the basis for the crime statistics, 
the 1969 Uniform Crime Reports include the following descrip­
tion:
The Uniform Crime Reporting Program employs seven 
crime classifications to establish an index to measure 
the trend and distribution of crime in the United States. 
These crimes— murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated 
assault, burglary, larceny $ 50 and over in value, and 
auto theft— are counted by law enforcement agencies as 
the crimes become known to them. These crimes were se­
lected for use in the Crime Index because, as a group, 
they represent the most common local crime problem.
They are all serious crimes, either by their very nature 
or due to the volume in which they occur. Offenses of 
murder, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault, 
are categorized as violent crimes. Offenses of burglary, 
larceny $50 and over in value, and auto theft are 
classes as crimes against property.
It is believed desirable to point out that there is 
no way of determining the total number of crimes which
Reports are published quarterly and annually by the 
FBI. The annual reports are published in the Uniform Crime 
Reports (7?* ) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office,yr.).
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are committed. Many criminal acts occur which are not 
reported to official sources. In light of this fact, 
the best source for obtaining a count of crime is the 
next logical universe, namely, crimes which come to 
police attention. The crimes used in the Crime Index 
are those considered to be most consistently reported 
to police and the computations of crime trends and 
crime rates are prepared using this universe— offenses 
known to police.^
It is realized that there occur a large number of 
crimes that are not covered by the crime index, including 
those offenses of a consensual nature in which there is sel­
dom a complainant. In addition, "important segments of crime 
are dealt with by regulatory agencies under the auspices of
administrative and civil law" and not by criminal justice
2agencies under the auspices of criminal law.
While recognizing that the indicators of the crime 
environment to be employed in this study do not cover all 
types of criminal activity, nor do they purport to accurately 
represent all criminal activity of the types covered, it re­
mains true that no other source of state-by-state crime data 
of a comparable nature exists. Furthermore, in large meas­
ure the seven "index" crimes covered by the Uniform Crime 
Reports are those types of criminal activity that the Congress 
sought to control in approving the Safe Streets Act.
''uniform Crime Reports, 19&9, op. cit., p. 4.
PHarry M. Shulman, "The Measurement of Crime in the 
United States," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology ^ d  
Police Science, Vol. 57? No. 4 (December, 1966), p. 483«
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In spite of noteworthy progress recorded by the FBI
in compiling and publishing crime statistics, the National
Crime Commission concluded that police statistics which are
compiled by the FBI do not begin to indicate the full amount
of crime. This conclusion was based on the results of the
first national surveys ever made of crime victimization,
which were initiated by the National Crime Commission in
1965- In pointing out the implications of this volume of
unreported crime, the Commission's general report states:
This margin of unreported crimes raises the possibility 
that even small changes in the way that crime is re­
ported by the public to the police, or classified and 
recorded by the police, could have significant effects 
on the trend of reported crime. There is strong reason 
to believe that a number of such changes have taken 
place within recent years.2
One reason given for the deficiencies in the reported 
crime statics is that given by the National Crime Commis­
sion's Task Force on Assessment: "In short the United States
is today (1967), in the era of high speed computers, trying 
to keep track of crime and criminals with a system that was 
less than adequate in the days of the horse and buggy.
By act of Congress approved June 11, 1930, the FBI 
was authorized to collect and compile nation-wide crime fig­
ures. The original program to do this was initiated by the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police. The Committee 
on Uniform Crime Records of that Association continues as 
advisor to the FBI on the conduct of the program. The num­
ber of cooperating agencies has increased from *+00 in 1930 
to about 8 , 5 0 0  in 1969.
pNational Crime Commission, op. cit., p. 20.
^Task Force on Assessment, op. cit., p. 123.
9̂
Another reason for the inaccuracies in crime report­
ing is, according to a number of observers,^ the manipulation
of crime reports by police administrators who are interested
2in maintaining a "respectable" clearance rate. While this 
may happen from time to time, it is probably the lack of 
knowledge and training on the part of the police record 
keepers that is responsible for most of the inaccuracy in 
crime reporting.
A recent study of the Jackson, Mississippi Police De­
partment conducted by the Public Administration Service^ will 
serve as an example of the manner in which inadequate record 
keeping contributes to unreliability in crime statistics.
The report states in part.
Police records are the most decentralized and un­
coordinated of all the Jackson technical services.
Some records are kept in the detective bureau; some in 
the traffic control section; others in the identifica­
tion bureau; still others in the sergeant's office. 
Statistical summaries are prepared by each office, but 
the Department's annual statistical activity report is 
the product of a civilian records clerk who classifies 
complaints for key punching by the city data
^See, for example, Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice With­
out Trial; Law Enforcement in a Democratic Society (New' 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 19^7), pp.
^The clearance rate is the ratio of offenses of each 
category that are "cleared by arrest" or solved for crime 
reporting purposes, to the total number of offenses of that 
category reported. Hence, it is possible to create a false 
clearance rate that is higher than it should be simply by 
not reporting all crimes that are "known to the police."
^Public Administration Service, Jackson, Mississippi 
Police Department; A Survey Report, December 31, 1970.
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processing unit and works under the nominal supervision 
of the detective chiefJ
The report then describes the process of complaint 
recording and makes the observation that complaint calls 
which are routed to the detective major may never be re­
corded at all.
If they are recorded by the detective major, they may 
not necessarily be submitted to the criminal records 
section in the division for processing, since the major 
makes an arbitrary decision whether to "make a case" 
or simply to log the complaint on an informal "white 
sheet." A call which is "white sheeted" is set aside, 
but kept available should an arrest ensue or property 
be recovered. However, it is not statistically tallied 
by the records staff.2
The survey staff determined that 758 calls to the detective 
desk were "white sheeted" in 19&9 , "including V19 auto ac­
cessory theft reports; 330 stolen bicycles and 9 thefts or 
burglaries, 8 of which involved firearms.
The foregoing example illustrates one type of crime 
reporting deficiency which the FBI seeks to overcome through 
its continuing effort to improve the validity of the Uniform 
Crime Reporting Program. A standard operating procedure em­
ployed by the FBI is to examine each incoming report for both 
arithmetical accuracy and for reasonableness as a possible 
indication of errors. Unusual variations are brought to the 
attention of the submitting agency by correspondence. This 
process resulted in the writing of 2 1 , 0 2 0  letters to con­
tributors during 1 9 6 9*^
^Ibid., p. 1 1 7 . ^Ibid.. p. 1 2 1. ^Ibid.. p. 1 2 2. 
1+Uniform Crime Reports, 19&9, on. cit., p. 52.
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The Seven Crimes "Known to the Police"
Our data on the crime environment of the American 
states is limited to that contained in official reports vol­
untarily submitted to the FBI by approximately 8,500 juris­
dictions in the fifty states. State-by-state crime rates 
per 100,000 population are computed annually by the FBI and 
are published in the Uniform Crime Reports for the seven 
"index" or "serious" crimes which are described below:
Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter  ̂ includes all 
willful killings without due process, and is scored on the 
basis of police investigation. Suicides, accidental deaths, 
manslaughter by negligence and justifiable homicides are not 
counted here. Most murders are committed by relatives of 
the victim, or by persons acquainted with him. In 1969? for 
example, this category of "nonfelonious" killings accounted 
for 73*5 percent of all murders reported to the FBI. Another 
7.2 percent were "suspected felony type" while 19»3 percent
were "known felony type" of murders in which the victim was
2not acquainted with his killer.
Based on Uniform Crime Reports, 1969, op. cit., 
pp. 5-9' The term "murder and nonnegligent manslaughter" 
has been shortened to "murder" throughout this discussion. 
For an interesting historical study of this offense see 
H. D. Brearley, Homicide in the United States (Montclair, 
New Jersey: Patterson Smith, 1969) (reprint of 1932 edi­
tion) .
2For additional discussion of murder see Marvin E. 
Wolfgang, "A Sociological Analysis of Criminal Homicide," 
in Federal Probation. March, 1961, pp. ^8-55*
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Aggravated Assault"* is defined as an unlawful attack 
by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting 
severe bodily injury, usually accompanied by the use of a 
weapon or other means likely to produce death or great 
bodily harm. Attempts are included since it is not necessary 
that an injury result when a gun, knife, or other weapon is 
used which could and probably would result in serious per­
sonal injury if the crime were successfully completed. As 
in the case of murder, most aggravated assaults occur within 
the family unit, or among neighbors or acquaintances. The 
relationships between aggravated assault and murder were in­
vestigated by Pittman and Handy in a survey of 2hl cases of 
aggravated assault occurring in the St. Louis, Missouri area
pduring 1961. In comparing their results with those of 
Wolfgang,3 Pittman and Handy concluded that the pattern for 
the two crimes is quite similar. "Both acts, of course, are 
reflections of population sub-groupings which tend to ex­
ternalize their aggression when confronted with conflict
ksituations.” This conclusion is supported by Porkorny who 
found homicide and aggravated assault are similar in all
^This discussion of aggravated assault is based on 
Uniform Crime Reports, 1969, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
^David J. Pittman and William Handy, "Patterns in 
Criminal Aggravated Assault," in Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology and Police Science. Vol. 55 096V), pp. 4b2-470.
^Wolfgang (1961), op. cit.
1+Pittman and Handy, op. cit., p. 4^0.
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aspects studies, and are basically the same category of be­
havior J
pForcible Rape is defined for the purposes of uni­
form crime reporting as the carnal knowledge of a female 
through the use of force or the threat of force. Assaults 
to commit forcible rape are also included; however, statu­
tory rape (without ^orce) is not counted. About two-thirds 
of these offenses reported in 1969 were actual rapes, while 
the remainder were attempts or assaults to rape. Although 
this offense is thought to be the most under-reported crime, 
due primarily to fear and/or embarrassment on the part of 
the victim, almost one-fifth (l8 percent) of all forcible 
rapes reported to the police in 1969 were determined to be 
unfounded and therefore not counted.
Menachem Amir’s study^ of 6H-6 cases of forcible rape 
occurring in Philadelphia between 1958 and 1960 revealed, 
inter alia, that rape is not a violent crime in which bru­
tality is inflicted upon the victim. In 87 percent of the 
cases studied, only seduction and verbal coercion were used 
initially to subdue the victim. Over fifty percent of the 
victims failed to resist their attackers in any way.
Alex D. Porkorny, "Human Violence: A Comparison of
Homicide, Aggravated Assault, Suicide, and Attempted Sui­
cide," in Journal of Criminal Law. Criminology and Police 
Science. Vol. 56 (l965), No. 4, pp.
2This discussion of forcible rape is based on the 
1 9 6 9 Uniform Crime Reports, op. cit.. pp. 11-13*
^Menachem Amir, "Forcible Rape," Federal Probation 
Vol. 31 (March, 1967), 51-58*
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Robbery  ̂ is the stealing or taking anything of value 
from the person by force or violence or putting him in fear 
by strong-arm robbery, stickups, armed robbery, assault to 
rob and attempt to rob. Injury to the victim frequently re­
sults. About 55 percent of the reported robberies are com­
mitted in the street, and about 60 percent of all robberies 
included the presence of a weapon such as a gun, knife, or 
club. The average value loss to the victims of robbery
during 1969 was $288.
2Burglary is defined as the unlawful entry of a 
structure to commit a felony or theft, even though no force 
was used to gain entrance. Forcible entry, unlawful entry 
without force, and attempted forcible entry are included in 
this offense category. Residential burglary accounted for 
56 percent of the 1969 total, over one-half of which occurred 
during daytime. Of the non-residential burglaries, only 6 
percent occurred during daytime.
Larceny-Theft^ is the unlawful taking or stealing of 
property or articles of value without the use of force or 
violence or fraud. It includes crimes such as shoplifting, 
pocket-picking, purse-snatching, thefts from autos, thefts
of auto parts and bicycle thefts. (Auto theft is excluded
^Based on Uniform Crime Reports, 1969, op. cit.,pp. 13-16.
2Based on Uniform Crime Reports, 1969, op. cit..
pp. 16-1 9 .
^Based on Uniform Crime Reports, 1969, op. cit..
pp. 19-25.
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here since it is a separate Crime Index offense.) Larceny 
is exceeded in volume only by burglary. During 19&9, lar­
ceny was highest in the summer months. Only thefts of prop­
erty of $ 50 value or greater are recorded in this crime 
category. The average value of property stolen in each 
larceny in 1969 was $111, up from $7^ in I960.
Auto Theft'* is defined as the unlawful stealing or 
driving away of a motor vehicle, including attempts. This 
definition excludes taking for temporary use when the ve­
hicle is actually returned by the taker provided prior au­
thority for its use has been granted or can be assumed.
From i960 through 1969 the percentage increase in auto theft 
was four times greater than the percentage increase in auto­
mobile registrations and four times greater than the per­
centage increase in the young-age population, 15 to 2*+ years. 
Nationally, one of every 100 registered automobiles was 
stolen during 1969? and 8U- percent of those stolen were re­
covered. This high recovery rate can be attributed to the 
fact that approximately 75 percent of all cars stolen are 
used for transportation or for unknown purposes other than 
resale or stripping for parts. As in prior years, in 1969 
persons arrested for auto theft were mostly the young, with 
77 percent under 21 and 58 percent under 18 years of age.
"'Based on Uniform Crime Reports. 1969. op. cit.,
pp. 25-28.
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C r i m e  E n v i r o n m e n t  I n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s
Having looked at some of the problems in crime re­
porting, and having defined the seven crime categories for 
which State data is available, we turn now to an analysis of 
the statistical relationships among the various crime cate­
gories.
Data for this analysis is taken from the FBI's Uni­
form Crime Reports for 1966 through 1969. From these Reports 
the state mean rates and the percent increase in each of the 
seven Index crimes by state has been computed. The results 
of this computation were then subjected to correlation anal­
ysis and the simple correlations shown in Table 3-2 were ob­
tained.
The relationships among the property crimes of 
burglary, larceny and auto theft are especially strong. Of 
interest is the higher correlation of forcible rape with ag­
gravated assault and property crimes than with murder and 
nonnegligent manslaughter. We note in Table 3-2 also the 
parallel decreasing relationships among murder and aggravated 
assault and the property crimes of robbery through auto 
theft. The highest correlations involving the increases in 
crime rates are those which represent the relationships be­
tween the increase in auto theft rates and the mean rates of 
burglary and auto theft over the period 1966 through 1969.
TABLE 3-2.— Simple Correlations^ of I9 6 6 -I9 6 9 State Mean Crime Rates andState Crime Rate Increases
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 II 21 31 4l 51 61
1 Murder
2 Forcible Rape .47
3 Aggravated .76 .70Assault .604 Robbery .31 .71
5 Burglary .22 .74 .53 .73
6 Larceny .13 .68 .44 .65 .91 \
7 Auto Theft .02 .47 .30 .68 .76 .66






In addition to the fourteen crime-environment vari­
ables described above and listed in Table 3-2, the ratio of 
suicides to homicides during 196?^ is included as an indi­
cator of the crime environment. This ratio overlaps the
1 9 6 6 - 1 9 6 9 mean murder rate described above, however it in­
cludes the additional element of suicide. Earlier studies
have indicated that both homicide and suicide rates are in-
2 3fluenced by both sociological and economic variances.
Hence it appears that the addition of the 1967 suicide rate 
may contribute to the explanation of environmental in­
fluences of both the socio-economic and the crime-environment 
nature. As illustrated in Table 3-3, interstate variances 
are emphasized when the suicide/homicide ratio is employed.
Derivation of Crime-Environment Factors 
As is evident in Table 3-2, there exists considerable
overlap among the crime-environment indicators described
above. To lessen multicollinearity problems, and to reduce
the number of variables to be dealt with, the fifteen crime-
environment indicators were subjected to factor analysis
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
Public Health Service, Vital Statistics of the United States, 
19 6 7 . Vol. 11-Mortality, Part A, pp. 1-169 to 1-249.
2Jack P. Gibbs, and Walter T. Martin, Status Inte­
gration and Suicide; A Sociological Study (Eugene, Oregon: 
University of Oregon Press, 1964J.
^Andrew F. Henry and James F. Short, Jr., Suicide and 
Homicide (New York: The Free Press, 195^)*
^0h
TABLE 3-3*— Suicide, Murder, and Homicide Rates Compared











Homicide Rate (1959-1961) 1 0 . 7
GA
0 ^
VT 11 . 9
Murder Rate (1966-1969 mean) 12.1
GA
0 . 8
N.D. 1 ^ . 5
Suicide/Homicide Ratio (196?) 1^-75ME
o.eh
MISS 2 3 . 0
employing a varimax rotation technique and Kaiser criterion 
By this means the following four crime-environment factors 
were derived:
1. Low rape and property crime rates
2. Low murder-high suicide/homicide ratio
3 . Rape and property crime rate increases 
h. Murder and auto theft rate increases
The factor loadings of the crime-environment variables are 
listed in Table 3-^* Factor scores of the forty-eight 
states are located in Appendix A.
This factor analysis has produced a set of crime 
rate groupings which differs from that adopted by the FBI. 
Analysis of Table 3-^ indicates that during the period 1966- 
1969 the frequency rates of forcible rape and robbery were
1
See Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, Quantative Analysis 
of Political Data (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill,
forthcoming), Chapter h.
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TABLE 3-4.— Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix; Fifteen Crime- 
Environment Indicators (normalized solution)
Crime-Environment
Variable
Factor Loadings 2 3








Assault Rate Increase 
Rape Rate Increase 
Robbery Rate Increase 
Burglary Rate Increase 
Larceny Rate Increase 
Auto Theft Rate Increase 






- . 3 1 6
- . 2 6 5
- . 0 9 2
.244




- . 8 1 1 - . 2 6 2
- . 9 0 6 - . 1 1 3
- . 9 0 6 - . 1 7 9
- . 7 2 3 . 0 2 6
-.907
-.127 . 7 5 0
. 2 3 2 . 5 6 1
. 0 3 3 .6 6 1
. 3 4 3 . 6 9 7
- . 1 5 1 . 5 0 5
- . 0 2 9 - . 0 8 3
1 8 . 5 15.2 1 0 . 5
Factor Labels:
1 - Low Rape and Property Crime Rates
2 - Low Murder-High Suicide^Aîomicide Ratio
- Rape and Property Crime Rate Increases
- Murder and Auto Theft Rate IncreasesI
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m o r e  c l o s e l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  p r o p e r t y  c r i m e s  o f  l a r c e n y  
a u t o  t h e f t  a n d  b u r g l a r y  t h a n  w i t h  m u r d e r  a n d  a g g r a v a t e d  a s ­
s a u l t .  T h e  F B I  g r o u p i n g ,  a s  p u b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  U n i f o r m  C r i m e  
R e p o r t s ,  p l a c e s  b u r g l a r y ,  l a r c e n y  a n d  a u t o  t h e f t  i n  a  " p r o p ­
e r t y  c r i m e "  c a t e g o r y ,  w h i l e  f o r c i b l e  r a p e  a n d  r o b b e r y  a r e  i n ­
c l u d e d  w i t h  m u r d e r  a n d  a g g r a v a t e d  a s s a u l t  i n  a  " v i o l e n t  
c r i m e "  c a t e g o r y .  T h e  m a i n  d i s t i n c t i o n  h e r e  i s  t h a t  t h e  v i o ­
l e n t  c r i m e  c a t e g o r y  i n c l u d e s  t h o s e  o f f e n s e s  a g a i n s t  p e r s o n s ,  
w h i l e  t h e  p r o p e r t y  c r i m e s  a r e  n o t  d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  p e r s o n s .
I t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  o u r  f a c t o r  a n a l y s i s  g r o u p i n g  o f  t h e  s e v e n  
i n d e x  c r i m e s  t e n d s  t o  e m p h a s i z e  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  m o t i v e s ,  a n d  
t h e r e b y  g r o u p s  f o r c i b l e  r a p e ”*' a n d  r o b b e r y  w i t h  p r o p e r t y  
c r i m e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  w i t h  v i o l e n t  c r i m e s .
T h e  f a c t  t h a t  A u t o  T h e f t  I n c r e a s e  l o a d s  e q u a l l y  o n  
b o t h  f a c t o r s  t h r e e  a n d  f o u r  i s  n o t e d .  I n  t h i s  i n s t a n c e  w e  
h a v e  e l e c t e d  t o  i n c l u d e  A u t o  T h e f t  I n c r e a s e  i n  o u r  l a b e l  f o r  
t h e  f o u r t h  f a c t o r ,  w i t h  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  o f f e n s e  c a t e ­
g o r y  w h i c h  c l e a r l y  d o m i n a t e s  t h i s  f a c t o r  i s  M u r d e r  I n c r e a s e .
I n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s  A m o n g  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  I n d i c a t o r s
H a v i n g  d e s c r i b e d  t h e  i n d i c a t o r s  w h i c h  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d i v i s i o n  o f  o u r  s y s t e m s  m o d e l ,  w e  t u r n  n o w  t o  
t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a m o n g  t h e s e  i n d i c a t o r s .
This grouping of forcible rape with property crimes 
is supported by Amir, op. cit., p. 8 3 , who reports that 
forcible rape "is not a violent crime in which brutality is 
inflicted upon the victim." We might speculate that this of­
fence is akin to property crimes in that the offender seeks 
to "take" something the victim is reluctant to part with.
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The Pearson product-moment or simple correlations 
among the eleven environmental indicators are set forth in 
Table 3-5* In our analysis of these relationships, we con­
sider first the two factors derived by Hofferbert in 1968: 
Industrialization and Affluence, for which we have used the 
i960 factor scores made available by Hofferbert. Table 3-5 
shows that the single-characteristic environmental variables 
are generally isolated from Industrialization. However, 
with regard to Affluence the variables of Population Increase, 
Negro Increase, and Percent Negro 1968 register correlations 
of .46, .3 0 , and - . 7 1  respectively. It is probable that 
these relationships are of a spurious nature because the 
variable Percent Negro, I960 is an important contributor to 
the Affluence factor, with a loading of -752 as shown in 
Table 3-1.
One exception to the foregoing relationships is the 
virtually equal loading of Non-white Migration on both the 
Industrialization and Affluence factors (.44 and .46). This 
is most likely a reflection of the Negro migration away from 
the South to the more industrialized states. Because there 
were so few Negroes residing in some of these states prior 
to 1 9 5 0, the in-migration of a small number of Negroes during 
the 19 5 0 's resulted in a large percentage increase, thereby 
skewing the data on this variable.
The relationships between the four crime-environment 
factors and Industrialization show a positive association
TABLE 3-5.—  Environmental Indicators - Simple Correlations^





5 Negro Increase, 60-70
6 Percent Negro, I9 6 8
7 Contributions Claimed
8 Low Rape and Property
Crime Rates, 6 6 - 6 9
9 Low murder-high Suicide/
Homicide Ratio10 Rape and Property Crime
Rate Increases, 6 6 - 6 9




. 0 8 .46
.44 . 5 2 .43
.04 . 3 0 - . 0 6 . 5 6
. 0 9 - . 7 1 .01 - . 4 3 - . 5 0
. 1 5 -.11 . 1 3 -.24 - . 3 0 .37
- . 2 5 -.53 - . 6 3 - . 2 5 . 0 6 . 0 9 - . 1 7
-.01 . 5 6 - . 0 3 . 5 0 . 5 7 -.83 -.33 . 0 1
.18 .16 . 2 3 . 2 6 .20 -.04 - . 0 9 . 0 1
5 . 0 . 0
o00
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of Industrialization with Murder and Auto Theft Increase, 
and a negative association with Low Rape and Property Crime 
Rates. While this may appear inconsistent at first, the 
negative relationship with low rates implies a positive 
relationship with high crime rates of the categories speci­
fied. The above set of relationships suggests that states 
with relatively high 1966-1969 mean rates of rape and prop­
erty crime recorded the greatest increases in murder rates. 
The implication here is that prior to 1966 the murder rates 
in these states were relatively low, and even slight in­
creases in the number of murders over the four-year period 
resulted in the statistically high increases.
Considering the relationship between Population In­
crease (1960-1970) and Low Rape and Property Crime Rates, a 
rather strong negative relationship (-.633) is recorded.
This indicates that states which experienced relatively high 
in-migrations also experienced relatively high rates of 
rape, robbery, larceny, burglary and auto theft.
Percent Negro, 1968, is strongly (and negatively) as­
sociated with only one of the four crime-environment factors 
— Low Murder and High Suicide/Homicide Ratio. Again a nega­
tive relationship with low crime rates implies that a rela­




Chapter III has introduced the eleven environmental 
indicators which comprise the input division of the systems 
model. Among these indicators are Hofferbert's factors—  
Industrialization and Affluence— derived by factor analysis 
from twenty-one ecological variables representative of i960 
interstate socio-economic variances. These two factors are 
supplemented by four single-characteristic variables which 
record shifts in population and racial balance occurring be­
tween 1950 and 1 9 6 8. In addition, employing factor analysis 
techniques, four crime environment factors have been derived 
from the fifteen criminal activity indicators introduced. 
Incident to the derivation of the crime -environment factors, 
some of the problems encountered in the collection of com­
parable crime statistics have been discussed.
Our examination of the interrelationships among the 
eleven environmental indicators shown in Table 3-5 has in­
dicated that relatively high rates of property crime (rob­
bery, burglary, larceny and auto theft) and forcible rape are 
strongly associated with high rankings in Affluence and Pop­
ulation Increase, and moderately related to Industrialization 
and Non-white Migration. In contrast, violent crimes against 
persons (murder and aggravated assault) tend to occur most 
frequently in states where the Negro population is highest.
On the other hand, states which recorded the largest per­
centage increase in their Negro populations during the past
Ill
two decades tended to rank below-average in rates of violent 
personal crime between 1966 and 1969.
Lastly, of interest is the definite and positive re­
lationship (r = .5 6) between Industrialization and the Murder 
and Auto Theft Increase factor. Further examination of the 
simple correlations (not shown in Table 3-5) reveals that the 
Auto Theft Increase (1966-1969) and Industrialization rela­
tionship dominates (r = .62), while the increase in reported 
murder rates is virtually isolated from Industrialization 
(r = -.0 6 ).
CHAPTER IV 
POLITICAL SYSTEM INDICATORS
Chapter IV introduces and describes the political 
system indicators listed in Figure ^-1. As in the preceding 
chapter, two multi-characteristic factors derived by earlier 
researchers are enlisted as chief indicators of state po­
litical systems. Factor analysis is employed to derive two 
factors which are representative of criminal justice systems 
and which are treated as part of the political system for 
the purposes of this inquiry. These four factors are aug­
mented by single-characteristic variables. Factor scores
Figure 4-1.— Political System Indicators 
State Political Systems Criminal Justice Systems
P r o f e s s i o n a l i s m - L o c a l  P o l i c e - C o r r e c t i o n s  E x p e n d i t u r e s
R e l i a n c e  J u d i c i a l - P r o s e c u t i o n  E x p e n d t ' s
C o m p e t i t i o n - T u r n o u t  E x p e n d i t u r e  L e v e l
S t a t e / L o c a l  E x p e n d i t u r e  R a t i o  
G o v e r n o r ' s  F o r m a l  P o w e r  P r i s o n e r / P o p u l a t i o n  R a t i o
P r i s o n  I n m a t e  I n c r e a s e  
R e v e n u e  a s  P e r c e n t  o f  P e r c e n t  P r i s o n e r s  P a r o l e d
P e r s o n a l  I n c o m e  S P A  P o l i c e  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n
I n n o v a t i o n  S P A  C o u r t s  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n
S P A  C o r r e c t i o n s  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
C e n t r a l i z a t i o n  S t a t e / L o c a l  S P A  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n
R a t i o
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and other data concerning the indicators to be described 
below are located in Appendix B of this study.
Professionalism-Local Reliance 
The first of two multi-characteristic factors which 
are representative of state political systems, Professional­
ism-Local Reliance, has been derived by Sharkansky and 
Hofferbert,”' who describe this factor as having drawn its 
name
. . . from the positively-loaded measures of judicial 
and legislative compensation, expenditures on legisla­
tive compensation, expenditures on legislative services, 
and legislative activity; and from negatively-loaded 
measures of reliance upon state government expenditures 
and federal aids. States scoring high on this factor 
show high salaries for judges and legislators, well- 
financed legislative staffs, and primary reliance on 
locally-raised and spent revenues. . . . (This factor) 
suggests that states making heavy use of intergovern­
mental assistance have judicial and legislative insti­
tutions that are less well-developed than average.^
Loadings of the political variables employed by
Sharkansky and Hofferbert on Professionalism-Local Reliance
are listed in Table lf-1.
Competition-Turnout 
The second of our two chief indicators of state po­
litical systems is Competition-Turnout, another factor
Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions 
of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," in American 
Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII, No. 3 (September 1969),
pp. 8 6 7-7 9 .
^Ibid., p. 870.
11 +̂
TABLE ^-1.— Varimax, Rotated Factor Loadings of Political 







Compensation of Judges .897 .045
Compensation of Legislators .865 .142
Legislative Service Ex­
penditures .821 .025
Number of Bills Introduced . 8 1 2 -.130
State and Local Revenue from 
Federal Government -.763 -.293
State and Local Revenue 
spent by state agencies -.732 -.330
Lower House Seats of the 
Major Party - . 2 8 0 -.861
Gubernatorial Election 
Turnout .033 .827
Gubernatorial Vote for Major 
Party -.077 -.775
Liberal Suffrage Laws -.006 .717
Lower House Tenure of Major 
Party -.061 -.623
Percent of total variance 36.7# 2 8 .8#
Source: Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, ’’Dimensions
of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," 
in American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII, 
No. 3 (September 1969), pp. 867-79*
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derived by Sharkansky and Hofferbert. Their description of
this factor is as follows:
(Competition-Turnout) has as its highest-loaded var­
iables the measures of turnout in a gubernatorial 
election, an index of suffrage liberality, and (nega­
tively) one-party dominance in the state legislature 
and in recent elections for governor. The Competition- 
Turnout dimension provides some post hoc justification 
for the many studies of state politics that have focused 
almost entirely on electoral processes and inter-party 
struggles.1
The reasons for adopting both Professionalism-Local 
Reliance and Competition-Turnout as the chief indicators of 
state political systems are found in the variable loadings 
displayed in Table . The variable which loads highest 
on Professionalism-Local Reliance is Compensation of Judges. 
Considering the importance of the judicial function to crim­
inal justice administration and assuming that there exists 
some relationship between compensation of judges and the 
character of judicial decisions the contribution of this one 
variable renders Professionalism-Local Reliance potentially 
important to our analysis. The variables which are next in 
importance to this factor are the three indicators of pro­
fessionalism in state legislatures. These characteristics 
could be instrumental in legislative decisions related to 
state expenditures for criminal justice functions, and to 
the character of state criminal statutes. Such legislative 
decisions affect the style of police and other criminal 
justice activities within the state and thereby enhance
llbid.
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the potential of Professionalism-Local Reliance as an indi­
cator of influences on law enforcement planning.
With regard to the Competition-Turnout factor the 
importance of those variables which pertain to the compet- 
titiveness among state political parties is noteworthy, as 
is the contribution of other variables which measure the 
degree of voter participation in state-wide elections. High 
scores in both party competition and voter participation 
suggest the presence of general support for the existing
political structure, and a lessened propensity toward the .
1alienation and civil disorder related thereto. For this 
reason Competition-Turnout merits inclusion as a potentially 
important indicator of law enforcement planning influences, 
especially since the control of civil disorder is one of the 
main objectives of Federal assistance to state and local law 
enforcement agencies.
Governor's Formal Powers 
One outcome of Joseph A. Schlesinger's study, "The
pPolitics of the Executive," is a general index of the 
formal powers of each state's governor. This index is based 
on four specific measures of the governor's formal powers: 
tenure potential, appointive power, budgetary power, and 
veto power. In the index devised by Schlesinger the maximum
’'see Easton, (1965)? op. cit., p. 55*
2In Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, eds., Poli­
tics in the American States; A Comparative Analysis (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1965’)? PP* 207-237*
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rating is a score of 19, awarded only to New York. The low­
est rating assigned is a score of 7, for which four states 
qualify: North Dakota, Texas, Mississippi and South
Carolina.^
In Schlesinger's judgment, the formal strength of 
each state's governor is positively associated with the size 
of the state of which he is the chief executive. This sug­
gests that "as the complexity of a state increases, the 
governor’s need for explicit means of control over his ad-
pministration also increases."
Although an index ranging from 7 to 19 may be ade­
quate for Schlesinger's purposes, at this point it appears 
that the narrow range of index scores will not provide the 
degree of discrimination needed in dealing with forty-eight 
states.^ This raises the question of whether Schlesinger's 
index of gubernatorial power merits inclusion here as an 
indicator of state political system characteristics.
The reason for the inclusion of Schlesinger's index, 
despite its apparent limitations, lies in the implications of 
the block grant funding method which give the governor a key 
role in influencing the direction of law enforcement planning 
within his state— provided, of course, that the governor has
^Ibid.. p. 228.
^Ibid., p. 231 .
^Sharkansky and Hofferbert, op. cit., p. 8 7 1 , note 
that Schlesinger's index survived their initial test for high 
intercorrelations among substantively similar variables, but 
failed the test for higher loading on a single factor.
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the formal powers to appoint those whom he wishes as members 
of the SPA supervisory board within the guidelines set forth 
by LEM. Table of Appendix B, for example, illustrates 
the great variance in the composition of the various SPA's. 
Representation by sheriff and police departments ranges from 
a high of 55*6 percent in Vermont to a low of 12.5 percent 
in Delaware, for example.
Revenue as Percent of Personal Income 
In his comparative study of the issue-basis of po­
litical divisions, John H. Fenton uses the percent of per 
capita income collected as state and local tax revenue from 
own sources to isolate those states in which issue-oriented 
politics exists independent of the two-party form. Fenton 
reports that his measure of governmental versus private al­
location of income is not significantly related to competi­
tion, income or urbanism. He concludes that the level of 
government versus private expenditures is at least partially 
determined by factors somewhat independent of these three 
variables.^ In his search for independent factors, Fenton 
notes that in 1959 eleven of the twelve states which ranked 
lowest in governmental versus private allocation of personal 
income had one important characteristic in common:
In each one, with the single exception of Connecticut, 
the composition of both the Democratic and Republican 
parties is in part a function of the Civil War. People
 ̂John H. Fenton, People and Parties in Politics 
(Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman & Co., I96é), p. ^8.
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from the South who settled in those states often sympa­
thized with the South during the Civil War and voted 
Democratic, and settlers from New England voted Re­
publican in support of Abraham Lincoln. The political 
loyalties that developed out of the Civil War persist 
in the l960's through the sons and grandsons of the 
original settlers, which means that current political 
affiliations have little relevance to current issues. 
Thus, in these states, class and other divisions of 
the electorate concerning twentieth-century issues are 
obscured and distorted by the white supremacy issue and 
by the sectional division produced by the Civil War, and 
the consequence in all eleven states has been an almost 
unbroken history of standpattism and oligarchical rule.^
Taking our lead from Fenton, we include State and 
Local Revenue as Percent of Personal Income as an indicator 
of state political systems. Our interest here is the rela­
tionships between state histories of "standpattism and 
oligarichal rule," patterns of criminal activity, and the 
allocation decisions of the state law enforcement planning 
agencies. Data for this indicator is taken from Rankings of
pthe States and consists of the general revenue of state and 
local governments from own sources, 1967-1968, as percent of 
personal income in 1968.
In comparing the 1959 data used by Fenton with the
1 9 6 7 - 1 9 6 8 data employed in this study, we note that eight of 
the twelve lowest-ranking states in Fenton's 1959-based list 
were still among the twelve lowest-ranking in 1968: Texas,
Ibid. Regarding Connecticut, Fenton comments: "It
is possible that Connecticut's low rank is due to the high 
incomes of suburban dwellers near New York City, which dis­
torts the per capita income figure for the state."
p National Education Association (Washington, D.C., 
1970), p. 3 8 .
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New Jersey, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Virginia, 
Illinois and Missouri. The four states which climbed out of 
the ’’lowest twelve” grouping are Maryland, West Virginia, 
Kentucky and Delaware. These four have been replaced by 
Tennessee, Arkansas, Rhode Island and New Hampshire.^
It is important to note that our data, like that of 
Fenton, is based solely on personal income; other measures 
of a state’s financial resources such as corporate income and 
wealth, are not reflected. Thus, our indicator does not 
reflect the full measure of a state’s ability to finance 
public services, including law enforcement or criminal- 
justice services.
Innovation
To explain the relative speed of adoption and the
patterns of diffusion of innovations by state legislatures,
2Walker has devised an ’’innovation score” which we have 
adopted as an additional means of investigating political 
system influences on state-wide law enforcement planning.
The reason for including Innovation as a political 
system indicator rests in a belief that states whose legis­
latures are ’’innovative” should be those states in which law 
enforcement planning is also ’’innovative.”
^This instability over time of the lowest-ranking 
states appears to weaken Fenton’s thesis of the continuing 
effects of the Civil War.
2jack L. Walker, ’’The Diffusion of Innovation among 
the American States,” American Political Science Review 
LXIII (September, 1969), 880-899-
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Walker’s Innovation score is based on his analysis 
of eighty-eight different programs which were enacted by at 
least twenty state legislatures prior to 1965* The larger 
the innovation score, the faster the state has been, on the 
average, in responding to new ideas or policies.^ The pro­
grams considered by Walker comprised six to eight different 
pieces of legislation in each of twelve areas: welfare,
health, education, conservation, planning, administrative 
organization, highways, civil rights, corrections and police, 
labor, taxes, and professional regulation. Sixteen of the 
eighty-eight programs diffused primarily during the latter 
half of the nineteenth century; the remainder were adopted 
during the twentieth century. States ranking highest in 
Innovation include New York, Massachusetts, California, New 
Jersey, and Michigan. Those ranking lowest include Texas 
(4^th), South Carolina, Wyoming, Nevada, and Mississippi 
(4-8 th).
Centralization 
In an effort to evaluate the degree to which im­
portant decisions in state political systems come from one 
organizational location (centralized decision-making) or are 
shaped by several cohesive subgroups (decentralized decision­
making), Wayne L. Francis has developed a centralization
'’ibid., p. 883.
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index, which ranges from 0.0 to 1.0.  ̂ This index is based 
on the opinions of state legislators as to where the most 
significant decisions are made in their legislature. Opin­
ions were obtained by means of a mail questionnaire.
Responses from legislators who felt that important 
decisions are made "in the governor's office" or in "policy 
committee" were assigned a score of 1.0. "Party caucus" 
rated a score of .50, while "regular committee meetings" and 
"on the floor" received scores of 0.0. The scores were 
totaled for each state and then divided by the number of re­
sponses for that state. Responses ranged in number from 5 
in Texas to 25 in Iowa, with an overall return rate of 5^ 
percent from 1,600 questionnaires mailed in late August and 
early September, 1963.
According to Francis' centralization index, Alabama, 
New Jersey and Tennessee rank highest in centralization, 
while South Carolina, Nevada and Florida rank lowest. Scores 
for all forty-eight states are located in Table B-2 of Ap­
pendix B.
The rationale for inclusion of Centralization is 
similar to that given for including Governor's Formal Power 
as an indicator of state political system characteristics. 
Since a high Centralization score implies that important de­
cisions are made in either the governor's office or in policy
^Wayne L. Francis, Legislative Issues in the Fifty 
States; A Comparative Analysis (Chicago; Rand McNally & 
Co., 1967), pp. 72-75-
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committee, where governors are frequently important partici­
pants, it is appropriate to consider Centralization as being, 
in effect, a measure of governor’s informal power.
Political System Interrelationships 
The relationships among the political system indi­
cators shown in Table ^-2, indicate that Professionalism- 
Local Reliance and Competition-Turnout are both positively 
related or associated with Innovation and Governor's Formal 
Power. However, the Sharkansky-Hofferbert factors are in­
versely related to Centralization and to State and Local 
Revenue as Percent of Personal Income. This suggests that 
although the correlations with the latter two variables are 
less than with the first two, the inverse relationships may 
portend greater explanatory power by Centralization and State 
and Local Revenue as Percent of Personal Income than the 
simple correlations imply.
The negative relationship between Centralization and 
the State and Local Revenue Indicator suggests that where the 
key decisions on legislation are made in the Governor's 
Office or locations other than in the state legislature, the 
citizens are less willing to tax themselves than in states 
where decision making is less centralized.
Criminal Justice System Indicators 
For the purposes of this study, state criminal- 
justice systems are treated as subsystems of the state
12 +̂
TABLE k-2.— Simple Correlations, Political System Indicators




3 Innovation .71 .37
k Governors' Formal 
Power .39 .32 .52
5 Centralization .26 -.17 .31 .37
6 State & Local Revenue 
as % Pers. Income -.20 .20 -.18 -.04 -.26
political systems.^ Since this inquiry concerns the in­
fluences of both environmental and political system vari­
ances on law enforcement planning outputs, and in view of 
the fact that the several components of the criminal justice 
system— courts, corrections and police— are strongly repre­
sented on the SPA boards, it is apparent that the following 
indicators are important to our overall analysis.
Variances in state criminal justice systems for 
which indicators have been selected reflect three distinct 
areas: 1) expenditures by state and local governments for
all criminal justice functions; 2) state prison systems; and 
3) the composition of the SPA supervisory boards.
It is recognized that state criminal justice systems 
could be considered indicators of policy outcomes. At one 
point certain criminal justice expenditure indicators are 
employed as dependent variables in order to determine the 
influence of other political system and environmental char­
acteristics on the criminal justice system of each state.
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Criminal Justice Expenditures 
This comparison of differences in criminal justice 
expenditures by both state and local governments within the 
state relies on the December, 1970 report issued jointly by 
LEAA and the Bureau of the Census, "Expenditure and Employ­
ment Data for the Criminal Justice System, 1 9 6 8-6 9 ." In each 
of the indicators derived from this report, expenditures are 
computed in terms of each state's 1968 total personal income 
in order to provide a basis for comparison of the relative 
fiscal effort that the expenditures entail.
As explained in the LEAA-Bureau of the Census report, 
expenditure data for the report was gathered in connection 
with the 1 9 6 8 - 1 9 6 9 Annual Survey of Governmental Finance, and 
the 1969 Annual Survey of Public Employment, both conducted 
by the Bureau of the Census. These surveys were augmented by 
responses to mail canvass questionnaires sent to a sample of 
approximately 6,200 local governments to elicit judicial ex­
penditure data. The data is presented with a warning that 
there are "various limitations on the comparability of gov­
ernmental finance and employment data.
While recognizing the limitations of the data used, 
it is important to note that prior to December, 1970 expendi­
tures for judicial activities were not separately tabulated
U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assist­
ance Administration, and Bureau of the Census, "Expenditure 
and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System, 1968- 
6 9 ," issued, December, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the 
LEAA-Bureau of the Census report).
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in report:: on criminal justice expenditures. Hence, this is 
the first instance in which expenditures for all three major 
components of the criminal justice system by both state and 
local governments have been available for comparative pur­
poses.
Listed below are the six variables derived from the 
LEAA-Bureau of the Census report which have been adopted as 
indicators of interstate variance in criminal-justice systems 
for fiscal year 1963-1969*
1. Ratio of state government expenditures to local 
government expenditures for all criminal justice functions.
2. Percent of total personal income (1968) ex­
pended by state and local government for all criminal justice 
activities.
3. Percent of state and local criminal justice ex­
penditures allocated to police protection. This includes 
regular police service, traffic control, and traffic safety 
activities, vehicular inspection, and detention and custody 
of persons awaiting trial at the municipal level.
V. Percent of state and local criminal justice ex­
penditures allocated to judicial activities, including all 
courts and activities associated with courts (e.g. law li­
braries, medical and social service activities, and juries).
5. Percent of state and local criminal justice ex­
penditures allocated to prosecution, which includes the ac­
tivities of the attorneys general and their staffs involving
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advice to the Governor on the legality of proposed actions, 
representation of the State in all law suits, and prosecution 
of violators of criminal law. Expenditures for both civil 
and criminal activities are included.
6. Percent of state and local criminal justice ex­
penditures allocated to correctional activities, which in­
clude the confinement and correction of adults and minors 
convicted of offenses against the law, as well as the pardon, 
parole, and probation activities. Expenditure data for 
county jails and other closely related items are included, 
but not for city jails, which is included under police pro­
tection.
In order to keep the number of indicators dealt with 
to a minimum, variables 3 through 6 above have been subjected 
to factor analysis, using the varimax rotation technique.
The result of this analysis, as shown in Table ^-3> is to 
combine the four variables into two criminal justice expendi­
ture factors.
From Table 4-3 it is apparent that the first factor 
reflects relatively high state and local expenditures for 
police protection and relatively low expenditures for cor­
rectional activities. We specify the relative nature of these 
expenditures for the reason that nation-wide expenditures for 
police protection are consistently highest (62 percent), 
while correctional activities receive about one-third that 
amount (2l percent), and judicial and prosecution activities
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TABLE ^-3 .— Rotated Varimax Factor Matrix of State and Local 






Police Protection .95635 -.28492
Correctional Activities - . 9 2 6 3 1 -.34687
Judicial Activities -. 1 5206 .8 1 6 1 3
Prosecution Activities - . 1 5 2 1 5 . 6 8 3 9 7
Percent of Total Variance 4 5 . 5 3 3 .^
Factor Labels: 1 - Police-Corrections Expenditures
2 - Judicial-Prosecution Expenditures
rank a poor third (7 percent).^ Thus, when we indicate that 
a state expends a relatively high amount on police protec­
tion, and a relatively low amount on correctional activities, 
we mean that police protection commands more than 62 percent 
of criminal justice system expenditures, and correctional 
activities receive something less than the national average 
of 21 percent.
Of the state and local government expenditures for 
the Judicial-Prosecution factor, judicial activities account 
for 76 percent, while prosecution claims the remaining 2k 
percent.
Computed from LEAA-Bureau of the Census, op. cit.. 
Table 5? pp. 1^-15*
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State Prison Systems 
The second type of criminal justice system indica­
tors to be dealt with are those which are representative of 
state prison system differences. Data used is for the year 
1 9 6 7, which is the most recent data available.^
Prisoner-to-Population Ratio. The ratio of the 19&7 
year-end inmate population of state prisons to the number of 
persons residing in the state ranges from a high of 1.448 
prisoners per 1,000 population in California, to a low of 
0 . 2 8 5  per 1,000 in North Dakota, with a national mean of 0.886 
inmates per 1,000 population. Care must be taken in inter­
preting this ratio because of the wide variances in minimum 
sentence which leads to incarceration in a state's prison 
system, and in parole policies.
Prison Inmate Increase. The second indicator of state 
prison system variance is the percentage increase in prison 
inmate population between 1964 and 1967* Nationally, the 
total number of state prison inmates at the end of 1967 was 
8 . 9  percent less than at the end of 1964, indicating that 
there existed during this four-year period a general trend 
toward reducing the number of persons incarcerated in state 
prison systems. Whether this trend is offset by increases 
in jail populations is unknown. Of the forty-eight states 
studied, eleven recorded net increases in inmate populations.
"'u.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 
National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin. No. 44 (1967)*
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with Nevada leading with an increase of 35«1 percent, from 
^ 5 0 to 65l prisoners, between 1964 and 1967- The state which 
recorded the largest percentage reduction in inmate popula­
tion is West Virginia with a drop of 29.8 percent from 
1 , 7 2 2 to 1 , 2 0 8  prisoners.
Percent Prisoners Paroled. The final indicator of 
state penal systems included in this study is the percent of 
all state prison inmates released during 1967 who were re­
leased on parole or other conditional release. Nationally, 
6 7 . 6  percent of inmates released from state prisons during 
1967 were granted conditional releases (generally on parole). 
The state of Washington led all others in this category by 
conditionally releasing 99.8 percent of inmates, while Oregon 
released only 40.1 percent in this manner. Wyoming ranks 
last in percent of conditional releases with 8 . 7  percent, 
which means that over 91 percent of Wyoming's state prison 
inmates who were released during 1967 served out their sen­
tences in confinement.
The foregoing does not take into account the average 
length of sentence awarded by the courts in each of the 
states. This could have an important impact on parole phi­
losophies. Another factor here, and one which is dealt with 
later, is the pressure on parole boards to maintain a con­
stant level in the inmate population of the state prison 
system.
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State Planning Agency Composition 
The third area in which indicators of criminal jus­
tice system differences are sought is in the composition of 
the SPA supervisory boards which have been appointed by the 
forty-eight state governors in response to the Safe Streets 
Act. Assisted by a professional staff, the SPA board is re­
sponsible for planning and implementing law enforcement im­
provement on a state-wide, coordinated basis. This responsi­
bility includes, inter alia, establishing priorities for law 
enforcement improvement; monitoring progress and auditing 
expenditures under grants to local units of government; co­
ordination with other federally-supported programs having an 
impact on law enforcement; and collecting data relevant to 
law enforcement in the state as required by LEAA.
LEAA Criteria. Guidelines^ published by LEAA set 
forth the criteria for SPA board composition. Of particular 
interest are the criteria for representation. The Safe 
Streets Act stipulates that state planning agencies must be
representative "of law enforcement agencies of the State and
2of the units of general local government within the State." 
In implementing this provision, LEAA guidelines require
U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assist­
ance Administration, Guide for Comprehensive Law Enforcement 
Planning and Action Grants, Fiscal Year 1970, p p . 3-4.
^Public Law 90-351? op. cit.. Sect. 203(a).
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’’balanced representation" in the make-up of the SPA board, 
which must include representation of the following:"'
1 . State law enforcement agencies.
2. Units of general local government by elected 
policy-making or executive officials.
3. Law enforcement officials or administrators from 
local units of government.
4. Each major law enforcement function— police, 
corrections, courts— plus, where appropriate, representa­
tion identified with the Act’s special emphasis areas, 
that is, organized crime and riots and civil disorders.
5. Juvenile delinquency, as well as adult crime 
control competencies.
6 . Community or citizen interests.
7. Reasonable geographic and urban-rural balance, 
with regard for the incidence of crime and the distri­
bution and concentration of law enforcement services in 
the State.
Lastly, the LEAA guidelines call for representation 
between State law enforcement agencies on the one hand and 
local units of government and local law enforcement agencies 
on the other, to approximate proportionate representation of 
State and local interests.
The foregoing has been set forth to illustrate the 
problem faced by a governor who would seek to comply with 
the LEAA guidelines in this respect. Two "loophole" pro­
visions in the guidelines ease the governor’s problem how­
ever. The first makes it possible for one board member "to 
be representative of more than one element or interest. "
The second provides for a case-by-case evaluation by LEAA of 
the "representative character of a State planning agency and 
its staff." This provision is in recognition of the
^LEAA Guide, op. cit., pp. $-6.
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"existing diversity of State governmental structures and of 
law enforcement conditions within the States."^
Among the several responsibilities of the SPA 
boards, the main concern of this study is the manner in which 
these boards allocated the $l8 ^ . 5  million in fiscal 1970 
block grant action funds. In effect, the allocation de­
cisions of the forty-eight SPA boards constitute the prin­
cipal "dependent" variables, that is the law enforcement 
planning outputs, of this inquiry.
SPA Board Composition. In spite of the detailed 
LEAA criteria for representation on SPA boards, for the most 
part these boards are composed of criminal justice system 
representatives— which seems reasonable considering the re­
sponsibilities involved. The degree of citizen and local 
elected official representation is generally quite small.
As of December 31, 19&9, it was estimated that citizens oc­
cupied 19 percent of SPA board memberships, while local 
elected officials occupied 13 percent and "others" 15 percent.
As a means of analysis, the following four indica­
tors of SPA board composition have been derived from a report 
to the Congress by the Advisory Commission on Intergovern­
mental Relations dated June, 1970:^
^Ibid., p. 6.
pAdvisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
op. cit.. Table 6.
^Ibid.
13^
1 . Percent of SPA board members representing police 
agencies, both state and local, including sheriffs depart­
ments and highway patrol agencies.
2. Percent of SPA board members representing courts, 
including the judicial, prosecution and defense functions.
3 . Percent of SPA board members representing cor­
rectional activities, including probation, parole and penal.
k. The ratio of the SPA board members representing 
state government agencies to those representing non-state 
government agencies and "citizens," hereinafter referred to 
as the state/local ratio.
Criminal Justice System Interrelationships
The interrelationships among the eleven criminal 
justice system indicators are set forth in Table In­
spection of this Table indicates that where the state/local 
criminal justice expenditure ratio is high, expenditures for 
correctional activities are also high, and expenditures for 
police activities are relatively low. The explanation here 
is that in most states the prison system claims the bulk of 
the state government’s criminal-justice expenditures."' Thus, 
when the state-to-local expenditure ratio is high, expendi­
tures for correctional activities may be above average, or 
may only appear to be so due to the absence of large city 
expenditures for police protection and related activities
This statement is based on a review of the data pre­
sented in Table k of the LEAA-Bureau of the Census report,
0 0 . cit.
TABLE 4-4.- - S i m p l e  C o r r e l a t i o n s ^  o f  C r i m i n a l  J u s t i c e  S y s t e m  I n d i c a t o r s
I n d i c a t o r 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 P o l i c e - C o r r e c t i o n s
E x p e n d i t u r e s
2 J u d i c i a l - P r o s e c u ­
t i o n  E x p e n d i t u r e s -.01
3 P o l i c e  R e p r e s e n t a ­
t i o n  o n  S P A  B o a r d -.23 .09
4 C o u r t s  R e p r e s e n t a ­
t i o n  o n  S P A  B o a r d .19 .12 -.13
5 C o r r e c t ' n s  R e p r e s e n t a ­
t i o n  o n  S P A  B o a r d .  l 6 .14 .05 .02
6 I n m a t e / P o p u l a t i o n
R a t i o .07 -.13 -.13 -.29 -.10
7 P e r c e n t  P a r o l e d .07 -.05 .06 .16 -.08 -.25
8 T o t a l  C r i m i n a l  J u s ­
t i c e  E x p e n d i t u r e s .01 .10 -.09 -.08 -.15 .17 .07
9 S t a t e / L o c a l  R a t i o ,  
C r i m . J u s t .  E x p e n d ' s -.60 -.11 .35 -.01 -.06 -.18 .06 -.50
10 S t a t e / L o c a l  R a t i o  
o n  S P A  B o a r d -.03 .01 -.10 .42 -.02 -.14 .02 -.11 .19
11 P r i s o n  P o p u l a t i o n  
I n c r e a s e ,  1964-6? .05 -.11 .02 -.22 -.07 .03 -.00 .38 -.05 .19
CO
VJ1
^ P e a r s o n ' s  r .
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including the operation of jails or other pre-trial detention 
facilities not counted as "correctional activities."
A second relationship of interest among the Table 4-4 
indicators is the positive association between Prison Popu­
lation Increase and the total expenditures for all criminal 
justice functions. One interpretation of this relationship 
might be that expenditures have risen in response to in­
creases in "criminality" during the i960's. The sequence in 
this instance would be that higher crime rates led to in­
creases in arrests, convictions, and incarcerations, all de­
manding higher-than-average expenditures for criminal justice 
matters. An alternative hypothesis could be that where in­
creased expenditures for criminal justice functions were not 
forthcoming, either fewer persons were awarded prison sen­
tences, or larger percentages were granted parole. This 
second hypothesis is supported by the virtual lack of asso­
ciation between both expenditure factors and Prison Popula­
tion Increase. It is important to note, however, the lack 
of relationship between both the Inmate/Population ratio and 
Percent Paroled and Prison Population Increase.
Lastly among the criminal justice system relation­
ships, the negative (r = -.25) association between Percent 
Paroled and Prison Population Increase is noted. This ap­
pears to be consistent, for as the percent of prisoners re­
leased on parole increases, the prison population should tend 
to decrease, other factors remaining stable, of course.
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Having looked very briefly at the interrelationships 
among the criminal justice system indicators, we turn now to 
a consideration of the manner in which indicators of the 
state political systems are associated with the criminal jus­
tice system characteristics just presented.
Political and Criminal-Justice 
Systems Relationships
The relationships among the six indicators of state 
political systems and the eleven criminal-justice system in­
dicators are set forth in Table ^-5* As in the case of the 
environmental indicator relationships (Table 3-5)? the asso­
ciations here generally are not strong, however, there are 
exceptions.
From Table we can hypothesize that states ranking 
high in Professionalism-Local Reliance ( and in Innovation) 
tend to allocate more than the average percent of personal 
income for all criminal-justice matters. In these states the 
SPA boards include a higher-than-average representation of 
police agencies and local governments tend to bear a greater 
share of criminal-justice system expenditures.
The relationships between Competition-Turnout and 
the criminal-justice system indicators suggest that states 
ranking high in political party competition and voter turn­
out tend to have relatively high representation of the courts 
on SPA boards and provide for the parole of state prison in­
mates more so than does the average state. These same states
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Police-Corrections
Expenditures .24 -.14 .04 .12 .14 -.17
Judicial-Prosecution
Expenditures -.28 .17 -.21 -.14 -.17 .43
Police Representa­
tion on SPA Board .34 -.18 -.30 -.09 -.10 -.03
Courts Representa­
tion on SPA Board .09 .37 .31 .26 .13 -.09
Corrections Represen­
tation, SPA Board -.16 -.08 -.24 -.04 -.15 -.05
Inmate/Population
Ratio .12 -.36 -.07 .10 .12 -.05
Percent Paroled .32 .36 . 5 8 .25 .19 - . 0 6
Total Criminal-jus­
tice Expenditures .49 -.22 .26 . 3 7 -.02 .25
State/Local Ratio,
Grim-Just. Expnd's - . 3 9  -.07 -.22 -.25 -.17 .05
State/Local Ratio on
SPA Board -.07 -.02 .10 -.11 . 1 9 - . 2 8
Prison Population
Increase, 1964-67 .03 -.11 -.04 - . 1 6  - . 1 5  - . 1 7
^Pearson's r.
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appear to spend relatively less of total personal income on 
police protection, enjoy a lower prisoner-to-population ratio, 
and have fewer than average numbers of police representatives 
on their SPA boards.
Summary
C h a p t e r  I V  h a s  d e a l t  w i t h  t h e  n i n e t e e n  i n d i c a t o r s  
w h i c h  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m  d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  s y s t e m s  
m o d e l  u p o n  w h i c h  t h i s  s t u d y  i s  b a s e d .  T h e  p r i m a r y  i n d i c a t o r s  
o f  s t a t e  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m s — P r o f e s s i o n a l i s m - L o c a l  R e l i a n c e  
a n d  C o m p e t i t i o n - T u r n o u t — a r e  a u g m e n t e d  b y  i n d i c a t o r s  o f  
g o v e r n o r ' s  p o w e r ,  b o t h  f o r m a l  a n d  i n f o r m a l ,  a n d  t h e  i n n o v a ­
t i v e n e s s  o f  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s ,  a n d  t h e  p e r c e n t  o f  p e r s o n a l  
i n c o m e  c o l l e c t e d  a s  r e v e n u e  b y  s t a t e  a n d  l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t s .
The relationships among the political system indi­
cators, as shown in Table '+-2, indicate that the innovative­
ness of state legislatures, as defined by Walker, and the 
formal powers of the state's governor, as defined by 
Schlesinger, are positively associated with both Profession­
alism-Local Reliance and Competition-Turnout. Centralization 
which is an indicator of the governor's informal power, is 
somewhat negatively associated (r = -.17) with Competition- 
Turnout and positively related (r = .26) with Professionalism- 
Local Reliance. In contrast. State and Local Revenue as Per­
cent of Personal Income shows an inverse relationship with 
the two Sharkansky-Hofferbert factors. Also, the positive 
associations among Innovation, Governor's formal Power and
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Centralization suggest that the innovativeness of a state 
legislature, as defined by Walker, is determined at least in 
part, by the actions of the state's governor.
For the purposes of this study three aspects of state 
criminal justice systems are treated as part of the state 
political system: state and local expenditures for criminal
justice functions, state prison system characteristics, and 
SPA supervisory board composition. Factor analysis has been 
used to reduce the number of expenditure indicators from six 
to four.
The relationships among the eleven criminal justice 
system indicators, as set forth in Table 4-4, reflect the 
fact that state correctional (prison) systems are funded pri­
marily by state governments, while local governments expend 
the bulk of their criminal justice funding on police activ­
ities. Of interest is the positive association (r = .3 8 ) be­
tween prison population increase and total expenditures for 
criminal justice functions. This suggests that either in­
creases in crime rates during the 1960's have led to the 
higher expenditures for criminal administration, or, alter­
natively, that increased appropriations have made it possible 
to arrest and incarcerate an increased number of offenders.
Of interest also is the negative association (r = -.25) be­
tween Percent Prisoners Paroled and Prison Population In­
crease, which appears consistent— for as the percent of 
prisoners released on parole increases, the population of
1̂-1
the prison can be expected to decrease, other conditions re­
maining relatively stable, of course.
The relationships among both political system and 
criminal justice system indicators, as set forth in Table 
^-5, require little additional comment here. High rankings 
in Competition-Turnout are associated with a relatively high 
court representation on the SPA supervisory board and above- 
average scores in Percent Prisoners Paroled. States with 
these characteristics tend also to spend a relatively smaller 
portion of total personal income on police activities, enjoy 
a lower prisoner-to-population ratio, and have a below- 
average representation of police agencies on their SPA boards. 
States ranking high in Professionalism-Local Reliance, and in 
Innovation, have relatively strong police representation on 
their SPA boards and tend to allocate an above-average per­
cent of personal income for all criminal justice functions. 
These states are characterized by high urbanization, with 
large city governments providing the bulk of the overall fi­
nancing for criminal administration.
CHAPTER V
P U B L I C  P O L I C Y  O U T C O M E S  A N D  O U T P U T S
Indicators of the third main division of the systems 
model are presented in this chapter. These indicators are 
of public policy outcomes of a socio-economic nature, and of 
law enforcement planning outputs for fiscal year 1970* In­
cluded in this group of indicators are two policy outcome 
factors derived by Sharkansky and Hofferbert— Welfare-Educa­
tion and Highways-Natural Resources— plus two additional 
measures of general public policy outcomes— Redistributive 
Ratio and Income Distributional Inequality. To these general 
indicators are added six measures of law enforcement plan­
ning, as shown in Figure 5-1*
F i g u r e  $ - 1 . — P o l i c y  O u t c o m e  a n d  O u t p u t  I n d i c a t o r s  
G e n e r a l  P o l i c y  O u t c o m e s  L a w  E n f o r c e m e n t  P l a n n i n g  O u t p u t s
W e l f a r e - E d u c a t i o n  S P A  B l o c k  G r a n t  A l l o c a t i o n s  f o r :
H i g h w a y s - N a t u r a l  R e -  P o l i c e  A c t i v i t i e s
s o u r c e s  C o r r e c t i o n a l  A c t i v i t i e s
C o u r t s
R e d i s t r i b u t i v e  R a t i o  O r g a n i z e d  C r i m e  C o n t r o l
C i v i l  D i s o r d e r  C o n t r o l  
I n c o m e  D i s t r i b u t i o n a l  M i s c e l l a n e o u s
I n e q u a l i t y
1^2
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Factor scores and other data concerning the indicators to be 
described below are located in Appendix C of this study,
Welfare-Education 
The first indicator of general public policy outcomes 
in the American states is the Sharkansky-Hofferbert factor 
Welfare-Education. States ranking high in this dimension 
tend to grant relatively generous welfare payments including 
Aid to Families of Dependent Children, Old Age Assistance,
Aid to the Blind and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Dis­
abled. These states also have a higher percentage of high 
school pupils remaining in school until graduation, and have 
a relatively high percentage of candidates passing the se­
lective service mental examination. The loadings of the 
policy variables employed by Sharkansky and Hofferbert on 
the Welfare-Education factor are set forth in Table 5-1•
Reasons for including this factor as an indicator of 
public policy outcomes are centered on the necessity of de­
termining whether policy outcomes in areas not specifically 
related to criminal justice administration tend to influence 
the allocation decisions of the state law enforcement plan­
ning agencies. The characteristics represented by the 
Welfare-Education factor have also been credited with in­
fluencing the crime environment of the American states; hence, 
although there may be no direct influence of one policy out­
come on another, or on law enforcement planning outputs, it 
is very possible that the "feedback" from policy outcomes
1M+
related to both education and welfare have an Indirect, or
what might be termed "second generation," influence. Daniel
Glaser, for example, stresses the importance of improving the
educational level of the population:
But the primary anti-crime factor in the immediate 
future, in my opinion, is the general educational up­
grading of our population. It has always been true 
that violent reaction to rebuffs, and willingness to 
risk arrest and prosecution by stealing, are more ac- 
cepted--even expected— among the less educated than 
among the more educated. The more educated have more 
to lose by overt crime, and are more conditioned against 
it. I am, of course, not referring to so-called "white 
collar" crime, but to the offenses most often prose­
cuted in our felony courts.^
Other observers report that relative deprivation and 
frustration are important contributors to the violent, per­
sonal crimes dealt with in this study. According to 
2Schuessler, an important factor underlying intercity varia­
tion in crime patterns is linked to social frustration. When 
individuals are led to believe that social advancement op­
portunities are equally distributed throughout the society, 
but live under semicaste conditions, high discontent and as­
sociated violence, especially in inter-personal relation­
ships, may be expected to occur. As Wilks points out,^ most 
current attempts at delinquency and crime prevention are di­
rected toward opening the opportunity structure.
^Daniel Glaser, "Correctional Institutions in a Great 
Society," Criminologica. Ill (August-November, 1965), 3-5*
2Karl Schuessler, "Components of Variation in City 
Crime Rates," Social Problems, 9 (Spring, 1962), 32].
\filks, op. cit., p. 151.
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TABLE 5-1•— Loadings of Policy Variables on the Sharkansky-
Hofferbert Policy Outcome Factors
Welfare- Highways-Natural
Policy Variables Education Resources
AFDC payments .911 .049OAA payments . 1 7 0
High school graduates .848 .113AB payments . 8 3 4 .042
Examination success . 7 7 9 .4l4APTD payments . 7 1 9 - . 2 7 4
Rural road mileage . 1 0 9 .869Hunting licenses - . 0 5 8 .8 6 0
Highway expenditures . 1 1 8 .857Fishing licenses .040 . 8 0 0
Natural resource expdt’s . 3 1 0 . 7 1 9OAA recipients .041 . 7 0 9
Percent of Total Variance 35»^ 3 4 . 9
Source: Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions
of State Politics, Economies, and Public Policy," 
in American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII, 
No. 3 (September, 1969), p.
Highways-Natural Resources 
The major components of the second Sharkansky- 
Hofferbert policy outcome factor— Highways-Natural Resources 
— are measures of rural highway mileage and highway expendi­
tures, plus indicators of fish and wildlife services and 
expenditures for natural resources. The incidence of Old 
Age Assistance recipients among the population with incomes 
of less than $2,000 also loads high (r = .?1). The authors 
observe that aid to the aged is "distinct from that of other 
welfare and education programs," and that "the aged are the 
largest group of potential welfare recipients who are
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eligible to vote"^— thus explaining why this variable is not 
reflected in the Welfare-Education Factor. As before, the 
factor loadings of the policy variables dealt with by 
Sharkansky and Hofferbert on this factor are shown in Table
5-1.
The reasons for including Highways-Natural resources 
as an indicator of policy outcomes are similar to those out­
lined with regard to Welfare-Education, especially with re­
gard to the frustration-aggression argument set forth by 
Schuessler. That is, we are interested here in whether high 
scores in those indicators of interest in outdoor recreation 
(hunting and fishing licenses sold, for example) are not in­
versely related to high rates of violent, personal crime.
Redistributive Ratio 
In their study of "The Politics of Redistribution,"^ 
Fry and Winters derive a summary measure of the net redis­
tributive impact of revenues and expenditures for the three 
lowest income classes in each state which they term the Re­
distributive Ratio. In arriving at this Ratio, the expendi­
ture benefits received are compared with the revenue paid by 
each income class. The lowest three income classes, for 
which the Redistributive Ratio is derived, include those
 ̂Sharkansky and Hofferbert, op. cit.. p. 873*
^Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics 
of Redistribution," in American Political Science Review, 
LXIV (June, 1970), 509-522.
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families with 1961 incomes of $3?999 or less. The higher 
ratios indicate more redistribution to the lowest income 
groups. The authors explain the criteria for their Ratio 
as follows:
Since it is commonly believed that the lowest income 
groups are denied access to the decision-making cham­
bers of government, the limitation of our analysis to 
redistribution to the three lowest income groups poses 
a rigorous test for hypotheses involving political 
variables.^
The source of data used by Fry and Winters is a
pstudy by the Tax Foundation and is restricted to revenues 
and expenditures for state governments only, although inter­
governmental revenues and expenditures are included. The 
reasons for including Redistributive Ratio as an indicator 
of policy outcomes are discussed in the section which fol­
lows .
Income Distributional Inequality 
Dye hypothesizes that the degree of income inequal­
ity in a state affects both the character of its political 
system and the content of its policies.3 The Income Distri­
butional Inequality index recommended by Dye has been
 ̂Ibid., p. 51k-.
2Tax Foundation, Inc., Tax Burdens and Benefits of 
Government Expenditure by Income Classes, 1961 and 1965' (New 
York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 1967).
^Thomas R. Dye, "Income Inequality and American 
State Politics," American Political Science Review, LXIII 
(March, 1969), 157-1Ô2.
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incorporated here as a potentially important indicator of 
public policy outcomes.
The reasons for inclusion of this variable, as well 
as the Fry and Winters' Redistributive Ratio, rest on the 
findings of earlier studies^ which indicate that marked in­
come differences, with attendant restrictions on opportunity 
for certain groups, leads to high frustration and consequent 
high rates of certain types of criminal activity, as dis­
cussed above.
Dye employs the Lorenz curve, which shows the cumu­
lative proportions of aggregate income accruing to cumulative 
proportions of the population, and measures the extent of 
income inequality within each state by Gini index which 
ranges from 1.00 (theoretical perfect inequality) to 0.00 
(theoretical perfect equality). The Gini indices used by Dye 
were computed by Thomas D. Hopkins from income distribu­
tional data for total families and unrelated individuals in 
1959- At that time, income inequality was greatest in 
Mississippi (.510) and least in Utah (.39^)» It is Dye's 
contention that the Gini index "permits us to systematically 
explore linkages between income inequalities and other
An excellent summary of "barriers to legitimate 
opportunity" is contained in Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. 
Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity; A Theory of Delinquent 
Gangs (New York: The Free Press, I960), pp. 97-107- See
also Ernest W. Burgess, "The Economic Factor in Juvenile De­
linquency," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, ^3 
(May-June, 1952), pp. 29-42.
1^9
measurable political system and public policy variables,”"' 
thereby providing a single, comparable measure for each 
state.
Lav Enforcement Planning Outputs 
The public policy outcomes of primary interest in
pthis study are those outputs of the law enforcement plan­
ning process which are reflective of allocation decisions 
made by the SPA supervisory boards during fiscal year 1970.
Data concerning these allocations was obtained from 
the Director, Office of Law Enforcement Programs, LEAA in 
the form of a preliminary program analysis prepared in July, 
1 9 7 0. The data from this analysis is presented in Appendix 
C. In this program analysis, prepared by LEAA staff mem­
bers, the percentage of available Federal block grant funds 
allocated to each of six major program categories by each of 
the SPA'S were computed. This was done by studying the 1970 
annual law enforcement plan of each state, and breaking down 
the total planned expenditures into the following six pro­
gram categories: police, corrections, courts, organized
crime, disorders, and miscellaneous.
In order to reduce these six variables to a parsi­
monious number of dependent variables, we subjected them to
^Dye, op. cit. , p. 158.
2See discussion in Chapter I of difference between 
outputs and outcomes.
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a factor analysis employing a varimax rotation technique, 
the results of which are shown in Table 5-2.
TABLE 5-2.--Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix of Six Law Enforce­
ment Planning Output Indicators
Percent of Fiscal 1970 Block 





Police Activities 0.97139 -0.19837
Correctional Activities -0.63697 0 . 3 7 5 0 2
Court Activities -0.64563 -0 . 3 0 3 5 5
Organized Crime Control 0.01130 0 . 7 5 1 0 8
Civil Disorder Control -0 . 0 7 7 9 4 0.74351
Miscellaneous -0.50637 -0 . 4 4 3 1 9
Percent of Total Variance 33.8# 26.4#
Factor labels: 1 - Police, Courts and Corrections
2 - Organized Crime and Disorder Control
From Table 5-2 it is evident that the first factor 
is "double ended" with a very high loading of the police 
activities variable at the positive end, and moderately 
strong loadings of the correctional and court activities 
variables at the negative end. This means that a state 
ranking high in the first factor tended to allocate an above- 
average portion (more than 55 percent) of 1970 block grant 
funds to police activities, and a below-average portion to 
correctional and court activities (that is, below 2 5 .^ per­
cent and 5*5 percent respectively). Low rankings in this
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factor are suggestive of an inverse tendency in allocations 
for police, courts and correctional activities.
The strong, positive loadings of the Organized Crime 
Control and Civil Disorder Control variables on the second 
factor are indications that SPA allocations for these two 
purposes may be influenced by the same circumstances. States 
ranking high in this factor are those which allocated above- 
average portions of block grant funds for either organized 
crime control (2.4 percent) or for civil disorder control 
(2 . 5  percent). Low rankings in this factor suggest lower 
than normal allocations for these purposes; however, inspec­
tion of Table C-4 of Appendix C indicates that all states in 
the lower quartile of both variables allocated less than 0.5 
percent for these purposes. This suggests that low scores 
in the second factor will be of doubtful value.
Policy Outcome Interrelationships
The simple correlations among the policy outcome and 
output indicators dealt with in this study are recorded in 
Table 5-3* Examination of these relationships reveals a 
virtual isolation of Welfare-Education from the SPA alloca­
tion factors. There are, however, indications that high 
rankings in Welfare-Education are associated with SPA allo­
cations for courts (r = .2 3 ) and to control organized crime 
(r = .11). Highways-Natural Resources is unrelated to the 
Police-Courts-Corrections factor but does show a modest nega­
tive association (r = -.24) with the Organized Crime and












Income Distributional Inequality 
SPA Allocations for Police
SPA Allocations for Courts
.27 
-.00 -.37 
-.72 -.05 -.25 
-.08 -.05 .09 .13
.23 - . 1 2  . 2 2 -.41 - . 5 0
SPA Allocations for Correct- -.07 .22 -.22 -.02 - . 6 7
ional Activities
8 SPA Allocations for Organized . 1 1 .00 -.23 .04 -.16
Crime Control
9 SPA Allocations for Civil -.08 .04 -.01 .16 -.23
Disorder Control10 Police-Courts-Corrections -.09 -.02 .04 .20 . 9 6




. 1 0 . 0 8 .35
.64 - . 6 3  . 0 3
. 3 1 .37 . 7 5
. 06 
.74 .03
Note: Data for items 10 and 11 are factor scores derived in Chapter V.
Items 5 through 9 are based on percentage of available block grant 
funds allocated for each item during fiscal year 1 9 7 0.
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Disorder Control factor. Further examination of Table 5-3 
reveals that Highways-Natural Resources does not influence 
allocations for civil disorder control, but is somewhat nega­
tively associated (r = -.2 3 ) with the organized crime control 
element. The relationship of Highways-Natural Resources with 
SPA allocations for Courts and for Correctional activities 
cancel each other, which accounts for the isolation between 
Highways-Natural Resources and the Police-Courts-Corrections 
factor.
The foregoing suggests that in states ranking high 
in Highways-Natural Resources— Wyoming, Nevada and Montana, 
for example— the SPA's did not find a need to allocate Fed­
eral law enforcement assistance funds for civil disorder 
control, but did see a need to bolster the control of organ­
ized crime and to improve the court system more so than in 
most states. At the same time, the SPA's in states ranking 
high in Highways-Natural Resources tended to allocate below- 
average percentages of block grant funds for correctional 
activities.
Also of interest in the Table 5-3 relationships are 
those among the four socio-economic outcome indicators. A 
consistent pattern in the positive association of Redistribu­
tive Ratio with Welfare-Education and in the negative rela­
tionship of Income Distributional Inequality therewith is 
evident. This pattern does not prevail, however, with regard 
to Highways-Natural Resources, where we find negative
1$4
relationships with both Redistributive Ratio and Income 
Distributional Inequality. The roots of this apparently 
inconsistent pattern are believed to lie in the isolation 
between Redistributive Ratio and Income Distributional In­
equality (r = -.05) and between Welfare-Education and High- 
ways-Natural Resources (r = -.00). That is, both pairs of 
indicators do not represent the extremes of a continuum, 
but, because of the varimax rotation technique, reflect dif­
ferent and unrelated policy outcomes.
Summary
With the possible exception of a mild influence of 
Highways-Natural Resources on allocations for Organized 
Crime and Disorder Control, socio-economic outcomes do not 
appear to influence law enforcement planning outputs. Of 
interest is the strong negative association between Welfare- 
Education and Income Distributional Inequality, a matter to 
be discussed more fully in Chapter VI.
CHAPTER VI
E N V I R O N M E N T ,  P O L I T I C A L  S Y S T E M  A N D  
P O L I C Y  O U T C O M E  R E L A T I O N S H I P S
In the three preceding chapters we have examined the 
relationships among the several factors and variables which 
serve as indicators of the main divisions of the systems 
model developed in Chapter I. We turn now to the main pur­
pose of the aggregate analysis; to evaluate the influences 
of environmental, political system and policy-outcome char­
acteristics on state-wide law enforcement planning outputs. 
The investigation here employs both simple correlation and 
stepwise, multiple regression techniques.
Environment and Policy Outcomes 
The simple correlations between eleven environmental 
indicators and six policy-outcome or output variables are 
set forth in Table 6-1. These seventeen indicators include, 
inter alia, four factors derived by Sharkansky and 
Hofferbert, four crime-environment factors derived in Chap­
ter III, and, as dependent variables, two law enforcement 
planning output factors derived in Chapter V above.
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Industrialization .15 -.09 -.70 .49 .38 -.32
Affluence -.04 -.12 .44 .01 .70 -.72
Population Increase .25 -.22 .11 -.08 .05 - . 1 8
Non-White Migration .09 -.02 -.25 .19 .59 -.63
Negro Increase -.14 .04 . 1 6 .07 .53 -.47
Percent Negro, 1968 .36 .04 -.43 -.01 -.67 .71
Contributions Claimed .24 -.24 -.21 .18 -.17 .14
Low Rape and Property 
Crime Rates -.22 .39 .04 -.11 -.35 .27
Low Murder-High Sui­
cide Rates -.23 .02 .36 .0 6 .63 -.69
Rape and Property 
Crime Increases -.04 -.17 - . 1 8 .20 .12 -.09
Murder and Auto Theft 
Increases .01 . 2 8 -.38 .38 .17 .13
^Pearson's r.
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Inspection of Table 6-1 shows relatively weak rela­
tionships between socio-economic environment indicators and 
law enforcement planning outputs. It is of interest that 
the Sharkansky-Hofferbert factors, Industrialization and 
Affluence, are less strongly related to law enforcement 
planning than are the Population Increase and Contributions 
Claimed variables, both of which have similar relation­
ships with the two law enforcement planning output factors.
With regard to allocations of block grant funds to 
police, courts and correctional activities, negative rela­
tionships with both Population Increase (1960-1970) and 
Contributions Claimed— our indirect measure of organized re­
ligion's influence— are noted. This suggests where the 
population increased at an above-average rate during the 
1960's , law enforcement planning agencies in fiscal 1970 
tended to grant relatively large portions of block grant 
funds to courts and correctional agencies, and less to police- 
related projects. In these same States, there was a propen­
sity for citizens to contribute a higher-than-average per­
cent of personal income to tax-deductible causes, with or­
ganized religion receiving a significant share of these 
contributions. This set of relationships points to a pos­
sible connection between the strength of organized religion
^U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue 
Service, Statistics of Income, op. cit.
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and the degree of emphasis placed on the various functions 
of the criminal justice system.
The one environmental indicator showing the strong­
est relationship (r = .3 6 ) with Organized Crime and Civil 
Disorder Control, as a factor, is Percent Negro, 1968. This 
suggests that states with relatively large Negro popula­
tions are also states wherein the problems of organized 
crime and civil disorder were given priority by the SPA 
supervisory boards. This relationship between racial dis­
tribution and block grant allocations is dealt with at some 
length in the next chapter.
C r i m e  E n v i r o n m e n t  I n f l u e n c e s
The simple correlations between the four crime- 
environment factors and the two law enforcement planning out­
put factors have been extracted from Table 6-1 and are set 
forth in Table 6-1 A. The strongest relationships recorded 
in this table are between SPA allocations and the Low Rape 
and Property Crime Rate factor. This suggests that where 
the 1 9 6 6 - 1 9 6 9 mean rates of such crimes were relatively low, 
a higher-than-average portion of available Federal block 
grant funds were allocated by the SPA to police activities, 
while courts and correctional activities received relatively 
smaller allocations than the national average for these 
functions. At the same time we note a negative trend 
(r = -.2 3 ) between low rape and property crime rates and al­
locations to control organized crime and disorders. The
1^9
implication here is that in states with high mean rates of 
rape and property crimes, there exists a tendency to stress 
control of organized crime and disorders in the allocation of 
block grant funds. Alternatively, the foregoing may mean 
that the higher mean crime rates stimulated increased ex­
penditures for police, courts and corrections in the years 
preceding 1970, with the result that the less traditional 
functions of organized crime and civil disorder control were 
"in line" for augmentations available due to the Federal 
block grant fund allocations.









Low Rape and Property Crime . 3 8 8 - . 2 2 5
Low Murder-High Suicide . 0 1 8 - . 2 3 4
Rape and Property Crime 
Increase - . 1 6 5 -.043
Murder and Auto Theft 
Increase . 2 7 6 .004
Pearson's r.
Crime Environment and Socio-Economic 
Policy Outcomes
In extending this inquiry to the relationships be­
tween the four crime-environment factors and the indicators 
of general, socio-economic policy outcomes, we consider the
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simple correlations presented in Table 6-1 wherein an in­
teresting set of relationships is recorded. Low murder and 
high suicide/homicide ratio is positively associated with 
Welfare-Education (r = .63), and negatively associated with 
Income Distributional Inequality (r = -.69). Although of 
lesser intensity, this relationship is reversed with regard 
to the low rape and property crime-environment factor. This 
confirms the observations of earlier researchers^ that prop­
erty crime rates tend to rise with educational levels, while 
high murder rates correlate frequently with socio-economic 
circumstances characterized by inequalities.
In order to explore further the relationships be­
tween Welfare-Education, Income Distributional Inequality 
and certain environmental variables, we have extracted from 
Table 6-1 the correlations shown in Table 6-1B. The essen­
tial point illustrated in these relationships is that in 
each instance the correlation between Income Distributional 
Inequality and the environmental variable is opposite to the 
relationship of Welfare-Education and that variable. On 
balance, the strengths of the several relationships are about 
the same. Thus, at least with regard to measuring the in­
fluence of these seven environmental variables on public 
policy outcomes, the simple Gini index of Income Distribu-
ptional Inequality advocated by Dye is as valid as indicator
^See Glaser, op. cit. and Wilks, op. cit. 
^Dye, op. cit.
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as the more complex Wei fare-Education factor derived by 
Sharkansky and Hofferbert.








Industrialization .3 8 0 - . 3 2 7
Affluence - . 6 9 6 .721
Non-white Migration .5 9 3 -. 63k-
Negro Increase .530 - . ^ 6 7
Percent Negro, 1968 -.669 .7 1 3
Low Rape and Property Crime 
Rates, 1 9 6 6 -1 9 6 9 -.3 ^ 6 .2 7 3
Low Murder-High Suicide/ 
Homicide Ratio .625 - . 6 9 2
Pearson's r .
Combined Influences 
Having examined the correlations between individual 
environmental and policy-outcome indicators, we now con­
sider the combined influences of selected environmental 
variables on law enforcement planning outcomes. In selecting 
seven indicators to be used as independent variables in a 
series of stepwise regressions, we have excluded Population 
Increase, Negro Increase, Non-white Migration and Percent 
Negro, 1 9 6 8, in the interest of parsimony and to avoid prob­
lems of multi-collinearity. As noted earlier, the three
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indicators of racial shifts overlap Percent Negro, i960, an 
important component in the Affluence factor.
With the Police-Courts-Corrections factor as the de­
pendent variable, the results of the first stepwise regres­
sion analysis are as shown in Table 6-2. All seven environ­
mental variables explain 3 2 . 8  percent of the interstate 
variance in allocations of block grant funds to police versus 
to courts and correctional activities. Of the seven vari­
ables, only two make contributions which are statistically 
significant at the .01 level. The four crime-environment 
factors together account for 26.5 percent, while the three 
socio-economic indicators claim only 6.3 percent of the 3 2 . 8  
percent total explained variance.
The main implication of the relationships illus­
trated in Table 6-2 is that the SPA board in states with 
relatively low rape and property crime rates allocated higher 
portions of available block grant funds to police activ­
ities, and less to courts and correctional activities than 
did SPA boards in states with higher rape and property crime 
rates between 1966 and 1969.
When the seven environmental indicators employed 
above are used in a second stepwise regression to explain 
variances in allocations of block grant funds to control 
organized crime and civil disorders, the results are as re­
corded in Table 6-3. None of the variables entered in this 
regression registers a significant influence. At best.
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TABLE 6-2.— Regression of Seven Environmental Variables
on SPA Allocations for Police, Courts and
Correctional Activities, Fiscal 1970
Step F 2 _aNo. Variable Entered Value R R r
1^ Low Rape and Property
Crime Rates 8.17 .3884 .1 5 0 9 .3 8 8
2° Murder and Auto Theft 
Increases 4.34 .4 7 6 5 .2 2 7 0 .2 7 6
3 Industrialization 2.03 .5 1 0 9 .2 6 1 0 -. 088
4 Contributions Claimed 1.39 .5 3 3 1 .2842 -.240
5 Rape and Property Crime Rate Increases 1.34 .5 5 3 4 .3 0 6 3 - . 1 6 5
6 Affluence 0.36 .5 5 8 5 .3 1 2 3 - . 1 1 6
7 Low Murder-High Sui­cide/Homicide Ratio 0.95 .5 7 3 0 .3 2 8 3 .0 1 8
^Indicates simple correlation of dependent 
variable with independent variable at step enterend.
^Significant at the .01 level -- see note.
cSignificant at the .05 level.
Note.
Although we are treating a universe of observa­
tion throughout the American states, in this Table and 
in all regression tables which follow a test of signif­
icance is used to provide an emperical basis for Judgments 
about relative contributions of the independent variables.
With forty-eight cases, the F value for .01 level 
significance is 7.20; for .05 level significance the F 
value is 4.04. (Dennis J. Palumbo, Statistics in Political 
and Behavioral Science (NY: Appleton-Century-Croi’ts, 19&9}
Where appropriate in each of the following regression 
tables, variables which make significant contributions are 
so identified by footnote. Absence of such indication means 
that none of the independent variables made significant con­
tributions .
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TABLE 6-3 .— Regression of Seven Environmental Variables on
Allocations for Control of Organized Crime
and Civil Disorders, Fiscal 1970
S t e p
N o . V a r i a b l e  E n t e r e d
F
V a l u e R R ^ r %
1 C o n t r i b u t i o n s  C l a i m e d 2 . 9 2 .2444 . 0 5 9 8 .244
2 L o w  R a p e  &  P r o p e r t y  
C r i m e  R a t e s ,  6 6 - 6 9 1 .7 0 .3065 .0 9 3 9 -.224
3 L o w  M u r d e r - H i g h  S u i c i d e /  
H o m i c i d e  R a t i o 1 . 4 9 .3 5 1 7 .1200 - . 2 3 4
4 I n d u s  t r i a l i z a t i o n 0 . 3 1 5 .3606 .1 3 0 0 .149
5 M u r d e r  a n d  A u t o  T h e f t  
I n c r e a s e ,  6 6 - 6 9 0 .1 5 3 .3650 .1 3 3 2 .004
6 R a p e  &  P r o p e r t y  C r i m e  
I n c r e a s e ,  6 6 - 6 9 0.146 .3692 .1 3 6 3 -.043
7 A f f l u e n c e 0 .0 0 3 .3 6 9 2 .1 3 6 3 - . 0 3 5
^Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable 
with independent variable at step entered.
these results suggest that the indirect measure of religious 
institutional influence, Contributions Claimed, explains 
about six percent of the interstate variance with which we 
are here concerned. The second-ranking contributor is Low 
Rape and Property Crime Rate, which explains an additional 
3 . 4 2  percent of the variance. The relationship in this latter 
instance is negative, which indicates that low rape and prop­
erty crime rates are associated with relatively low alloca­
tions for the control of organized crime and civil disorders.
The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing 
two regressions is that the allocations by SPA supervisory
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boards of fiscal year 1970 block grant funds for the con­
trol of organized crime and civil disorders is much less 
sensitive to environmental indicators than are decisions re­
garding allocations for police, courts and correctional ac­
tivities.
P o l i t i c a l  S y s t e m  a n d  P o l i c y  
O u t c o m e  R e l a t i o n s h i p s
The simple correlations between seventeen political 
system indicators and the same six policy-outcome variables 
discussed above are recorded in Table 6-4. To be considered 
first are the relationships between the more general indi­
cators of state political systems and the two law enforcement 
planning output factors. Although the correlations recorded 
in the upper left section of Table 6-4 are not high, the 
Sharkansky-Hofferbert indicators of state political systems 
are here more closely associated with law enforcement plan­
ning outputs than were their indicators of the socio-economic 
environment discussed earlier. However, only Professionalism- 
Local Reliance, with correlation coefficients of -.20*+ and 
.3*+3 appears to discriminate clearly between the two law en­
forcement planning factors. Innovation shows a pattern sim­
ilar, but with weaker relationships. The implication of this 
set of relationships is that states ranking high in 
Professionalism-Local Reliance and in Innovation tended to 
allocate Federal funds for the control of civil disorders and 
organized crime, and to upgrade court systems and
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T A B L E  6-4.— S i m p l e  C o r r e l a t i o n s ^ ,  P o l i t i c a l  S y s t e m  a n d
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Professionalism- 
Local Reliance .34 -.20 -.55 .40 .39 -.16
Competitlon-Turnout .20 -.17 .25 .03 . 7 0 T . 7 4
Innovation .15 -.17 -.43 .49 . 7 0 - . 5 4
Governor's Power .01 - . 2 6 .04 .27 .39 - . 4 3
Centralization . 1 8 -.04 -.40 .29 - . 0 8 .0 8
State & Local Revenue 
as ^ Personal Inc. .07 -.07 .67 -.23 .1 9 -.14
Pollce-Correctlons
Expenditures .31 -.03 -.21 —. 09 .01 . 1 8
Judlclal-Prosecutlon
Expenditures .10 .11 .46 - . 1 3 .11 - . 1 5
Police Representation 
on SPA Board .12 .04 .31 .07 -.33 . 2 3
Courts Representation 
on SPA Board .05 .12 .03 .17 .35 - . 3 8
Correct'ns Rep, SPA .12 .23 .13 -.04 -.02 . 0 3
Inmat e/Populat1on .31 - . 1 6 -.20 - . 1 0 -.22 .39
Percent Paroled .22 - . 2 6 -.14 .20 . 5 0 - . 5 0
Prison Pop. Increase .14 .05 -.11 .02 -.01 .02
Total Expenditures for 
Criminal Justice












- . 2 7
.01
State/Local Ratio, SPA 
Board Represent'n .20 .38 -.23 .11 -.01 -.11
^ P e a r s o n ' s  r .
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correctional activities more so than did most states. The 
fact that Competition-Turnout is negatively associated with 
both output factors suggests that states ranking high in this 
political system indicator did not find it necessary to al­
locate Federal funds for either the traditional police ac­
tivities or the control of disorders and organized crime, 
both of which are essentially police functions. Instead, 
these states (ranking high in Competition-Turnout) tended to 
stress the upgrading of courts and correctional agencies in 
the allocation of fiscal 1970 block grant funds. It is of 
interest to note that where the Governor's Formal Powers are 
strong, the tendency of the SPA supervisory board was to 
favor courts and correctional systems— which tend to be agen­
cies of the state government more so than of local govern­
ments .
The relationship between Centralization and alloca­
tions to control civil disorders and organized crime (r =
.1 8 ) suggests that there exists some connection between what 
can be regarded as the governor's informal powers and the SPA 
supervisory board's perception of the importance of problems 
related to organized crime and civil disorders.
Criminal Justice System Indicators
In Chapter IV we described how factor analysis was 
employed to reduce the number of criminal justice system 
indicators from thirteen to eleven. Four of these eleven 
variables reflect the composition of the SPA supervisory
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boards as of December, 1969; three reflect state prison 
system characteristics. The four remaining indicators in 
this category represent different aspects of State and local 
government expenditures for criminal justice functions. The 
simple correlations between these eleven criminal-justice 
system variables and the two law enforcement planning output 
factors are recorded in the lower left section of Table 6-4.
As in the earlier cases, we find relatively weak re­
lationships between the criminal justice indicators and the 
law enforcement planning factors. There are, however, a 
number of instances in which rather clear relationships are 
evident. For example, the Percent Paroled variable shows a 
positive relationship (r = .23) with Organized Crime and 
Civil Disorder Control, and a negative association (r = -.26) 
with high allocations to police and low allocations to courts 
and correctional activities.' This indicates that states in 
which the larger percentage of prison inmates are released 
on parole tend also to allocate relatively high portions of 
block grant f'unds to improve control of organized crime and 
civil disorders. A perhaps equally important indication here 
is that states which parole the larger percentage of their 
prison inmates are the same states in which a relatively 
larger portion of the fiscal 1970 block grant funds were al­
located to courts and to correctional activities. The im­
plication here may be that the better-established state 
parole systems were able to demonstrate to the SPA boards
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the need for additional allocations which fall under the 
"correctional activities" category.
The positive relationship (r = .31) between SPA al­
locations for Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control and 
state and local expenditures for police versus corrections 
is of interest to our analysis. As" detailed in the following 
chapter, the control of organized crime and civil disorders 
is essentially a police function, which means that the bulk 
of the block grant funds allocated under this heading will 
go to police agencies. The implication in this instance 
seems to be that of continuing the strong emphasis on police 
activities which earlier expenditure patterns have estab­
lished.
Combined Influences 
To determine the combined or cumulative influence of 
state political system differences on law enforcement plan­
ning outputs, the following six indicators have been selected 





State and Local Revenue as Percent of Personal Income 
Centralization
State/local Representation Ratio on SPA Board 
The first five of these indicators reflect state political 
system characteristics which appear to have the greatest 
influence on law enforcement planning outputs. The sixth
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indicator, which is representative of the criminal justice 
system differences, was selected because of its generally 
higher correlation with both output factors of interest—  
higher, that is, than the other criminal justice system in­
dicators.
The first stepwise regression employing the six vari­
ables listed above explains 21.9^ percent of interstate vari­
ance in allocations of block grant funds for police versus 
courts and correctional activities, as shown in Table 6-5- 
The variance explained in this table compares unfavorably 
with the 3 2 .8 3 percent variance explained by the seven en­
vironmental indicators employed in the regression of Table 
6-2 above. As is the case in this earlier regression, we 
again find that the Sharkansky-Hofferbert indicators are 
overshadowed by less complex variables. In Table 6-5 
Governor's Formal Powers and State-Local Representation Ratio 
on SPA Boards claim 19-5 percent of the 21.9 percent ex­
plained variance.
The results of a second regression analysis employing 
six political system indicators explains 22.06 percent of the 
variance in SPA Board allocations for Organized Crime and 
Civil Disorder Control are shown in Table 6-6.
For the first time in four multiple, stepwise regres­
sions, we find the Sharkansky-Hofferbert factors dominating, 
albeit the competition is not strong. That is, Professional­
ism-Local Reliance and Competition-Turnout account for 15*73 
out of a 2 2 . 0 6  percent total explained variance.
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TABLE 6-5.— Regression of Six Political System Variables on





Value R r2 r%
1^ State/Local Representa­
tion Ratio, SPA 7:79 .3805 .1448 .381
2 Governor's Formal Power 2 . 7 8 7 .1+^12 .1 9 4 7 -.262
3 Professionalism-LocalReliance 0.533 .1+520 .2043 -.204
4 Competi tion-Turnout 0.677 J+655 .2 1 6 7 -. 168
5 Centralization 0 .13^ .4682 . 2 1 9 2 - .0 3 7
6 State & Local Revenue 
as Percent of 
Personal Income 0.010 .4684 . 2 1 9 4 - . 0 7 4
^Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable 
with independent variable named at step entered.
^Significant at the .05 level.
A comparison of the regression results of Tables 6-5 
and 6-6 highlights the inverse relationships between several 
of the independent variables and the two law enforcement 
planning outputs. Where state government tends toward strong 
representation on the SPA supervisory board, and where Gov­
ernor’s Formal Power and Professionalism-Local Reliance re­
ceive low scores, then SPA allocations for police activities 
tend to be favored. In contrast, high rankings in Profes­
sionalism-Local Reliance and Centralization, and relatively 
weak state government SPA board representation leads to an 
emphasis on Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control by the
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S P A .  H i g h  r a n k i n g s  i n  C o m p e t i t i o n - T u r n o u t  a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  l o w  e m p h a s i s  o n  p o l i c e  a c t i v i t i e s  a n d  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  
o r g a n i z e d  c r i m e  a n d  c i v i l  d i s o r d e r  c o n t r o l ,  a n d  a b o v e - a v e r a g e  
a l l o c a t i o n s  o f  b l o c k  g r a n t  f u n d s  f o r  c o u r t s  a n d  c o r r e c t i o n a l  
a c t i v i t i e s .
T A B L E  6 - 6 . — R e g r e s s i o n  o f  S i x  P o l i t i c a l  S y s t e m  V a r i a b l e s  o n  
A l l o c a t i o n s  f o r  O r g a n i z e d  C r i m e  a n d  C i v i l




Value R r2 r^
Professionalism-Local
Reliance 6.12 .3 4 2 7 .1 1 7 4 .3 4 3
2 Competition-Turnout 2.13 .3 9 6 6 .1 573 -.200
3 State/Local Represen­tation Ratio, SPA 1.77 .4 3 5 7 .1 8 9 9 -.202
4 Centralization 0.55^ .4 4 7^ .2001 .1 7 7
5 Governor's Formal Power 1.10 .4694 .2206 .0 0 8
6 State and Local Revenue 
as Percent of Personal 
Income .4694 .2206 - .0 6 8
^ I n d i c a t e s  s i m p l e  c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  
w i t h  i n d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  n a m e d  a t  s t e p  e n t e r e d .
^Significant at the .05 level.
E n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  P o l i t i c a l  
S y s t e m  R e l a t i o n s h i p s
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a m o n g  t h e  e n v i r o n ­
m e n t a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m  i n d i c a t o r s  a r e  e x p l o r e d .  A s  
b e f o r e ,  a  s t e p w i s e  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s i s  i s  e m p l o y e d  w i t h  o n e  
o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  m e a s u r e s  o f  c r i m i n a l  j u s t i c e  e x p e n d i t u r e s
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filling the role of dependent variable in each of four re­
gressions:
1. Total expenditures for criminal justice functions 
by state and local governments within the state, 
as percent of 1968 personal income.
2. Ratio of state-to-local government expenditures for 
all criminal-justice functions, fiscal 1968-69*
3* State and local government expenditures for police 
activities, as compared with expenditures for cor­
rectional activities.
Level of state and local government expenditures 
for judicial and prosecution functions.
In this series of four regressions the same eleven 
environmental and political system indicators are used as 
independent variables. These include the four crime- 
environment factors derived in Chapter III and Hofferbert's 
two socio-economic environment factors. Industrialization and 
Affluence. The Sharkansky-Hofferbert political system fac­
tors, Professionalism-Local Reliance and Competition-Turnout, 
plus Governor's Formal Powers, Innovation and Centralization 
complete the set of eleven independent variables.
Total Expenditures 
The results of the first regression in this series 
are shown in Table 6-7* The cumulative influence of the 
eleven independent variables explains 73*1 percent of inter­
state variance in total expenditures for all criminal justice 
functions by state and local governments as a percent of 1968 
total personal income. Analysis of Table 6-7 indicates that: 
- The percent of personal income expended by state 
and local governments for all criminal justice functions is
17^
TABLE 6 -7 .— Regression of Eleven Environmental and Political 
System Variables on Percent of Total Personal 
Income for 1968 Expended by State and Local 




Value R r2 r^
1^ Low Rape and Property 
Crime Rates, 6 6 -6 9 77:42 .7 9 2 0 .6273 - . 7 9 2
2 Rape and Property Crime 
Rate Increase, 66-69 1.89 .8014 .6423 .1 1 8
3 Competition-Turnout 1 .1 6 .8071 .6515 .022
4 Affluence 3 . 3 4 .8226 .6 7 6 6 .4 7 6
5 Professionalism-LocalReliance 1 .3 7 .8 2 8 8 .6868 .489
6 Low Murder-High Suicide/ 
Homicide Ratio 1.44 .8 3 ^ 2 .6975 .0 3 6
7 Innovation 2 .6 1 .8462 .7 1 6 0 .264
8 Governor's Formal Power 2.14 .8549 .7 3 0 8 .3 7 4
9 Industrialization 0.48 .8568 .7341 .244
10 Centralization 0.4l .8585 .7 3 7 0 - . 0 2 3
11 Murder and Auto Theft 
Increases, 6 6 - 6 9 0.01 .8586 .7371 -.000
^Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable 
with independent variable named at step entered.
^Significant at the .01 level.
strongly influenced by the 1966-1969 mean rates of rape and 
property crimes. The negative relationship here (r = -.79) 
indicates that where rape and property crime rates were low, 
the percent of personal income expended for criminal justice 
functions was also low. By implication, high expenditures
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for all criminal justice functions are associated with high 
rates of rape and property crimes.
- Only 8.4 percent of the 73*7 percent explained 
variance is accounted for by variables which are not reflec­
tive of crime environment. Political system variables ac­
count for 5*5 percent, while environmental indicators other 
than those related to crime claim an additional 2.9 percent 
of the explained variance. Since the Rape and Property 
Crime Rate factor so strongly dominates the results of this 
regression, no conclusions are drawn from the meager contri­
butions of the other independent variables.
Because of the importance of the Rape and Property 
Crime Rate factor in this regression, the relationships be­
tween the individual offense categories which comprise this 
factor and overall criminal justice expenditure levels merit 
further attention. The simple correlations and factor load­
ings of five 1 9 6 6 -1 9 6 9 mean crime rates are shown in Table 
6-8.
It is evident in Table 6-8 that the four property
crimes are dominant, and that forcible rape is not as strongly
related to high expenditures for criminal justice functions 
as the factor lable suggests. Thus it is reasonable to con­
clude that the states in which a relatively high percentage
of personal income is expended for criminal justice matters
are characterized by relatively high rates of property crime, 
especially larceny and burglary, and that the reported rates
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of forcible rape are, in these states, probably only slightly
higher than the national average.
TABLE 6-8.— Factor Loadings and Simple Correlations of 1966- 
1 969 Mean Crime Rates with Low Rape and 
Property Crime Rate Factor
M e a n  C r i m e  R a t e ,  1966-1969
S i m p l e
C o r r e l a t i o n
F a c t o r
L o a d i n g
L a r c e n y .756 -. 906
B u r g l a r y *725 -. 906
A u t o  T h e f t .626 - .7 2 3
R o b b e r y .625 - .8 1 1
F o r c i b l e  R a p e .1+91 -.76I+
State/Local Expenditure Ratio 
The second dependent variable employed in . our ex­
ploration of state characteristics which influence the ex­
penditure of public revenues for criminal justice functions 
is the ratio of state-to-local government expenditures for 
all criminal justice functions during fiscal year 1968-1969* 
The outcome of a stepwise regression analysis employing the 
same eleven independent variables as used in the previous 
regression are recorded in Table 6-9*
Analysis of the results shown in Table 6-9 suggests
that:
- States in which the state-local ratio of criminal 
justice expenditures is relatively high are those states 
identified by relatively low levels of Professionalism and
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TABLE 6-9.— Regression of Eleven Environmental and Political 
System Variables on the Ratio of State-to-Local 
Government Expenditures for all Criminal 




Value R R^ r®’
1^ Professionalism Local 
Reliance 8.46 .3941 .1 5 5 3 - . 3 9 4
2° Industrialization 5.92 .5 0 3 4 .2 5 3 4 - . 0 7 8
3 Centralization 2.17 .5371 .2885 - . 1 6 8
1+ C omp etition-Turnout 1 .92 .5647 . 3 1 8 9 - . 0 6 7
5^ Low Murder-High Suicide/ Homicide Ratio 8.35 .6572 . 4 3 1 9 .2 7 7
6 Innovation 0 . 9 8 .6 6 7 2 .4451 - . 2 2 3
7 Low Rape and Property Crime Rate, 66-69 0.28 .6 7 0 0 .4 4 9 0 .262
8 Affluence 0.44 .6746 .4 5 5 0 - . 0 9 0
9 Rape and Property Crime Rate Increase, 66-69 0 . 5 9 .6 8 0 7 .4633 .0 9 4
10 Murder and Auto Theft 
Rate Increase, 66-69 0.26 .6 8 3 4 .4670 .060
11 Governor's Formal Power 0 .1 7 .6 8 5 2 .4695 - . 2 5 0
^Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable 
with independent variable named at step entered.
^Significant at the .01 level. 
^Significant at the .05 level.
Local Reliance in their political systems. This can be ex­
plained by the absence of large, industrialized metropolitan 
areas and the Professionalism-Local Reliance associated 
therewith in states where the state government's share of
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criminal justice expenditures is above average. There are 
important exceptions however in states with very small geo­
graphic area and high population density, as discussed in 
Chapter VII.
Police versus Corrections Expenditures
The third expenditure factor to be examined by step­
wise regression is Police-versus-Corrections Expenditures.
The results of this regression are recorded in Table 6-10.
Analysis of the regression results listed in Table 
6-10 indicates:
- That l6.1 percent of the expenditure variance is 
accounted for by two of the four crime environment factors: 
Low Murder-High Suicide/Homicide Ratio, and Rape and Property 
Crime Rate Increase, 1966-1969* The remaining nine variables 
account for an additional 8.6 percent of the 24^7 percent 
total explained variance.
- That states characterized by low murder rates and 
relatively high increases in rape and property crime rates 
between 1966 and 1969 tend to spend relatively higher amounts 
on correctional activities than on police activities. The 
implications of this are discussed further in Chapter VII.
- There also exists a tendency for states ranking 
high in Professionalism-Local Reliance and low in Competition- 
Turnout to expend relatively high amounts for police protec­
tion, and less than average amounts on correctional activ­
ities. Again, we note that Professionalism-Local Reliance is
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TABLE 6-10.— Regression of Eleven Environment and Political 
System Variables on Expenditures for Police 
versus Correctional Activities by State 




Value R R^ r&
1^ Low Murder-High Suicide/ 
Homicide Ratio 6.28 .3466 .1201 - . 3 4 7
2 Rape and Property Crime 
Rate Increase, 66-69 2.19 .4012 .1609 -.202
3 Professionalism-LocalReliance 2.42 .4524 .2047 .244
Competition-Turnout 0.59 .4641 .2 1 5 4 - . 2 0 5
5 Indus trialization 0.4l .4 7 2 2 .2 2 2 3 .068
6 Murder and Auto Theft 
Rate Increase, 66-69 0.44 .4808 .2 3 1 2 .1 0 3
7 Centralization 0.4l .4889 .2 3 8 9 .1 3 6
8 Innovation 0.17 .4921 .2422 .044
9 Affluence 0.06 .4 9 3 3 .2433 - . 1 5 2
10 Low Rape and Property 
Crime Rates, 1966-69 0.17 .4 9 6 8 .2468 -. 166
11 Governor's Formal Power 0.00 .4 9 6 9 .2469 .1 1 7
^Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable 
with independent variable named at step entered.
^Significant at the .05 level.
generally associated with Industrialization and a dominance 
of large cities over state government in the criminal justice 
expenditure area. This accounts for the lower emphasis on 
correctional activities in the overall expenditures for crim­
inal justice functions in these states.
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Judicial and Prosecution Expenditures
In the fourth regression of this series we employ 
the relative level of combined state and local government 
expenditures for both judicial and prosecution functions as 
the dependent variable. The cumulative influence of the same 
eleven independent variables used earlier is recorded in 
Table 6-11.
Analysis of the regression results recorded in 
Table 6-11 indicates that:
- The Sharkansky-Hofferbert environmental factors, 
Industrialization and Affluence, each make significant con­
tributions, and together explain 3 ^ * 0 2  percent of the inter­
state variances in level of expenditures for judicial and 
prosecution functions. The negative relationship with In­
dustrialization (r = -.^^) means that states ranking high in 
Industrialization are not states in which a relatively high 
portion of criminal justice expenditures are devoted to the 
judicial and prosecution functions.
- The positive correlation of Affluence (r = .37) 
complements the foregoing and suggests that states ranking 
high in Affluence tend to allocate relatively high amounts 
for both judicial and prosecution functions from revenue 
raised within the state. The implications of this and the 
foregoing finding are examined in Chapter VII.
- The variables entered in steps 1 through 3 are all 
environmental indicators and together account for 38 percent
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TABLE 6 -1 1 .— Regression of Eleven Environmental and Political 
System Variables on State and Local Expenditures 




Value R R^ r^
1^ Industrialization 10.9^ .4 3 8 3 .1921 - . 4 3 8
2b Affluence 10.25 .581+8 .34-20 .3 7 4
3 Rape and Property Crime Rate Increase, 66-69 2.76 .6171 .3 8 0 8 -.211
Governor's Formal Power 2.10 .6̂ +01 .4-097 -.l40
5 Centralization 4^82 .6859 . 4 7 0 5 —. 167
6 Low Rape and Property 
Crime Rates, 66-69 1.38 .6984- .4-877 .001
7 Compe ti tion-Turnout 1.81 .714-1 .$099 .171
8 Innovation 1.06 .7231 .5 2 2 8 -.206
9 Low Murder-High Suicide/ Homicide Ratio 1.06 .7 3 1 9 .$3 $7 .2 5 0
10 Murder and Auto Theft 
Rate Increase, 66-69 0.53 .7364- .5^23 - . 2 9 0
11 Professionalism-Local
Reliance 0 . 0 8 .7371 .$4-33 - . 2 7 7
^Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable 
with independent variable named at step entered.
^Significant at the .05 level.
explained variance. The five political system variables ac­
count for only 12.58 percent. Thus it appears that expendi­
tures for the judicial and prosecution functions are in­




To üummari.ze the results of the foregoing four re­
gressions, the percent of explained variance accounted for 
each of three variable groupings is shown in Table 6-12.
TABLE 6-12.— Summary of Environmental and Political System 
Influences on State and Local Government 
















Total Expenditures 2.9# 64.2# 5.5#
State/Local Ratio 1 0 .0 # 1 2 .0# i?.5#
Police-vs.-Corrections 3.0# 1 6 .0#
Judicial and Prosecution 34.0# 6 .6# 1 2.6#
Notes :
The last two expenditure characteristics listed are 
factors derived in Chapter IV, and are "breakouts" from the 
total expenditure characteristic listed first.
Percentages listed represent the sums of each in­
dividual contribution toward the total explained variance, 
and are not the influence of these variables considered 
together with others held constant as "multiple-partial" co­
efficients .
This summary table makes evident the strong influence 
of the crime environment on the total expenditures for crim­
inal administration by state and local governments. Politi­
cal system differences are somewhat more important than other 
types with regard to the state/local expenditure ratio,
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although the influences in this category of expenditures are 
almost equally balanced. Although the regression analysis of 
expenditures for police versus corrections is not as fruitful 
in percent of variance explained as the other regressions, 
again we find the influence of the crime environment domi­
nant. Lastly, the regression analysis of influences on ex­
penditure levels for judicial and prosecution functions shows 
that the socio-economic environmental indicators account for 
the bulk of the interstate variance. This is the one expendi­
ture category wherein crime environment influences are rele­
gated the last position. A possible explanation for this
pattern of influences may lie in the traditional practice of
the courts to virtually "pay their own way" through fines and 
court costs, and thereby be in a better position to absorb 
fluctuations in case loads. Also, the fact that the criminal 
prosecutor enjoys great discretionary power with regard to 
the prosecution (or not) of criminal cases, provides great
flexibility for handling case loads.
Public Policy Outcome Influences 
The relationships among the public policy outcome 
indicators which comprise the third division of our systems 
model were examined in Chapter V wherein it was concluded 
that, with possible exception of the Highways-Natural Re­
sources factor, socio-economic outcomes do not influence law 
enforcement planning outputs.
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To validate this conclusion, the two output factors 
were subjected to stepwise regression analysis using the 
four socio-economic outcome indicators as independent vari­
ables. The results were meager indeed. Only 5«93 percent 
explained variance in allocations for police versus courts 
and correctional activities was accounted for by the four in­
dependent variables. The results with respect to allocations 
by the SPA supervisory boards for the control of organized 
crime and civil disorders were only slightly better, with 
7 .6 1 percent explained variance achieved. These results, 
which do not merit tabulation here, confirm our initial 
finding that law enforcement planning outcomes are not as­
sociated to an important degree with socio-economic outcomes, 
that is with previous policy outcomes in other policy areas.
One important feature of our systems model— the lack 
of a feedback loop— may well lie at the roots of the fore­
going conclusion. This matter will be taken up in the con­
cluding chapter.
E n v i r o n m e n t ,  S y s t e m ,  a n d  
O u t c o m e  I n f l u e n c e s
In the two sections which follow, the combined in­
fluences on law enforcement planning of variables represent­
ing all three divisions of our systems model are investigated. 
As before, regression analysis is used in this search for 
models which best explain inter-state variances in law en­
forcement planning. Different combinations of independent
18^
variables are used while retaining as dependent variables
the two law enforcement planning outcome factors derived in
Chapter V-
Police, Courts and Corrections Allocations 
Five combinations or groupings of independent vari­
ables, ranging in number from five to seventeen, have been 
subjected to stepwise regression analysis as a means of 
finding the combination which best explains variances in the 
allocation of fiscal 1970 block grant funds by SPA boards 
for police versus courts and correctional activities. The 
results of these regressions are shown in Tables 6-13 
through 6 -1 7 *
The fraction of explained variance obtained ranges 
from a low of 2 3 . 9  percent using twelve independent variables 
to a high of 50.3 percent using seventeen variables. Ex­
planatory power is not gained, however, solely by increasing 
the number of independent variables. As will become evident, 
greater explanatory powei is achieved primarily by adjusting 
the "mix" of the independent variables employed. Analysis 
of the five regressions recorded in Tables 6-13 through 6-17 
leads to the following two conclusions.
1 . Crime-environment indicators must be included in 
any model which purports to explain law enforcement planning 
outputs which are related to allocations of block grant funds 
for police, courts and correctional activities.
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2. The inclusion of Income Distributional Inequality 
plus the two criminal justice expenditure factors is essen­
tial to achieving maximum explanatory power within the limits 
of the systems model employed and the indicators dealt with 
in this study.
The first conclusion is founded on the marked dif­
ference in explanatory power of Tables 6-13 and 6-l4. Al­
though the eleven variables of Table 6-13 represent all three 
main divisions of the systems model, and include the six 
primary indicators derived by Sharkansky and Hofferbert, they 
yield only 2 3 . 9  percent total explained variance, or less 
than the yield of any of the four other combinations tested. 
In Table 6-l4, four crime-environment indicators have been 
substituted for three policy-outcome variables— Welfare- 
Education, Highways-Natural Resources, and Income Distribu­
tional Inequality— and one political system variable— State 
and Local Revenue as Percent of Personal Income. These sub­
stitutions increase the total explained variance by 20 per­
centage points— from 24.3 percent in Table 6-13 to 44.3 per­
cent in Table 6-l4.
The fact that deleting three socio-economic outcome 
indicators had virtually no adverse impact accords with the 
earlier finding that socio-economic outcomes have little in­
fluence on the type of law enforcement planning outputs dealt 
with here. The deletion of one political system variable 
does not weaken the new combination (Table 6-1^) since five 
other political-system indicators are retained.
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TABLE 6 -1 3.— Regression of Twelve Variables on SPA Alloca­




Value R r 2 r&
1 Governor's Formal Power 3 . ^ 0 .2622 .0 6 8 8 - . 2 6 2
2 Professionalism-Local
Reliance 0.60 .2846 .0 8 1 0 -.204
3 Industrialization 0 . 7 5 .3 1 0 5 .0964 - . 0 8 8
Income Distributional 
Inequality 0 .9^ .3 ^ 0 3 .1 1 5 8 .200
5 Highways-Natural Re­sources 2 . 0 6 .3964 .1571 .0 3 9
6 Welfare-Education 2 . 5 3 .4 5 4 0 .2061 - .0 9 1
7 Competition-Turnout 0 . 7 3 .4693 .2 2 0 3 - . 1 6 8
8 State & Local Revenue as 
% Pers. Income o.4o .4 7 7 8 .2 2 8 3 - . 0 7 4
9 Centralization 0 . 2 3 .4825 .2 3 2 8 - . 0 3 7
10 Affluence 0.11 .4849 .2 351 -.116
11 Innovation 0.20 .4892 .2 3 9 3 - . 1 7 3
12 Redistributive Ratio 0 . 1 5 .4 9 2 5 .2426 - . 0 2 3
^Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable 
with independent variable named at step entered. .
Additional support for the first conclusion is found 
in Tables 6-15 and 6 -16. The fraction of explained variance 
accounted for by the first six variables entered in these 
two tables is essentially the same as that of Table 6-1^.
The main difference in the latter two tables is the inclusion 
of criminal justice system indicators in place of two
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political system variables, Centralization and Innovation. 
The effect of this change in mix is to replace the principal 
environmental indicator, Industrialization, with Judicial- 
Prosecution Expenditures as the third-ranking independent 
variable. Crime-environment indicators still retain their 
high rankings and contribute 22.7 percent, or about half of 
the explained variance regardless of the mix.
TABLE 6-l4.— Regression of Eleven Variables on SPA Alloca­




Value R r2 r^
Low Rape and Property 
Crime Rates, 66-69 8.17 .3884 .1509 .3 8 8
2C Murder and Auto Theft 
Increase, 66-69 4.^3 .4765 .2270 .2 7 6
3 Industrialization 2.03 .5109 .2610 - . 0 8 8
4 Competition-Turnout 1.16 .5296 .2804 -.168
5"" Affluence .5880 .3457 - . 1 1 6
6 Rape and Property Crime 
Rate Increase, 66-69 3.80 .6334 .4011 - . 1 6 5
7 Governor's Formal Power 1.^6 .6498 .4222 -.262
8 Centralization 0.83 .6590 .4343 - . 0 3 7
9 Innovation 0.45 .6640 .4409 - . 1 7 3
10 Low Murder-High Suicide/ 
Homicide Ratio 0.04 .6645 .4415 .0 1 8
11 Professionalism-Local
Reliance 0 . 0 8 .6655 .4428 -.204
^Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable 
with independent variable named at step entered.
hrSignificant at the .05 level.
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TABLE 6-15---Second Regression of Twelve Variables on SPA Al­




Value R r 2 r^
l" Low Rape and Property 
Crime Rates, 66-69 8.17 .3884 . 1 5 0 9 . 3 8 8
2^ Murder and Auto Theft 
Increase, 66-69 k.3k .4765 . 2 2 7 0 . 2 7 6
3 Judicial-Prosecution
Expenditures 2 . 2 3 .5141 .2643 . 1 0 5
4 C omp etition-Turnout 2.20 .$479 . 3 0 0 2 -.168
5 Affluence 2.85 . 5 8 7 0 .3446 - . 1 1 6
6 Rape and Property Crime 
Rate Increase, 66-69 3.79 . 6 3 2 5 .4000 - . 1 6 5
7 Highways-Natural Re­sources 0.36 . 6 3 6 7 . 4 0 5 4 . 0 3 9
8 Industrialization O.glf .6465 .4179 - . 0 8 8
9 Welfare-Education 0.26 .6495 .4219 - . 0 9 1
10 Professionalism-Local
Reliance 0 . 1 8 .6 5 1 6 .4246 -.204
11 Low Murder-High Suicide/ 
Homicide Ratio 0.0^ .6520 . 4 2 5 2 .0 1 8
12 High Police-Low Correc­
tions Expenditures 0.01 .6521 .4253 - . 0 3 4
^Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable
with independent variable at step entered. 
^Significant at the .01 level. 
^Significant at the .05 level.
With regard to the second conclusion and the achiev­
ing of maximum explanatory power, we note that when criminal
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justice system indicators are included in the mix, their 
contribution is second only to that of crime-environment in­
dicators, as illustrated in Tables 6-15 and 6-16. When 
policy-outcome variables are also made available they enter 
at the seventh step. In Table 6-15 the Sharkansky-Hofferbert 
outcome factor— Highways-Natural Resources— contributes only 
0 . 5  percent; however in Table 6 -I6 , seventh-ranking Income 
Distributional Inequality contributes about 3 percentage 
points.
Taking into account the importance of a parsimonious 
mix of independent variables in the regression of Table 6-17 
our investigation has been limited to a mix of only five 
variables, each representing a different subdivision of the 
systems model. We see that the first four variables entered 
in Table 6-17 account for 33»^ percent explained variance, or 
more than any other combination of four independent vari­
ables .
In selecting variables for the Table 6-17 regression 
we chose the one indicator from each subdivision of the sys­
tems model which is most strongly associated with the de­
pendent variable, while at the same time is relatively inde­
pendent of the other variables chosen. That our success in 
this endeavor was less than complete is evident from inspec­
tion of the correlations recorded in Table 6-18. The chief 
difficulty in keeping the relationships among the independent 
variables of Table 6-18 weak, while still retaining
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TABLE 6-16.— Regression of Seventeen Variables on SPA
Allocations for Police, Courts,
and Correctional Activities
Step
No. Variable Entered Value R R^ r&
Low Rape and Property 
Crime Rates, 6 6 - 6 9
8 . 1 7 .3884 . 1 5 0 9 . 3 8 8
Murder and Auto Theft 
Increases, 6 6 - 6 9
4 . 3 4 . 4 7 6 5 . 2 2 7 0 . 2 7 6
3 Judic ial-Prosecution Expenditures
2 . 2 3 .5141 .2643 . 1 0 5
4 Competition-Turnout 2.20 . 5 4 7 9 . 3 0 0 2 - . 1 6 8
5 Affluence 2.84 . 5 8 7 0 .3446 - . 1 1 6
6 Rape and Property Crime 
Rate Increases, 6 6 - 6 9
3.79 . 6 3 2 5 .4000 - . 1 6 5
7 Income Distributional Inequality
2 . 1 6 .6 5 6 3 . 4 3 0 8 . .200
8 Governor's Formal 
Powers 0.97
.6668 .4446 - . 2 6 2
9 Innovation 1.66 .6840 .4678 - . 1 7 3
10 Professionalism- 
Local Reliance
1.02 . 6 9 4 3 .4821 -.204
11 Centralization 0 . 8 5 . 7 0 2 9 . 4 9 4 1 - . 0 3 7
12 Redistributive Ratio 0.20 . 7 0 5 0 . 4 9 7 0 - . 0 7 9
13 Industrialization 0 . 1 3 . 7 0 6 3 .4 9 8 9 -.088
14 Highways-Natural
Resources
0.10 . 7 0 7 4 . 5 0 0 5 . 0 3 9
1 5 Welfare-Education 0.14 . 7 0 8 9 . 5 0 2 6 - . 0 9 1
16 High Police-Low Cor­
rections Expendt's
0.01 . 7 0 9 0 . 5 0 2 7 - . 0 3 4
17 Low Murder-High Sui- 0.00 . 7 0 9 1 . 5 0 2 8 . 0 1 8
cide/Homicide Ratio
^Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable 
with independent variable named at step entered.
^Significant at the .01 level, 
cSignificant at the .05 level.
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strongest-available correlations with the dependent variable 
is the - . 5 3  correlation between Low Rape and Property Crime 
Rates and Professionalism-Local Reliance.
TABLE 6-17-— Regression of Five Variables on SPA Allocations 




Value R R^ ar
1^ Low Rape and Property 
Crime Rates, 66-69 8 . 1 7 .3884 . 1 5 0 9 . 3 8 8
2 " State/Local Represen­
tation Ratio, SPA 5 . 7 5 . 4 9 7 0 . 2 4 7 0 .3 8 1
3 Contributions Claimed 2 . 8 0 .5404 .2 9 2 1 -.240
4. Income Distributional 
Inequality 2.69 . 5 7 7 7 . 3 3 3 8 . 2 0 0
5 Professionalism-Local
Reliance 0 . 0 5 . ^ 7 8 5 .3346 -.204
^Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable 
with independent variable named at step entered.
b.Significant at the .01 level. 
'^Significant at the .05 level.
Organized Crime and Disorder 
Control Allocations
The second of two law enforcement planning output 
factors to be employed as the dependent variable in a series 
of stepwise regressions is the Organized Crime and Civil 
Disorder Control factors derived in Chapter V. As in the 
previous analysis of combined influences, five different 
groupings of independent variables are subjected to regres­
sion analysis. Four of these five groupings are identical
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with those employed above. The fifth grouping of five in­
dependent variables contains a different mix.
TABLE 6-1 8.— Simple Correlations, Table 6-17 Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Low Rape and Prop­
erty Crime Rates,




3 ContributionsClaimed - . 1 7 .0 8
4 Income Distribu­
tional Inequality .2 7 -.11 .14
5 Prof e s s i onali sm- Local Reliance - . 5 3 - . 0 7 .21 -.16
6 Competition-
Turnout - . 1 5 -.02 - . 1 5 - . 7 4 -.00
7 Police vs. Correc­tions Expendi­
tures . 3 9 . 3 8 -.24 .20 -.20 - . 1 7
The fraction of explained variance obtained in this 
series of regressions ranges from a low of 17.2 percent 
using only five variables to a high of 42.7 percent using 
seventeen variables. As noted earlier, achieving greater 
explanatory power is not a matter of simply increasing the 
number of independent variables, but is related primarily to 
the mix or selection of variables employed. The following 
discussion of this second series of five regressions builds
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on the analysis of the previous section and supports the fol­
lowing three conclusions:
1 . The influence of crime-environment indicators is 
less important to the explanation of SPA allocations for the 
control of organized crime and civil disorders than it is 
with respect to allocations for police, courts and correc­
tional activities.
2. Interstate differences in expenditures for 
criminal justice functions exert an influence on SPA alloca­
tions for the control of organized crime and civil disorders 
which approximates that exerted on SPA allocations for po­
lice, courts and correctional activities.
3. The inclusion of the Sharkansky-Hoff erbert indi­
cators (factors) is important to the explanation of inter­
state variances in allocations for the control of organized 
crime and civil disorders.
In support of the first conclusion, the mix of vari­
ables listed in Tables 6-19 and 6-20 is compared. In the 
latter table we have substituted four socio-economic policy 
outcome indicators and one political system variable for the 
four crime-environment factors which are included in Table 
6-20. Although the result of this substitution is a gain of 
only 2.2 percentage points in explanatory power, the policy 
outcome variables which replaced the crime-environment vari­
ables of Table 6-19 account for 6.9 percent explained vari­
ance. This is a marked increase over the .13 percent
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TABLE 6-19*— Regression of Eleven Variables on SPA Allocations




Value R r 2 r^
1^ Professionalism-Local
Reliance 6.12 . 3 4 2 7 .1 1 7 4 .343
2 Competition-Turnout 2.13 . 3 9 6 6 .1573 -.200
3 Industrialization 0 . 7 8 .4147 . 1 7 1 9 .149
if Centralization 0.69 .4 3 0 1 . 1 8 5 0 . 1 7 7
5 Governor's Formal 
Power 0 .6 5 .4442 .1973 . 0 0 8
6 Affluence 0 .6 5 .4 5 8 1 .2099 - .0 3 5
7 Low Murder-High Suicide/ Homicide Ratio 0 . 6 1 .4 7 0 8 . 2 2 1 7 - . 2 3 4
8 Innovation 0.40 .4 7 9 1 .2295 . 1 5 4
9 Rape and Property Crime 
Rate Increases, 66-69 0.60 . 4 9 1 4 .2415 - .0 4 3
10 Murder and Auto Theft 
Rate Increases, 66-69 0.01 . 4 9 1 6 .2417 .004
11 Low Rape and Property 
Crime Rates, 66-69 0.00 . 4 9 1 6 .2417 - .2 2 5
^Indicates simple correlation between dependent vari­
able and independent variable named at step entered.
^Significant at the .05 level.
claimed by the four crime environment factors enteres in 
Table 6-19.
The relative unimportance of crime-environment indi­
cators in this series of regressions on SPA allocations for 
Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control is also evident
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TABLE 6-20.— Regression of Twelve Variables on SPA Allocations




Value R R^ r^
1^ Professionalism-Local
Reliance 6.12 .31+27 . 1 1 7 4 . 3 4 3
2 Income Distributional 
Inequality 2.88 .1+129 . 1 7 0 5 . 1 7 4
3 Affluence 0.77 .1+298 .1847 - . 0 3 5
U- Welfare-Education 0.81+ .1+1+75 . 2 0 0 3 -.062
5 Innovation 1. l4 .1+706 .2214 .1 54
6 Governor's Formal Power 0 . 8 2 .4466 . 2 3 6 8 . 0 0 8
7 Centralization 0 . 8 7 .5 0 3 1 .2 5 3 1 - . 0 3 7
8 Industrialization 0.1+2 . 5 1 0 9 .2610 .149
9 State & Local Revenue- 
Percent Pers. Income 0.06 . 5 1 2 0 .2621 -.068
10 C omp etiti on-Turnout 0 . 0 3 . 5 1 2 6 .2628 -.200
11 Highways-Natural Re­
sources 0 . 0 3 .5 1 3 2 .2634 - . 2 3 9
12 Redistributive Ratio 0.00 . 5 1 3 3 .2635 . 1 3 4
Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable 
with independent variable named at step entered.
Significant at the .05 level.
in Tables 6-21 and 6-22. In both instances the four crime- 
environment factors are entered only after the bulk of the 
explanatory power has been claimed by indicators of other 
subdivisions. In Table 6-21 the four crime-environment vari­
ables claim only 2.6 percent of the 28.8 percent total
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explained variance; in Table 6-22 they account for only ^.5 
percent out of the total explained variance of ^2.7 percent.
In order to understand why allocations to control 
organized crime and civil disorders are more sensitive to 
political-system than to crime-environment variances, it is 
profitable to review the type of control projects which were 
approved by the SPA's of three states which rank among the 
upper quartile in allocations for organized crime and civil 
disorder control, as listed in Table C-2 of Appendix C.
In Indiana, organized crime control funds were allo­
cated primarily to establish an organized crime intelligence 
unit within the Indiana State Police."' Disorder control al­
locations emphasize police-community relations programs, and 
the purchase of riot-control equipment. In addition, a num­
ber of programs to study causes of racial unrest and to de­
velop recommendations for resolving them were planned for 
1 9 7 0 fund allocations.
In Michigan, organized crime control allocations
stress improving existing organized crime units in police
departments and developing them in departments where they do 
2not exist. Of particular interest is a plan to create spe­
cial inter-departmental task forces (involving 16 law enforce­
ment agencies) to work closely with the Michigan Intelligence
U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement As­
sistance Administration, Second Annual Report of LEAA (Wash­
ington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), P* 7*
^Ibid., p. 11.
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Network Team in combating organized crime. Major efforts in 
education programs to alert the public to the dangers of 
organized crime are also included. Projects in the civil 
disorder control category place equal emphasis on police 
training in the prevention and control of riots, and in the 
development of a state-wide emergency preparedness program 
for dealing with riots, civil disorders and natural dis­
asters, including the training of 1,200 to 1 , 5 0 0  police re­
serves to aid law enforcement agencies.
In Pennsylvania, organized crime control funds are 
allocated to establish an intelligence unit in the state De­
partment of Justice. In addition, the Organized Crime Di­
vision of the State Police receives additional funds to 
broaden its undercover operations. It is of interest that 
the Pennsylvania SPA spells out the problem of organized 
crime in some detail, for example:
Income from gambling alone is estimated to be $2 bil­
lion a year— as much as the entire state operating 
budget. One hundred and forty-two identified members 
of the national organized crime syndicate live or oper­
ate in Pennsylvania; 92 of these individuals have 
criminal records totaling ^95 arrests for indictable 
offenses, but only one is presently in jail. The na­
tional crime syndicate operates directly or through 
franchises, vast and lucrative criminal enterprises in 
gambling, loan-sharking, untaxed liquor, narcotics 
racketeering, and organized prostitution.'
With regard to civil disorder control, the largest project
planned by the Pennsylvania SPA is for the expansion of
the Philadelphia Police Department's Civil Disobedience
^Ibid., p. 13.
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Squad. Emphasis is also given to police-community relations 
programs, the recruitment of more Negroes to he policemen, 
and the development of community action programs in coopera­
tion with the police to reduce crime.
These three examples illustrate how projects to 
control organized crime and civil disorders tend to focus on 
police activities rather than on courts and corrections. 
However, the scope of each of these projects exceeds the 
traditional areas of police responsibility and involves co­
ordination of efforts with state and local agencies other 
than police agencies. A second element of importance here 
is the fact that the types of crime or criminal activity 
normally associated with organized crime and civil disorder 
are not those seven "index" crimes which comprise the crime 
environment dealt with in this study.
The relationships between allocations for organized 
crime and civil disorder control and political system vari­
ances are explored further in Chapter VII, and the implica­
tions of this important relationship are discussed in Chap­
ter VIII.
The second conclusion to be drawn from this regres­
sion series concerns the important influence of criminal 
justice expenditure factors on both law enforcement planning 
output factors. This conclusion is based on the regressions 
recorded in Tables 6-21 and 6-22. In both regressions, 
police-versus-corrections expenditures by state and local
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TABLE 6-21.— Second Regression of Twelve Variables on Allo­




Value R R^ r&
Professionalism- 
Local Reliance 6.12 .3427 . 1 1 7 4 . 3 4 3
2 Police-Corrections
Expenditures 3.07 .4168 . 1 7 3 7 . 3 1 4
3 Welfare-Education 2.04 . 4 5 8 6 .2104 - . 0 6 2
4 Affluence 1.07 . 4 7 9 0 . 2 2 9 5 - . 0 3 5
5 Highways-Natural Resources 0.42 .4869 . 2 3 7 1 - . 2 3 9
6 Industrialization 0.73 .5004 . 2 5 0 4 .149
7 Low Murder-High Suicide/ 
Homicide Ratio 0 . 2 8 .5 0 5 5 . 2 5 5 5 - . 2 3 4
8 Competition-Turnout 0.35 . 5 1 2 0 . 2 6 2 1 -.200
9 Judicial-ProsecutionExpenditures 0.20 . 5 1 5 6 . 2 6 5 9 - . 0 9 5
10 Rape and Property Crime 
Rate Increases 0.24 . 5 2 0 1 . 2 7 0 5 -.043
11 Low Rape and Property 
Crime Rates 0.39 . 5 2 7 5 . 2 7 8 3 - . 2 2 5
12 Murder and Auto Theft 
Rate Increases 0.46 . 5 3 6 2 . 2 8 7 6 .004
^Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable
with independent variable at step entered, 
bSignificant at the .05 level.
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TABLE 6-22.— Regression of Seventeen Variables on Allocations
for Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control
Step
No. Variable Entered Value R r 2 r&
lb Professionalism-Local 
Reliance 6.12 .3427 . 1 1 7 4 . 3 4 3
2 Police-Corrections
Expenditures 3.07 .4168 . 1 7 3 7 . 3 1 4
3 Welfare-Education 2.04 . 4 5 8 6 . 2 1 0 3 - . 0 6 2
4 Affluence 1.07 .4 7 9 0 .2 2 9 5 - . 0 3 5
5 Governor's Formal Power 1.00 .4 9 7 4 . 2 4 7 4 .0 0 8
6 Innovation 1.77 . 5 2 7 8 . 2 7 8 6 . 1 5 4
7 Income Distributional Inequality 1.88 .5 5 7 7 . 3 1 1 0 . 1 7 4
8 Centralization 0.86 . 5 7 0 9 . 3 2 5 9 - . 0 3 7
9 Rape and Property Crime Rate Increases 0 . 6 1 .5 8 0 0 . 3 3 6 5 -.043
10 Judicial-Prosecution
Expenditures 1.15 . 5 9 7 1 . 3 5 6 6 - . 0 9 5
11 Murder and Auto Theft 
Increases 0.90 . 6 1 0 1 . 3 7 2 2 .004
12 Low Rape and Property 
Crime Rates 0.98 .6240 . 3 8 9 4 - . 2 2 5
13 Redistributive Ratio 1 . 1 6 .6 3 9 9 .4095 . 1 3 4
14 Competition-Turnout 0.46 .6462 . 4 1 7 6 -.200
15 Highways-Natural Resources 0.12 .6479 . 4 1 9 8 - . 2 3 9
l6 Industrialization 0.31 . 6 5 2 3 .4255 .149
17 Low Murder-High Suicide/ 
Homicide Ratio 0.10 . 6 5 3 9 . 4 2 7 4 - . 2 3 4
^Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable 
with independent variable at step entered.
^Significant at the .05 level.
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governments combined enters at step 2 and contributes about 
5 . 5  percent to the total explained variance. Referring back 
to Tables 6-15 and 6-16, we note that the other expenditure 
factor— Judicial and Prosecution expenditures— enters at 
step 3 in those regressions and contributes about 4- percent 
to the total explained variance in SPA allocations for police 
versus courts and correctional activities.
It is noted that in Tables 6-21 and 6-22 the Police- 
versus-Corrections expenditure factor correlates positively 
(r = .3 1 ) with SPA allocations for the control of organized 
crime and civil disorders. This adds support to our earlier 
observation that the allocation of block grant funds for 
organized crime and civil disorder control is essentially an 
allocation to police activities, although the programs to be 
carried out frequently exceed traditional police responsi­
bilities.
The third conclusion, concerning the importance of 
the Sharkansky-Hofferbert factors, is based on the relative 
stability of the explained variance in Tables 6-20 and 6-21, 
despite the shifting of variables that takes place. The key 
to this stability lies in the retention of all six 
Sharkansky-Hofferbert factors, two of which represent each 
of the main divisions of the systems model employed in this 
study. The substitution in Table 6-21 of the two criminal 
justice expenditure variables for two policy-outcome vari­
ables of Table 6-20 has the effect of replacing Income Dis­
tributional Inequality with Police-Corrections Expenditures
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as the second-ranking contributor. The Welfare-Education 
factor enters at step four vice step three, while 
Professionalism-Local Reliance maintains its pace as the 
most important contributor.
Siuntnary
In continuing this search for the mix of independent 
variables with the highest possible explanatory power, we 
examine the results displayed in Table 6-22 in which seven­
teen independent variables account for k2.y percent ex­
plained variance. Comparison of Tables 6-22 and 6-21 re­
veals that Table 6-22 retains the mix of twelve variables 
from Table 6-21, and incorporates five of the six variables 
deleted from Table 6-20 when the Table 6-21 combination was 
created. This addition of five variables has increased the 
total explained variance by l4 percentage points. The key to 
this important gain is found in the variables entered in 
steps five through eight of Table 6-22. Three political 
system indicators— Governor's Formal Powers, Innovation, and 
Centralization— and one policy outcome indicator— Income Dis­
tributional Inequality— account for 10.65 of the l4 percent­
age points gained. Keeping the importance of parsimony in 
balance with the desire for maximum possible explained vari- 
ence, it appears that the combination of independent vari­
ables entered in steps 1 through 13 of Table 6-22 best ex­
plain the fiscal 1970 block grant allocation decisions re­
lated to the control of organized crime and civil disorders
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the weaker relationship between two of the independent vari­
ables and the dependent variable.
TABLE 6-24.— Simple Correlations, Table 6-24 Variables
1 2 3 I f 5
1 P o l i c e - C o r r e c t i o n s  E x ­
p e n d i t u r e s
2 C o n t r i b u t i o n s - C l a i m e d .14
3 H i g h w a y s - N a t u r a l  R e ­
s o u r c e s -.21 -.21
4 C o m p e t i t i o n - T u r n o u t -.14 -.15 .25
5 L o w  M u r d e r - H i g h  S u i c i d e /  
H o m i c i d e  R a t i o -.35 -.33 .36 .68
6 O r g a n i z e d  C r i m e  & D i s ­
o r d e r  C o n t r o l .31 .24 -.24 -.20 -.23
T h e  l o w  e x p l a n a t o r y  p o w e r  o f T a b l e 6-23 m e r i t s o n l y
brief comment. The Police-Corrections Expenditure factor 
enters first in Table 6-23 and second in Tables 6-22 and
6-21. This lends support to the earlier conclusion regard­
ing the relative importance of criminal justice system in­
dicators in explaining law enforcement planning allocations 
We note also that the multicollinearity (r = -.35) between 
the first and last variables entered in Table 6-23 produces 
a result not unlike that of Table 6-17 where the two most 
closely independent variable occupy the first and last posi­
tions in the "variable entered" list.
C H A P T E R  V I I  
A P P L I C A T I O N
T h e  p r e v i o u s  a g g r e g a t e  a n a l y s i s  o f  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  
p l a n n i n g  i n  f o r t y - e i g h t  A m e r i c a n  s t a t e s  p r o v i d e s  t h e  f o u n d a ­
t i o n  f o r  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  o p e r a t i o n a l  m o d e l s  o f  s t a t e - w i d e  
c r i m i n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a n d  o f  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  p l a n n i n g .
T h i s  c h a p t e r  b u i l d s  o n  t h e  f i n d i n g s  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  f o u r  
c h a p t e r s  t h r o u g h  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  a n d  t e s t i n g  o f  s i x  m o d e l s ,  
f o u r  o f  w h i c h  d e p i c t  v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  o f  s t a t e  a n d  l o c a l  g o v ­
e r n m e n t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  f o r  c r i m i n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  T w o  
f i n a l  m o d e l s  i n c o r p o r a t e  s e t s  o f  s t a t e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  w h i c h  
a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  p l a n n i n g  o u t c o m e s  
d e a l t  w i t h  i n  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r s .
T h e  m o d e l s  t o  b e  p r e s e n t e d  a n d  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  
c h a p t e r  a r e  u s e f u l  i n  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h o s e  s e t s  o f  s t a t e  c h a r ­
a c t e r i s t i c s  m o s t  o f t e n  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  i n t e r - s t a t e  v a r i a n c e s  
i n  g o v e r n m e n t a l  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  c r i m e  c o n t r o l  a n d  
t h e  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  o r d e r .  T w o  p u r p o s e s  a r e  s e r v e d  b y  t h e  
a n a l y s i s  w h i c h  f o l l o w s :  1 )  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  a n a l ­
y s i s  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r s ;  2 )  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  
u n i q u e  o r  o v e r - r i d i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  c e r t a i n  s t a t e s  w h i c h
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require a more detailed investigation than that performed by 
aggregate analysis.
The general finding of the aggregate analysis, as 
reported in Chapter VI, is that the fiscal 1970 state plan­
ning agency allocations of Federal block grant funds for 
police, courts and correctional activities were more sensi­
tive to environmental variances than to political system 
variances. In contrast, allocations for the control of or­
ganized crime and disorders were found to be sensitive to 
political system differences, but were not influenced by en­
vironmental variances to an important degree. These findings 
lead to the question of how the influences of varying en­
vironmental and political system characteristics operate to 
affect the allocation decisions of the SPA supervisory boards. 
Chapter VII responds to this question through the construc­
tion of models, followed by their testing and evaluation.
The procedure employed in model construction is to 
build on the multiple regressions of Chapter VI through the 
substitution and addition of indicators which strengthen the 
mix of variables entered in each regression. It is recog­
nized that this procedure leads to instances of overlap or 
multicollinearity in which two or more variables reflect 
aspects of essentially the same state characteristics. Hence 
the accuracy computed for each of the models is not meant to 
indicate the degree of explanatory power of the model, but 
is included only to suggest the degree to which the tendencies 
of state rankings in the variables which comprise each model
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are predictable. Indications of model accuracy are based on 
ordinal rankings only; no attempt is made to employ the in­
terval data which was processed in the earlier aggregate 
analysis since the purpose here is to provide a standard for 
comparison. This is done in order to tie the aggregate anal­
ysis to particular states with a view toward enhancing the 
explanation of interstate variances in law enforcement plan­
ning.
All six models presented here are "double ended" in 
that each permits the identification of groups of states 
which rank at either extreme in the characteristic repre­
sented by the model. States which rank either high or low, 
as appropriate, in most of the model's variables form one 
group, while other states with inverse rankings in most of 
the same variables form another group.
Following a brief introduction, each of the six 
models is tested through application to the twelve states 
ranking highest and lowest in the characteristic represented. 
It is recognized that in applying each model to only twenty- 
four states, the effectiveness of the model is not tested 
with regard to the twenty-four other states which rank neither 
particularly high or low in the characteristic which the 
model represents. This is largely compensated for by the 
fact that forty-seven of the forty-eight states dealt with are 
examined with regard to at least one of the six models, while 
thirty-two states are examined by three of the six models, 
and eighteen states are examined by four models.
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In a less mathematically sophisticated fashion, this 
application phase resembles the procedure employed by 
Matthews and Prothro^ who derived a multiple regression equa­
tion to represent the typical relationships between twenty- 
one social and economic characteristics and Negro voter 
registration rates in 997 southern counties. The values of 
these demographic attributes for each county were entered 
into the regression equation to predict the 1958 Negro regis­
tration rates. Counties in which the actual voter registra­
tion rates varied significantly from the predicted rates were
2then examined by "residual analysis." In this manner 
Matthews and Prothro were able to "control the effects of the 
socio-economic structure on Negro registration and ascertain 
whether political and legal factors have any independent as­
sociation with Negro registration; and if so, how much." As 
the authors explain, "The larger the residual, the more 
likely it is that other factors are needed to explain the 
county’s Negro registration rate.
In this application phase the rankings of the twenty- 
four states in each of the variables which comprise the 
model are examined. Rankings inconsistent with those
Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Political 
Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," Merican 
Political Science Review. Vol. XVII, No. 2 (June, 1963),
355-67.
2Deviations from predicted levels are called "re­
siduals" in statistical parlance.
^Matthews and Prothro, op. cit., p. 356.
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predicted by the model suggest that the model is inappro­
priate for particular states. In some cases it is possible 
to explain the ranking inconsistencies by analysis of the 
data upon which the rankings are based. In other instances 
there appears, within the parameters of the model, to be no 
explanation for the inconsistencies. This requires the ex­
ploration of state characteristics not represented by the 
model. In a few instances this exploration extends to vari­
ables not included in the earlier aggregate analysis. The 
result is a sharpening of our understanding of law enforce­
ment planning complexities.
The first four models to be examined all deal with 
expenditures for criminal justice functions, in short, with 
how state and local governments allocate their own resources 
for purposes of crime control and the maintenance of order. 
The final two models are representative of fiscal 1970 law 
enforcement planning outcomes, or how state law enforcement 
planning agencies allocated Federal block grant funds to im­
prove law enforcement and the administration of criminal jus­
tice within each state.
Model I
Criminal Justice Expenditure Level 
Model I employs a set of eight state variables, as 
shown in Figure 7-1, which together appear to have influenced 
the 1 9 6 8 - 1 9 6 9 level of expenditure for criminal justice func­
tions by state and local governments. For comparative
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purposes the combined expenditures of state and local govern­
ments within the state are expressed as a percent of total 
personal income for 1968. Model I is based largely on the 
regression of Table 6-8 in that six of the eleven variables 
entered in that regression are included. In addition, Model 
I incorporates Population Increase, 1960-1970 and Prison In­

















State and Local Expenditures 
for Criminal Justice Functions 
as Percent of Personal Income
The eight variables which comprise Model I suggest 
that the following conditions are associated with relatively 
high combined state and local government expenditures for all 
criminal justice functions:
- High mean rates of forcible rape and property 
crimes, accompanied by rapid population growth between i960
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1and 1 9 7 0, and by a relative increase in state prison inmate 
population between 196^ and 1967*
- High rankings in Affluence and above-average rank­
ings in Industrialization, accompanied by high scores in 
Professionalism-Local Reliance, Governor's Formal Powers, and 
moderately high ranking in Innovation.
Among the states in which the level of criminal jus­
tice expenditure as a percent of personal income was highest 
in 1 96 8-1 9 6 9, Model I is best exemplified by California and 
New Jersey. At the low-expenditure end, Arkansas best ex­
emplifies Model I, with Alabama, South Dakota, Iowa, North 
Dakota and West Virginia only slightly less representative.
A comparison of California's ranking in Model I var­
iables with the ranking of Arkansas, as shown in Table 7 -I, 
illustrates the two aspects of Model I. The loadings of 
Table 3-1 show that the three variables which load rela­
tively high on both Industrialization and Affluence are Per­
cent Urban, Telephones per 1,000 Population, and Personal 
Income Per Capita. To a lesser degree, both factors are also 
characterized by above-average rates of business and commer­
cial establishment failures. When these variables are com­
bined with high rates of population increase and prison pop­
ulation increase, there exists the type of environment
As indicated in Table B-5 of Appendix B, only 10 of 
the 48 states recorded actual increases in prison inmate 
population between 1964 and 1967» Thus a "relative increase" 
may, in some instances, mean an actual decrease in inmate 
population.
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frequently associated with high rates of property crime— in 
which California led the nation from 1966 to 1969* Cali­
fornia’s high rankings in Professionalism-Local Reliance, 
Governor's Formal Power, and Innovation are all consistent 
with relatively high expenditures for all criminal justice 
functions.
As noted above, Arkansas exemplifies the low- 
expenditure aspect of Model I. Again we find consistency in 
that the socio-economic environment of Arkansas is that which 
is generally associated with low rates of property crime in 
which Arkansas ranks fourth in the nation. It appears that 
the median rankings of Arkansas in Governor's Formal Powers 
(32), Innovation (32), Prison Population Increase (31), and 
Population Increase (33) are not entirely consistent with 
this state's bottom ranking (^8) in level of expenditure for 
criminal justice functions and low ranking (4l ) in 
Professionalism-Local Reliance.
TABLE 7-1.— Rankings of California and Arkansas in the Vari­




Population Increase 4 33Low Rape & Property Crime Rates h8 4-
Professionalism-Local Reliance 2 4-1
Governor's Formal Powers 7 32Innovation 3 32Prison Population Increase 8 31
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Appraisal
Tables 7-2 and 7-3 present the rankings in the eight 
variables which comprise Model I of the twelve states ranking 
highest and lowest in percent of 1968 personal income ex­
pended for criminal administration by both state and local 
governments within the state. Inspection of these two tables 
indicates that Model I is appropriate for eleven of the 
twelve top-ranked states and for nine of the twelve low- 
ranked states. This evaluation is based on the fact that 
Model I is 80 percent accurate in locating twenty of the 
twenty-four states within the appropriate half of all forty- 
eight states ranked according to criminal justice expenditure 
levels.
Dislocations
As implied above, Model I does not apply to four of 
the twenty-four states listed in Tables 7-2 and 7-3- The one 
state of Table 7-2 for which Model I is not appropriate is 
New Mexico, where a moderately high mean reported rate of 
forcible rape and property crime is the only characteristic 
which clearly suggests that this state belongs among the 
upper quartile in criminal administration expenditures. In 
six of the seven other Model I variables, New Mexico's rank­
ing suggests that this state does not fit Model I. It is 
necessary to look beyond the limits of Model I to account 
for this state's apparent dislocation. Table A-4 shows that 
between 1966 and 1969 the increases in rape and property
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TABLE 7-2.— Twelve States Ranking Highest in Expenditures 
for Criminal Justice Functions as Percent of 
Total Personal Income, 1968: Rankings
in Model I Variables
PS
0) >»n -p« nJ u !—1 d0 <D (D 1 CÔ o
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cS «H ft *H O O >  > •H  o
q o O fw O O O 2 sh d
CO M ft hS Ü PS  h S a  PS M f t  M
1 NEV 1+2 1 1 45 28 21 1
2 N.Y. .3 18 31 46 1 1 1 35
3 MD 12 2i 5 47 10 8 16 18
4 GAL 10 2 4 48 2 7 3 8
5 ARIZ !±1 16 3 44 20 4l 36 13
6 N.J. 1 19 13 28 7 3 4 11
7 DEL 8 12 7 31 16 42 6
8 N.M. 24 35 34 32 34 26
9 Wise 14 32 20 18 9 28 10 24
10 FLA 22 l4 2 42 13 44 31 7
11 LA • 24 41 19 35 19 24 19 3
12 MASS 4 20 25 32 3 30 2 23
Note: Underscored rankings are those not in the appropriate 
half of all -̂8 states as predicted by Model I.
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TABLE 7-3*— Twelve States Ranking Lowest in Expenditures 
for Criminal Justice Functions as Percent of 
Total Personal Income, 1968: Rankings

















































































A  CD 
CO 
q  cd 0 CD 
CO Ph•H 0
3 7 UTAH 3 6 1 0 1 1 H 4 4 1 1 2 2 1 2
3 8 ALA 3 1 45 3 7 1 4 3 3 1 4 30 30
3 9 B.C. 2 1 47 30 1 0 2 1 4 6 45 1 0
4 0 OKLA 3 8 2 6 2 8 2 2 4 0 25 4 2 l 4
4 l SD 4 6 25 4 6 6 43 3 3 43 1 2
4 2 lA 2 5 11 43 1 3 25 2 6 29 35
4 3 N.D. 4 8 31 47 8 4 2 48 21 42
44 KANS 34 i 4 0 15 22 35 25 3 6
45 N.H. 1 6 30 8 3 39 3 7 1 2 i
4 6 IND 1 1 28 2 1 2 6 18 31 18 3 7
4 7 W.VA 2 7 4 0 4 8 2 3 8 ^ 3 35 4 8
4 8 ARK 4 0 4 4 3 3 4 4 i 32 32 3 1
Note: Underscored rankings are those not in the appropriate 
half of all 48 states as predicted by Model I.
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crime rates reported by law enforcement agencies in New 
Mexico were sixth highest in the nation. In per capita per­
sonal income for 1968, New Mexico ranked forty-second, and in 
total personal income fortieth."' These two factors suggest 
that New Mexico's high ranking (8) in criminal justice ex­
penditures as a percent of personal income stems from a 
surge in criminal administration expenditures not matched by 
increased personal income.
In considering the states listed in Table 7-3 for 
which Model I is not appropriate the characteristics of 
Indiana, New Hampshire and Utah require examination. In 
Indiana, middle rankings in property crime rates (26), prop­
erty crime rate increases (2 5 ), and in population increase 
(2 3 ) all combine with a four-year decrease of 19.1 percent 
in prison inmate population, as indicated in Table B-5, to 
lessen pressures for high criminal justice expenditures nor­
mally associated with the degree of industrialization 
achieved by Indiana.
In the case of Utah, high rankings in Affluence, 
Population Increase, Governor's Formal Powers, Prison Popula­
tion Increase, and property crime rates all suggest that 
Utah's expenditures for criminal justice should command a 
percentage of her total personal income greater than that of 
most states. This reasoning ignores the low rankings of Utah
1 National Education Association, Rankings of the 
States. 1970. op. cit.. p. 31*
2l8
in Industrialization (36) and Professionalism-Local Reliance 
(44) which over-ride the other influences including the high 
reported rates of forcible rape and property crime. This 
may be accounted for by the fact that although Utah experi­
enced relatively high mean rates of property crime between 
1966 and 1 9 6 9, the increases in these offense categories over 
that period were relatively low, as evidenced by Utah's 
ranking of forty-first in property crime rate increases.^
This set of conditions suggests that in 1966 Utah's law en­
forcement agencies were more efficient than those of most 
states in crime reporting, or that Utah's citizens were
2highly attentive in reporting property crimes to police. In 
either case there would have existed a relatively small "res­
ervoir" of unreported crime to be drawn upon between 1966 and 
1 9 6 9. Consequently, with reported crime rates of the prop­
erty type high but not rising as rapidly as in most states.
From Table C-2 we note that Utah ranks last in In­
come Distribution Inequality, which suggests that the absence 
of severe relative deprivation may have held down the in­
creases in property crime rates. In 1968 Utah ranked thirty- 
seventh in both per capita income and in total personal in­
come. For additional discussion of the relationships between 
relative deprivation and crime rates see Paul Eberts and 
Kent ?. Schwirian, "Metropolitan Crime Rates and Relative De­
privation," Criminologica, Vol. V, No. 4 (February, 1968),
4 3 -5 2 .
2This suggests that there is some connection between 
Utah's crime reporting and the fact that this state leads 
the nation in contributions claimed on individual income tax 
returns as a percent of personal income. This temptation is 
increased when we note that New Hampshire ranks forty-eighth 
in Contributions Claimed and ranks third from the bottom in 
reported property crime rates.
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there would be less justification for increased expenditures 
for criminal justice functions.
New Hampshire is the third of the twelve low-ranked 
states for which Model I is not appropriate. Four variable 
rankings indicate that New Hampshire belongs elsewhere, while 
an equal number suggest that this state is rightfully located 
among those which spend the least portion of personal income 
for criminal justice functions. The indicators of New 
Hampshire's dislocation include high rankings in Industriali­
zation, Population Increase, Prison Population Increase, and 
Innovation. These are counterbalanced by low rankings in 
Affluence, Professionalism-Local Reliance, and Governor's 
Formal Powers, and by especially low reported rates of forc­
ible rape and property crimes between 1966 and 1969- Also, 
as in the case of Utah, we find that New Hampshire ranks near 
the bottom (^3) in rape and property crime rate increases.
Our interpretation of these circumstances is that an absence 
of marked increases in property crime rates combined with 
low mean rates of these offenses provided little justifica­
tion for high criminal justice expenditures, hence New 
Hampshire's appearance in Table 7-2, rather than in Table
7-1.
The foregoing rationale for the apparent dislocation 
of both Utah and New Hampshire is admittedly speculative, 
and is limited to consideration of only a few of the in­
fluences which, over time, resulted in the expenditure levels
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reported by these states for fiscal year 1968-1969* The key 
to the low ranking of both states in criminal justice ex­
penditures appears to lie in their comparatively stable re­
ported rates of property crime, and by their low rankings in 
Professionalism-Local Reliance. Both states vary greatly in 
the four other characteristics of-Model I which might in­
fluence criminal administration expenditure levels.
Model II 
State/Local Expenditure Ratio
Model II includes the set of nine state character­
istics listed in Figure 7-2 which are associated with rela­
tively^ high expenditures by state government for criminal 
justice functions, as compared with the expenditure level of 
local governments within the state for the same general pur­
poses. Our reliance in the construction of this model on 
the regression of Table 6-10 is strong in that six variables 
are taken from that regression. One criminal justice ex­
penditure variable and two indicators of general policy out­
comes are added to bring the total of Model II variables to 
nine.
The state-wide characteristics most often associated 
with relatively high state government expenditures for
Nationally, state governments account for only about 
2 9 percent of state-local expenditures for criminal justice 
functions. Thus, a particular state government's portion may 
be rated as relatively high and still be substantially less 
than the expenditures of the local governments within the 
state for criminal justice functions.
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criminal justice matters which Model II represents are as 
follows :
- Low rankings in Industrialization and the political 
system indicators of Professionalism-Local Reliance, Inno­
vation, and Governor's Formal Powers.
- Above-median rankings in Highways Natural-Resources, 
and relatively high expenditures for correctional activities 
plus low expenditures for police.
- Below-average rates of property crimes and murder, 
combined with a relatively high suicide/homicide ratio, and 



























State/Local Ratio of Expenditures 
for All Criminal Justice Functions
Among the states with the highest state/local ex­
penditure ratios. Model II is best exemplified by Vermont.
The inverse side of Model II is best illustrated by New York,
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with New Jersey, Michigan and Illinois also providing excel­
lent examples. A comparison of New York's rankings in the 
Model II variables with those of Vermont, as shown in Table 
7-4, will serve to illustrate the two aspects of Model II.
TABLE 7-4.— Rankings of New York and Vermont in the Varibles 
of Model II— State/Local Criminal 
Justice Expenditure Ratio
Model II Variables New York Vermont
Industrialization 3 30Low Murder-High Suicide/Homicide 26 1
Low Property Crime Rates, 1966-69 1+6 7Professionalism-Local Reliance 1 48
Innovation 1 28
Governor's Formal Power 1 40
Police-vs-Corrections Expenditures 11 47Welfare Education 6 35Highways-Natural Resources 44 6
Geographic Area 30 43
New York's high rankings in Industrialization, 
Police-vs-Corrections expenditures, and in property crime 
rates^ are all consistent with a low state/local expenditure 
ratio, as are Vermont's relatively low rankings in these 
variables with a high state/local expenditure ratio. The 
fact that Vermont ranks near the bottom (^7) in police- 
corrections expenditures suggests that the state govern­
ment's penal system claims an above-average portion of the 
state's criminal justice expenditures. In contrast. New
The property crime rate factor emphasizes low rates 
of rape and property crimes, hence a low ranking (46) in 
this factor indicates high rates of these offenses.
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York's ranking of eleventh in this variable indicates that 
municipal police expenditures tend to dominate. Checking 
the urbanization of these two states, we find that in 19&9 
about 87 percent of New York's 1 8 .3 million population lived 
in standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA), while 
Vermont, with a population of 4^9,000 had no SMSA."* While 
these relationships all contribute to making New York and 
Vermont superior examples of Model II, an even more important 
contributor is Professionalism-Local Reliance. In this char­
acteristic we find New York leading the nation, while Vermont 
ranks last. Inspection of Table 4-1 reveals that the "Local 
Reliance" element includes high negative loadings for State 
and Local Revenue from the Federal Government, and State and 
Local Revenue Spent by State Agencies which accounts for the 
key role Professionalism-Local Reliance in Model II.
Appraisal
Tables 7-5 and 7-6 present the rankings in the ten 
variables of Model II of the twelve states which rank highest 
and lowest in the state/local ratio of criminal justice ex­
penditures for fiscal year 1968-1969* From these two tables 
we observe that Model II is adequately representative of 
nine of the twelve top-ranked states, and of eleven of the 
twelve low-ranked states. Overall, Model II is 77 percent
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1969 (Washington, 
B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969)? PP* 919-922.
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accurate in locating twenty of the twenty-four states among 
the appropriate half of all forty-eight states when ranked 
according to state/local expenditure ratio.
Dislocations
The two top-ranked states for which Model II is not 
appropriate are Connecticut and Rhode Island, both of which 
rank high (2 and 7) in Industrialization, and low (^2 and ^7) 
in Highways-Natural Resources. Based on Connecticut’s rank­
ing in seven of ten and Rhode Island's ranking in six of nine 
Model II variables, it would appear that criminal justice ex­
penditures in these two states should be borne by local gov­
ernments to a much larger degree than they are. Nationally, 
local governments account for about 71 percent of all criminal 
justice expenditures; in Connecticut they account for only 
49 percent, and in Rhode Island only 52.5 percent.
One reason why local government expenditures in these 
two states are exceptionally low may be that neither state 
has the county system,^ hence expenditures that in many states 
are borne by county governments are shifted to the state gov­
ernment in Connecticut and Rhode Island. Another reason for 
the apparent dislocation of these two states may lie in their 
small geographic area as indicated in Table 7-5. Seven of 
the twelve states in which the state/local expenditure ratio
Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Gov­
ernment (New York: Macmillan Co., 19^9)j p. 102. Lockard
notes that only three states, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and 
Alaska have no counties as organized units of government.
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is highest rank in the lower quartile with respect to geo­
graphic area.
The single state among the twelve of Table 7-6 in 
which local government expenditures for criminal justice 
functions dominate and for which Model II is clearly inap­
propriate is Nevada, wherein seven of the nine variable rank­
ings suggest dislocation. The one variable which appears to 
dominate in the case of Nevada is the state's ranking of 
forty-fifth in the Low Rape and Property Crime Rate factor, 
which means that Nevada experienced relatively high rates in 
these offense categories between 1966 and 1969* In 1969 ap­
proximately seventy-four percent of Nevada's 460,000 citi­
zens lived in the state's two metropolitan areas of Las Vegas 
and Reno. In view of the concentration of Nevada's gambling 
industry in these two areas, we speculate that the excep­
tionally high local government expenditures for criminal ad­
ministration are related to, and supported by, the gambling 
industry and its "take" from non-residents.
Model III
Police-Versus-Corrections Expenditures 
Model III is representative of those characteristics 
which influence state and local government decisions in the 
relative amounts to be expended for police protection and for 
correctional activities. In many instances these two func­
tions are in competition for fiscal support, which means 
that above-average allocations for police activities results 



























State and Local Expenditures 
for Police versus Corrections
In the development of Model 111 the regression of 
Table 6-11 is relied upon in that five of the nine Model 111 
variables listed in Figure 7-3 are taken from that table. In 
addition, Model 111 includes two indicators of policy out­
comes, one criminal-justice expenditure factor, and Percent 
Negro, 1968. This combination of nine characteristics sug­
gests that states in which police activities are awarded the 
lion's share of criminal justice funds, to the detriment of 
correctional funding, are characterized by the following 
conditions :
- Above average rates of murder and aggravated as­
sault (violent, personal crime), a below-average ratio of 
suicides-to-homicides, and somewhat lower than average in­
creases in forcible rape and property crime rates between 
196 6 and 1969"
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- Greater inequality in distribution of income than 
is found in most American states, combined with an above- 
average percentage of Negro citizens.
- Somewhat below-average rankings in Highways-Natural 
Resources and in Competition-Turnout.
- Relatively high scores in Professionalism-Local 
Reliance and in Centralization, combined with above-average 
expenditures for criminal justice functions by local govern­
ments and relatively low state government expenditures in 
this area.
Among the states in which expenditures for police 
activities dominate those for corrections, Model III is best 
exemplified by Louisiana, while Oregon sets a superior ex­
ample among states where expenditures for correctional ac­
tivities, as a percent of personal income, are highest.
Table 7-7 facilitates a comparison of Louisiana's rankings 
in the Model III variables with those of Oregon to illustrate 
the two features of Model III.
Oregon is characterized by low murder and high sui­
cide rates, relatively equal distribution of income, strong 
political party competition in the state legislature and 
liberal suffrage laws, decision-making in the legislature 
versus the governor's office, and a low percentage of Negroes 
among its population. These circumstances are consistent 
with relatively high emphasis on correctional efforts and 
relatively low emphasis on police activities. In contrast.
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Louisiana ranks high in violent personal crime, inequality in 
distribution of income, centralized decision-making, and in 
percent of residents who are Negroes (third highest of forty- 
eight states). These characteristics combined with very low 
scores in Competition-turnout to maintain a climate which 
favors relatively high expenditures for police protection, 
and assigns a low priority to correctional efforts.
TABLE 7-7*— Rankings of Louisiana and Oregon in the Variables 
of Model III— Police-Versus-Corrections Expenditures
Model III Variables Lous iana Oregon
Low Murder-High Suicide/Homicide Ratio 39 9Property Crime Rate Increases, 1966-69 29 18Highways-Natural Resources 27 8Income Distributional Inequality 5 “+0State/Local Criminal Justice Expend's 3^ 28Percent Negro, 1968 3 38Professionalism-Local Reliance 19 26Comp etition-Turnou t ^3 9Centralization 7 ^3
Appraisal
The rankings in the nine variables of Model III of 
the twelve states ranking highest and lowest in police- 
versus-corrections expenditures are recorded in Tables 7-8 
and 7-9" Inspection of these two tables reveals that Model 
III is 70 percent accurate in locating twenty of the twenty- 
four states in the appropriate half of the nine variables 
which comprise Model III.
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The one top-ranked state listed in Table 7-8 for 
which Model III is clearly not appropriate is Nebraska, whose 
ranking in six of the nine variables indicates dislocation. 
Analysis of Nebraska's rankings here fails to suggest the 
reason for the dislocation; however, by reference to Table 
B-5, we note that in 1967 Nebraska ranked thirty-first in the 
percent of the state population incarcerated, and that be­
tween 196^ and 1967 this state's prison population decreased 
by 26.8 percent. Only three other states, Georgia, Montana 
and West Virginia, recorded greater decreases in prison pop­
ulation during the same period. Table B-3 shows that Nebraska 
ranks thirty-sixth in percent of 1968 personal income ex­
pended for all criminal-justice functions. Of this total, 
police activities claimed 66.1 percent, while correctional 
activities received only 1 8 .2 percent and courts 15*5 per­
cent.^ Thus it appears that Nebraska's high ranking in 
police-versus-corrections expenditures stems primarily from 
earlier actions to reduce the state's prison inmate popula­
tion. This appears not to have been accomplished by releas­
ing excessive numbers of prisoners on parole, for in 1967 
Nebraska ranked forty-sixth in Percent of Prisoners Paroled 
with 31.8 percent releases listed as "conditional." This 
suggests that Nebraska's parole system does not have a large 
work load on which to justify high expenditures.
 ̂LEAA-BuCensus, Expenditure and Employment Data for 
the Criminal Justice System, op. cit.. Table 5. p. l4.
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Model III is not appropriate for Georgia, Ohio, and 
North Carolina, three of the twelve states which rank lowest 
in the police/corrections expenditure ratio. In the case of 
Georgia, eight of the nine Model III variable rankings in­
dicate that this state is "out of place" by ranking thirty- 
ninth in police-versus-corrections expenditures. Inspection 
of Table 7-9 indicates that we must look to indicators not 
included in Model III for an answer to Georgia's apparent 
dislocation. Table B-5 indicates that Georgia ranks sixth 
in the nation in percent of population incarcerated in the 
state's prison system in 1967, after having reduced the in­
mate population by 2 7 .^ percent between 196^ and 1967* Also, 
Georgia ranks thirty-ninth in percent of prisoners paroled in 
1 9 6 7, with only Vi .>+ percent released conditionally. Table 
A-3 indicates that law enforcement agencies in Georgia re­
ported a relatively low rate of property crime between 1966 
and 1 9 6 9, and that the state ranked thirty-fourth in reported 
increases in these offense categories during the same period. 
This is in contrast with Georgia's high ranking (V) in murder 
and aggravated assault rates during the same period. From 
Table B-3 we note that Georgia ranks twenty-fifth in percent 
of personal income allocated for all criminal justice func­
tions.
The foregoing suggests that the propensity toward 
violent crime against persons, where arrest and conviction 
rates are high, versus property crime, where arrest and
23^
conviction rates are low, has led to Georgia's relatively 
high expenditures for correctional activities as compared 
with police activities. In short, it appears that given the 
pattern of criminal activity which enables fewer police to 
"deliver" the same number of convictions, Georgia's criminal 
justice system calls for relatively high correctional ex­
penditures .
The second of three low-ranking states for which 
Model III is not appropriate is Ohio whose ranking in five of 
nine variables suggests dislocation. Table A-3 shows that 
Ohio's pattern of criminal activity tends to be somewhat like 
that of Georgia's in that rates of property crime were rela­
tively low between 1966 and 1969, and violent crimes against 
persons tended to occur at rates higher than in most states. 
The major difference between Ohio's and Georgia's crime pat­
tern is the marked increase in forcible rape and property 
crime rates in Ohio between 1966 and 1969, as compared with 
such increases in Georgia. Ohio's penal system ranked thir­
teenth in percent of population incarcerated in 1967, and
-1twenty-fifth in prisoner increase from 196^ to 1967* Of in­
terest here is Ohio's high ranking of fourth in percent of 
prisoners paroled in 1967 (9*+ percent), which suggests an 
above-average sized state-parole system. Thus it would
This middle ranking in prisoner-increase represents 
a net reduction in Ohio's state prison inmate population of 
about 13 percent between December 31, 1964 and December 31, 
1 9 6 7, with the total dropping from 11,861 to 1 0,3 2 3, for a 
net reduction of 1 ,5 3 8 in inmate population.
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appear that the earlier patterns of criminal activity led to 
the incarceration of an above-average percentage of Ohio's 
population and an over-loading of the state's penal system. 
This, in turn, appears to have led to the establishment of an 
extensive parole organization. We speculate here that the 
effect of the high increases in property crimes between 1966 
and 1969 will result in a shift toward greater relative ex­
penditures for police activities. Whether this will bring 
about a reduction in correctional expenditures will, we sug­
gest, be decided by the budgetary skills of Ohio's correc­
tional "establishment."
North Carolina is the third state ranking low in 
police/corrections expenditures for which Model III is inap­
propriate. In four of the nine Model III variables North 
Carolina's ranking suggests that expenditures for police 
activities should rank much higher than they do. Inspection 
of Table 7-6 reveals that in contrast to Ohio and Georgia, 
North Carolina ranks near the top (W) in the ratio of state 
government to local government expenditures for all criminal 
justice functions. Since the bulk of correctional funding 
in North Carolina, as in other states, is by the state gov­
ernment ($31 million provided by state government versus 
$4.8 million by local governments in 1968-1969), North 
Carolina's high rankings in percent of population incarcerated 
(10) and prisoner increase, 1964-196? (4),^ both support the
^North Carolina was one of ten states in the nation 
that reported net increases in number of persons
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low-ranked position recorded in Table 7-6. As in Ohio and 
Georgia, North Carolina's pattern of criminal activity has 
been distinguished by low rates of property crime and high 
rates of violent personal crime, which apparently have led 
to the budgetary dominance of the correctional establishment 
for the reasons outlined above. Increases in property crime 
rates between 1966 and 1969 reported by North Carolina's law 
enforcement agencies were moderate (ranked 2 3 ), as were re­
ported increases in murder and auto theft (ranked 20).
In summary, the three states ranking relatively low 
in expenditures for police activities for which Model III is 
inappropriate illustrate the effect of distinctive crime 
patterns on the funding of the several criminal justice func­
tions. Violent crimes against persons, that is murder and 
aggravated assault, tend to result in higher arrest and con- 
vistion rates than do property crimes.This leads to higher, 
"production" levels for police, or to the capability of fewer 
police to produce the number of arrests adequate to keep the 
state's penal system fully loaded, provided, of course, the 
court system "cooperates" in awarding sentences to confine­
ment. This, in turn, leads to the requirement for additional 
correctional facilities, which never seem to be adequate, and 
the creation of an adequate force of parole officials.
incarcerated in state institutions between the end of 1964
and 1 9 6 7.
Ûniform Crime Reports, 1969, op. cit., pp. 8-9* In 
1969 the arrest rate for murder and non-negligent homicide 
was 86 percent, and for aggravated assault, 65 percent.
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Together these circumstances appear to over-ride the in­
fluences of other state characteristics represented by the 
Model III variables, at least in the case of Ohio, Georgia 
and North Carolina. This hypothesis is supported by the 
case of Nebraska outlined above. Nebraska's "dislocation" 
at the "police" end of the police-corrections expenditure 
spectrum appears to be the result of a decreased emphasis on 
correctional activities.
This analysis suggests that each state is at a dif­
ferent phase of a cycle of police-courts-corrections expendi­
tures which, in turn, are in response to shifts in patterns 
of criminal activity from property crime to violent crime and 
back again.
Model IV
Judicial and Prosecution Expenditures 
Model IV has been constructed to depict those state 
characteristics which are most frequently associated with 
relatively high expenditures by state and local government 
for judicial and prosecution functions. Our dependence in 
this model on the regression of Table 6-12 is substantial in 
that six of nine variables listed in Figure 7-^ are taken 
from that table. The variables added include Percent Negro, 
1968, Police Expenditures, and Revenue as a Percent of Per­
sonal Income, 1968.
The state characteristics associated with relatively 
high expenditures for judicial and prosecution functions, 
as depicted by Model IV, are as follows:
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- Low scores in Industrialization and Percent Negro, 
1968 (outside the South), combined with relatively stable 
rates of murder and auto theft between 1966 and 1969*
- Relatively low rankings in the political system in­
dicators of Professionalism-Local Reliance, Innovation, 
Governor's Formal Powers, and Centralization.
- Above-average scores in the percent of personal in­
come collected as public revenue by state and local govern­
ments .
- Below-average expenditures for both police and cor­
rectional activities (as a percent of personal income), which, 












Governor's Formal Powers 
State and Local Revenue as 
Percent Personal Income 
Police Expenditures
Expenditure Characteristic
Judicial and Prosecution 
Expenditures by 
State and Local Government
Among the states ranking highest in judicial and 
prosecution expenditures. Model IV is best exemplified by 
South Dakota; at the other extreme New Jersey sets the
2^0
example for Model IV. From Table 7-10 it is possible to com­
pare the rankings of South Dakota and New Jersey in the vari­
ables which comprise Model IV as a means of illustrating the 
conditions represented by the model.
South Dakota, which ranks fourth in the percent of 
criminal justice expenditures allocated to judicial and pros­
ecution functions combined, is distinguished by very low 
scores in Industrialization, Percent Negro, 1968, 
Professionalism-Local Reliance, and Innovation. In contrast. 
New Jersey’s rankings in the Model IV variables are virtually 
the inverse of South Dakota's. Of particular interest is 
New Jersey's ranking of forty-second^ in State and Local 
Revenue as Percent of Personal Income, compared with South 
Dakota’s ranking of eighth in this variable.
The foregoing leads us to speculate that a minimum 
expenditure level is required to render the judicial and 
prosecution functions operable, and that once this level is 
reached these functions have the capacity to process the out­
come of a significant increase in police expenditures. The 
low Industrialization rankings of most of the states listed 
in Table 7-11 suggests low total personal incomes. The im­
plication here is that a high ranking in state and local
This low ranking is probably related to New Jersey's 
proximity to New York City, and the fact that many of New 
Jersey’s residents earn their incomes out of state— a circum­
stance that would make for a high total personal income of 
which only a relatively small portion is taxed by state and 
local government in New Jersey.
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is 80 percent accurate in locating eighteen of the twenty- 
four states in the appropriate half of all forty-eight states.
Dislocations
Model IV is inappropriate for three of the twelve 
top-ranked states: Florida, Alabama and Texas. One possible
key to these dislocations is the high ranking of these three 
states in Percent Negro, 1 9 6 8; all nine other top-ranked 
states of Table 7-11 have a much lower proportion of Negro 
residents. Considering the other variables of Model IV, we 
note that in addition to ranking high (9) in Percent Negro, 
1 9 6 8, Florida's relatively high ranking (13) in Profession­
alism-Local Reliance is the other characteristic which sug­
gests that this state should not rank as high as it does in 
judicial and prosecution expenditures. These influences 
appear to have been overcome by Florida's exceptionally low 
rankings in Governor's Formal Powers (44) and in Centraliza­
tion (48). The low rankings of Texas in these two variables 
appears to lend support here; however this approach is not 
applicable to Alabama which ranks relatively high (l4) in 
Governor's Formal Powers and ranks at the head of all states 
in Centralization.
There remains to be explored one variable of Model 
IV in which the three states of Florida, Alabama and Texas 
are clearly set apart from the other nine states listed in 
Table 7-11: State and Local Revenue as Percent of Personal
Income, 1968. The relatively low ranking of these three
2̂ -5
states in this variable suggests that at least with respect 
to the other nine states of Table 7 - 1 1 ,  expenditures for 
judicial and prosecution functions by state and local govern­
ments are linked directly to the level of revenue collected. 
All considered, Table 7 - 1 1  suggests that the level of ex­
penditures for the judicial and prosecution functions is de­
termined primarily by the degree of tax effort of state and 
local government. However, for reasons not evident in Model 
IV, a high ranking in percent of Negroes overcomes the rela­
tive lack of public revenue in the case of Alabama, Florida 
and Texas.
Among the twelve states which rank lowest in ex­
penditures for judicial and prosecution functions Table 7 - 1 2  
indicates that Model IV clearly does not apply to Nebraska, 
Mississippi and Wisconsin. In the rankings of the first two 
states named, seven of the nine Model IV variables indicate 
dislocation, while Wisconsin's ranking in five of the nine 
variables also suggests that this state belongs elsewhere 
with respect to judicial and prosecution expenditure levels. 
If we limit consideration to the nine variables of Model IV, 
it appears that Nebraska's very high rankings in Murder and 
Auto Theft Increase ( 2 )  and Police Expenditures (3) over-ride 
all other rankings of Table 7 - 1 2 ,  and in Mississippi the na­
tion's highest percent of Negro residents in 1968, coupled 
with a high ranking (8) in police expenditures has taken 
charge of judicial and prosecution expenditure levels. Under
2h6
the same limitations, in Wisconsin it would appear that upper 
quartile rankings in Industrialization, Professionalism- 
Local Reliance, Innovation and Centralization dominate.
The foregoing completes a brief analysis of the four 
expenditure models. We turn now to Models V and VI which 
deal with allocations by the SPA supervisory boards of the 
fiscal 1970 Federal block grant funds.
Model V 
SPA Allocations to Police,
Courts and Corrections
Model V employs the set of ten state indicators 
listed in Figure 7-5 to represent those state characteristics 
which appear to influence SPA's to favor the support of 
police activities in their allocations of block grant funds. 
Eight of the ten Model V variables are taken from the regres­
sion of Table 6-17* The two variables added are Percent 
Prisoners Paroled, 1967? and Total Criminal Justice Expendi­
tures as a Percent of Personal Income, 1968.
The characteristics associated with relatively high 
allocations of block grant funds to police and relatively low 
allocations to courts and correctional activities suggested 
by Model V are as follows:
- Low reported rates of forcible rape and property 
crimes between 1966 and 1 9 6 9, coupled with relatively low 





























Block Grant Funds to Police 
versus
Courts and Correctional Activities
- Above average increases in rates of murder and 
non-negligent homicide and auto theft.
- Below-average expenditures for all criminal- 
justice functions by state and local governments.
- A below-average record in percent of state prison 
inmates released on parole or other condition during 1967»
- Below average scores in the political system indi­
cators: Competition-turnout, Innovation, Governor's Formal 
Power and Professionalism-Local Reliance.
- Greater inequality in the distribution of income 
than exists in most of the American states.
Among the states which allocated the largest portion 
of available fiscal 1970 block grant funds to police activ­
ities, and less to courts and corrections. Model V is best
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exemplified by South Dakota, Mississippi, and South Carolina. 
At the other extreme, where SPA emphasis was on courts and 
corrections, Washington is the best example of Model V. A 
comparison of South Carolina's rankings in the Model V vari­
ables with those of Washington, as shown in Table 7-13, will 
serve to illustrate the two aspects of this Model.
TABLE 7-13*— Rankings of South Carolina and Washington in the 
Variables of Model V— SPA Allocations for 
Police, Courts and Corrections
South Wash­
Model V Variables Carolina ington
Low Rape and Property Crime Rates 10 38
Increase in Murder Rate, 1966-1969 24 17Competition-Turnout 48 12
Property Crime Rate Increase, 1966-69 27 1Governor's Formal Power 46 6
Innovation 45 l4Professionalism-Local Reliance 21 22
Income Distributional Inequality 6 36
Criminal Justice Expenditures Level 39 23Percent of Prisoners Paroled, 1967 47 1
South Carolina is distinguished first by very low 
scores in Competition-Turnout, Governor's Formal Power, In­
novation, Percent of Prisoners Paroled in 1967, and in 
equality of income distribution. The picture thus far ap­
pears consistent with SPA emphasis on police activities, 
however we must look further. South Carolina ranks thirty- 
ninth in percent of personal income expended for criminal 
justice functions. Given the circumstances outlined above, 
we speculate that the primary concern of the South Carolina
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SPA in a.l l(jcaling fiscal 1970 funds was not that of foster­
ing change and rehabilitation through improved court and 
correctional systems, but rather putting "first things 
first" and upgrading police effectiveness.
With regard to Washington's propensity to favor 
courts and correctional activities in the allocation of block 
grant funds, the rankings of Table 7-13 show that this state 
leads the nation in increases in property crime rates and in 
percent paroled, which suggests a rapid turn-over in prison 
inmate population— perhaps the result of an earlier emphasis 
on upgrading police capabilities. In comparison with South 
Carolina, it appears that Washington is a phase or two 
"ahead" in emphasizing courts and corrections. However, 
Washington's high ranking (6) in Governor's Formal Power com­
pared with South Carolina's very low ranking (46) may have 
permitted Washington's governor to appoint a SPA supervisory 
board oriented toward state responsibilities (courts and cor­
rections) more so than municipal responsibilities (police).
Appraisal
The rankings in the ten Model V variables of the 
twelve states which rank highest and lowest in allocation of 
block grant funds to police activities versus courts and 
correctional activities are shown in Tables 7-l4 and 7-15- 
Examination of these tables shows that Model V is reasonably 
accurate with regard to ten of the twelve top-ranked states, 
and to a like number of the twelve low-ranked states.
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Overall accuracy in locating these nineteen states in the 
appropriate half of the variable rankings is 76 percent.
Dislocations
The two top-ranked states for which Model V is not 
appropriate are Connecticut and New Jersey, both of which 
rank much higher in Industrialization than do six of the 
eight other states listed in Table 7-1^* Although two other 
states, Rhode Island and New Hampshire, both rank among the 
top one-third in Industrialization, the characteristics of 
their political systems and low increases in property crime 
rates place these two states among the less industrialized 
for which Model V is appropriate. In effect. Model V allows 
for wide variation in Industrialization ranking, provided 
that the patterns of criminal activity and the state-wide 
political systems do not vary too greatly.
One of the three states listed in Table 7-15 for 
which Model V clearly is not appropriate is Texas, where 
seven of ten variable rankings suggest that this state be­
longs at the police end of the police-courts-corrections 
continuum. Based on Table C-4- a primary reason for Texas' 
dislocation appears to be that this state led all others in 
percent of block grant funds allocated to the "miscellaneous" 
category (3 1 . 5  percent versus 8 percent national average). 
Further examination of the 1970 allocation decisions of the 
Texas SPA (Tables C-3 and C-4) reveals that 28.6 percent of 
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to courts, and 2 5 . 2  percent to correctional activities.
These figures compare with national averages of 51*0 percent 
to police, 6.9 percent to courts, and 26.7 percent to correc­
tions. Thus it is apparent that the relatively high alloca­
tion to "miscellaneous" activities was taken largely from 
the police end of the police-courts-corrections continuum.
The second low-ranking state for which Model V is not 
appropriate is Louisiana, which in 1970 allocated 40.2 per­
cent of available block grant funds to police activities, 
and 44.3 percent to correctional activities. These alloca­
tions ran counter to national averages by about 11 percent 
less to police and 17 percent more than average to correc­
tional activities. Thus, where the Texas SPA "took” funds 
from police activities and allocated them to a miscellaneous 
category, the Louisiana SPA simply "shifted" such funds from 
police to correctional activities.
The status of the prison systems in Texas and 
Louisiana may hold part of the answer to the dislocation of 
these two states with respect to police-versus-corrections 
allocations. Both states rank among the top ten in the na­
tion in ratio of prisoners to population, in increase in 
prison inmate population between 1964 and 1967, and in police 
expenditures by state and local government combined. These 
circumstances lead us to speculate that the SPA's in these 
two states were confronted with much over-loaded correctional 
systems, while the police agencies of both states were
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receiving relatively high appropriations, thereby adding to 
the correctional overload through an increased capability to 
make arrests. The data suggests that the SPA's of Texas and 
Louisiana dealt with similar situations in different manners. 
In Texas the correctional system received a "standard" por­
tion of the block grant funds available, while more than 30 
percent was allocated to "miscellaneous" projects related to 
law enforcement. In Louisiana, the SPA reduced the "normal" 
allocation for police activities and increased the portion 
of block grant funds for correctional activities. In both 
states the SPA's effort appears to have been in the direction, 
of correcting an imbalance within the state's criminal jus­
tice system.
The third low-ranked state for which Model V is in­
appropriate is Vermont whose ranking in seven of the ten 
variables suggests dislocation. Analysis of Vermont's Model 
V variable rankings fails to indicate a reason for this dis­
location; however, by extending the analysis we find the 
answer to be not unlike that in the case of Texas and 
Louisiana. Tables C-3 and C-4 indicate that Vermont's SPA 
allocated ^7 . 8  percent of the fiscal 1970 block grant funds 
to police activities, l8.2 percent to correctional activities, 
2.8 percent to courts, and 26.8 percent to the miscellaneous 
category. In this last category Vermont is second only to 
Texas. Thus, as with Texas, Vermont's dislocation with re­
spect to Model V lies in the relatively high grant for
2^^
miscellaneous law enforcement programs. In contrast to both 
Texas and Louisiana, most of the miscellaneous allocation by 
Vermont's SPA has been "taken" from courts (̂ .1 percent) and 
from correctional activities (8.5 percent).
From the foregoing we may attribute the dislocations 
of all three states, Texas, Louisiana and Vermont, to ex­
ceptional allocation patterns involving high allocations to 
either correctional activities (Louisiana) or to the miscel­
laneous category (Texas and Vermont). It appears evident 
that in each instance the SPA dealt with the several com­
ponents of the state's criminal justice system as a system, 
and made some effort to redress the imbalance in the combined 
state and local expenditure patterns. Whether such redress 
would have occurred without the block grant method of funding 
and the requirement for "comprehensive" planning at the state 
level is, we feel, doubtful.
Model VI
Organized Crime and Disorder Control 
Model VI is comprised of state indicators which ap­
pear to have influenced SPA decisions to allocate funds for 
the control of organized crime and disorders. Three of the 
eight Model VI variables listed in Figure 7-6 are taken from 
the regression of Table 6-23. Thus, Model VI relies on the 
results of the earlier aggregate analysis to a lesser degree 
than do any of the other five Models. Variables added in 
Model VI include Percent Negro, 1968 and the state/local
2^6
ratios of both criminal justice expenditures and of repre­
sentatives appointed to the SPA supervisory boards. In addi­
tion, and for the first time in our model construction,
Model VI includes two measures of fiscal 1970 SPA allocation 
decisions: percent of block grant funds to corrections, and






















SPA Allocation Factor 
Organized Crime and Disorder Control
The conditions associated with relatively high allo­
cations of fiscal 1970 block grant funds for the control of 
organized crime and disorders which Model VI depicts are as 
follows :
- A relatively low state/local ratio of expenditures 
for all criminal justice functions, combined with a below- 
average ratio of state government representatives on the SPA 
supervisory board.
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- Relatively low scores in Highways-Natural Re­
sources, complemented by high scores in Professionalism- 
Local Reliance and in Percent Negro, 1968.
- High relative expenditures for police activities, 
balanced by below-average expenditures for correctional ac­
tivities by state and local government.
- A relatively high allocation of block grant funds 
for correctional activities, and a low allocation of these 
funds for "miscellaneous" projects.
Among the states which allocated the largest portion 
of available block grant funds to the control of organized 
crime and disorders. Model VI is best exemplified by Indiana 
and Louisiana. Among the states which allocated lowest por­
tions in this area, Montana is the best example of Model VI. 
Table 7-16 sets forth the rankings of Indiana and Montana in 
the variables of Model VI. A comparison of these rankings 
provides a means for illustrating the two features of Model 
VI.
TABLE 7-16 .— Rankings of Indiana and Montana in the Variables 
of Model VI— SPA Allocations to Control 
Organized Crime and Disorders
Model VI Variables Indiana Montana
Professionalism-Local Reliance 18 he
Police-vs-Corrections Expenditures 20 h-2
Highways-Natural Resources 27 3SPA Miscellaneous Allocations 28 12
SPA Corrections Allocations 16 38
State/Local Criminal Justice Expend's 2 5 10State/Local SPA Representative Ratio 38 16
Percent Negro, i960 22 4-8
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Indiana, which ranks fifth in percent of block grant 
frinds allocated to control organized crime and disorders, 
shows generally median rankings in seven of the eight Model 
VI variables. We do note a moderate tendency toward 
Professionalism-Local Reliance, and high expenditures for 
police which are compensated for by relatively high SPA al­
locations for courts and corrections. Although Indiana's 
state/local ratio of expenditures for criminal justice func­
tions is average, the portion of local representatives on the 
SPA supervisory board is well above average. Thus, we con­
clude that Indiana's relatively strong emphasis on organized 
crime and disorder control is reflective of a SPA supervisory 
board that recognized and was sensitive to the urban-oriented 
problems of organized crime and disorders.
In the case of Montana, which ranks forty-sixth in 
SPA allocations for organized crime and disorder control, we 
note particularly low scores in Professionalism-Local Re­
liance, Police-Corrections Expenditures, and SPA allocations 
for courts and corrections. The picture here is one of rela­
tively high state and local expenditures for corrections, 
balanced by low SPA emphasis on this function. In addition, 
the SPA supervisory board includes an above-average repre­
sentation of state government officials and the state govern­
ment's portion of expenditures for all criminal justice 
functions is well above average. All considered, it appears 
that the Montana SPA could well have allocated a greater
2^9
portion of block grant funds to control organized crime and 
disorders. The fact that such allocations were not made sug­
gests that the control of organized crime and disorders in 
Montana was not recognized as being important, or at least 
not as important as other problems for which larger amounts 
were allocated.
Appraisal
The rankings in the eight Model VI variables of the 
twelve states which rank highest and lowest in the allocation 
of fiscal 1970 block grant funds for the control of organized 
crime and disorders are presented in Tables 7-17 and 7-18 .
Our examination of these tables reveals that Model VI is 
reasonably representative of eleven of the twelve top-ranked 
states and of ten of the twelve low-ranked states. As in the 
previous models, this criteria for representativeness is 
based on the accuracy of the model in locating each state in 
the appropriate half of the forty-eight states in the vari­
ables which comprise the model. On this basis. Model VI is 
7^ percent accurate with regard to twenty of the twenty-four 
states listed in Tables 7-17 and 7-18 .
Dislocations
The four states of Tables 7-17 and 7-18 for which 
Model VI clearly is not representative are Colorado, Iowa, 
Illinois and Maryland. Iowa's ranking in seven of the eight 
Model VI variables suggests dislocation. Only a relatively
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low ratio of state/local representation on the SPA super­
visory board is consistent with Iowa's ranking of eleventh 
in allocations for control of organized crime and disorders. 
Inspection of Table 7-17 reveals that none of Iowa's fiscal 
1970 block grant funds were allocated for disorder control, 
and that 8.8 percent of such funds were allocated for con­
trol of organized crime. It is apparent that further in­
vestigation of circumstances in Iowa would be required to de­
termine why Iowa's ranking in allocation of block grant funds 
for organized crime control is unique.
Colorado’s ranking of fourth in SPA allocations for 
Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control appears to be out 
of line with this state's ranking in five of the eight Model 
VI variables. The one ranking which does support relatively 
high allocations (10.5 percent) to control organized crime 
and civil disorders is that of thirty-ninth in allocation of 
block grant funds for miscellaneous law enforcement projects. 
This ranking, combined with a ranking of forty-third in 
police-corrections expenditures, suggests that police depart­
ments in Colorado were "in line" for a healthy portion of the 
available block grant funds, and that the SPA supervisory 
board saw a greater need for allocations to the police- 
related areas of civil disorder and organized crime control 
than for other areas. This emphasis may be rooted in the 
5 2 . 9  percent non-white migration experienced by Colorado
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between 1950 and 1 9 6 0J  Although Colorado's Negro population 
increased by about 97 percent between 1950 and 1968, at the 
end of this period the state's Negro population represented 
only 3 . 5  percent of the total population, or about one-third 
the national average. It seems reasonable that the bulk of 
the state's non-white migration included a high percentage of 
Mexican-Americans, which led to the "Chicano" movement in 
Colorado's metropolitan areas. Thus, the allocations for 
organized crime and disorder control could be related to the 
growing demands of the state's Mexican-American minority.
Among the twelve states which rank lowest in the use 
of Federal funds to control organized crime and disorders. 
Model VI is clearly not appropriate for Illinois and Mary­
land. The rankings of these two states in the Model VI vari­
ables, as shown in Table 7-l8, indicate that Illinois and 
Maryland are much alike in the manner in which they differ 
from the ten other states of Table 7-18. Of primary interest 
are the parallel rankings in Percent Negro, 1968 and in 
Professionalism-Local Reliance. No other state ranking as 
high in percent Negro citizens ranks as high in Professional­
ism-Local Reliance as do both Illinois and Maryland.
Summary
Summarizing the foregoing discussions of six models 
is simplified somewhat by the fact that the characteristics
^U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, op. cit., p. 3^»
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r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  t h r e e  o f  t h e  f o u r  e x p e n d i t u r e  m o d e l s  a r e  i n ­
c l u d e d  a s  v a r i a b l e s  i n  o u r  t w o  m o d e l s  o f  t h e  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t  
p l a n n i n g  p r o c e s s .  M o d e l  V ,  r e p r e s e n t i n g  i n f l u e n c e s  w h i c h  
f a v o r  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  b l o c k  g r a n t  f u n d s  f o r  p o l i c e  a c t i v ­
i t i e s  o v e r  t h o s e  f o r  c o u r t s  a n d  c o r r e c t i o n s  i n c l u d e s  a s  o n e  
o f  t e n  v a r i a b l e s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  c r i m i n a l  j u s t i c e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  
w h i c h  i s  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  M o d e l  I .  I n  a  l i k e  m a n n e r ,  M o d e l  V I  
i n c l u d e s  a m o n g  i t s  e i g h t  v a r i a b l e s  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  r e p ­
r e s e n t e d  b y  M o d e l s  I I  a n d  I I I .
C o m b i n i n g  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  w h i c h  m a k e  u p  M o d e l s  I  a n d  
V ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s t a t e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h  a l l o c a t i o n s  o f  f i s c a l  1 9 7 0  b l o c k  g r a n t  f u n d s  
f o r  p o l i c e  a c t i v i t i e s ;
-  A b o v e - a v e r a g e  r a n k i n g s  i n  I n c o m e  D i s t r i b u t i o n a l  
I n e q u a l i t y  a n d  i n  M u r d e r  a n d  A u t o  T h e f t  I n c r e a s e s .
-  B e l o w - a v e r a g e  r a n k i n g s  i n  A f f l u e n c e  a n d  i n  I n ­
d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  a n d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
w h i c h  a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  a s s o c i a t e d  t h e r e w i t h :  P r o f e s s i o n a l i s m -  
L o c a l  R e l i a n c e ,  C o m p e t i t i o n - T u r n o u t ,  I n n o v a t i o n ,  G o v e r n o r ' s  
F o r m a l  P o w e r ,  a n d  P o p u l a t i o n  I n c r e a s e ,  1960-1970.
-  B e l o w - a v e r a g e  r a n k i n g s  i n  R a p e  a n d  P r o p e r t y  C r i m e  
R a t e s  a n d  i n c r e a s e s  t h e r e i n ,  i n  P e r c e n t  o f  P r i s o n e r s  P a r o l e d ,  
i n  P r i s o n  I n m a t e  P o p u l a t i o n  I n c r e a s e ,  a n d  i n  E x p e n d i t u r e s  f o r  
C r i m i n a l  J u s t i c e  a s  a  P e r c e n t  o f  P e r s o n a l  I n c o m e .
M o d e l s  I I ,  I I I  a n d  V I  c o m b i n e d  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h  a l l o c a t i o n  o f
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block grant funds for the control of organized crime and 
disorders include above-average rankings in the following:
- Industrialization and the political system char­
acteristics frequently associated therewith.
- Percent Negro, 1968, Income Distributional Inequal­
ity, Geographic Size, and Welfare-Education.
- Expenditures for police activities versus correc­
tional activities.
- Murder and Aggravated Assault Rates and Rape and 
Property Crime Rates.
- Allocation of Federal block grant funds for cor­
rectional activities.
These rankings are balanced by below-average rankings in the 
following variables:
- State/Local Criminal-Justice Expenditure Ratio, and 
the State/Local ratio of representatives on the SPA super­
visory board.
- Highways-Natural Resources, Competition-Turnout, 
and the allocation of block grant funds for "miscellaneous" 
programs to improve law enforcement.
- Rape and property crime rate increases, and the 
suicide/homicide ratio.
In comparing the lists of variables which make up the 
two combination-models outlined above, we find that four 
variables are operative in both: Income Distributional In­
equality, Industrialization, Property Crime Rates, and
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Professionalism-Local Reliance. The manner in which these 
four state characteristics are related to the allocation de­
cisions of the SPA's are set forth in Table 7-19* Examina­
tion of this table shows that relatively high allocations to 
courts and corrections and to the control of organized crime 
and disorders are associated with above-average rankings in 
Industrialization, Property Crime Rates, and Professionalism- 
Local Reliance. In contrast, relatively high allocations to 
police activities are associated with below-average rankings 
in each of these three characteristics.
TABLE 7-1 9.— Trends of State Rankings in Variables which In­
fluence all Block Grant Fund Allocations
Ranking Tendency of States Wherein SPA 




Organized Crime & 
Disorder Control
Industrialization low high high
Property Crime low high high
Professionalism- 
Local Reliance low high high
Income Distribu­
tional Inequal­
ity high low high
Note: "Low" and "high" indicate that rankings tend to be
in the lower or higher half of the forty-eight 
states, respectively.
Income Distributional Inequality, the fourth vari­
able of Table 7-19, is important because it is the only
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variable which indicates that allocations for the improvement 
of courts and correctional activities are favored by cir­
cumstances different from those which favor allocations to 
control organized crime and disorders. If our earlier find­
ing that SPA allocations tend to redress imbalances within 
state criminal justice systems is valid, the rankings of 
Table 7-19 suggest that inequality in the distribution of 
income is associated with relatively high state and local 
expenditures for corrections, and below-average expenditures 
for police protection. Such conditions would call for the 
SPA allocation of relatively greater amounts for police ac­
tivities and for organized crime and disorder control, which 
falls under the "police" heading more so than under the 
"courts and corrections" heading. By implication, the SPA's 
of states which tend toward equality in the distribution of 
incomes saw the need for improvement of correctional activ­
ities to be greater than that for improvement of police ac­
tivities, including organized crime and disorder control.
This summarization concludes with a review of the 
findings with regard to application of Model IV. The ap­
parent direct linkage between the degree of tax effort by 
state and local governments and expenditures for the judicial 
and prosecution functions, except where the percent of Negro 
residents is especially high, suggests that courts are lowest 
on the priority list of the criminal-justice components. 
However, an alternative hypothesis seems worthy of consider­
ation: that where the degree of tax effort by state and
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local governments is relatively low, court systems tend to be 
self-sufficient through the collection of fines. This would, 
for the most part, obviate the necessity for the expenditure 
of public tax revenue for the judicial and prosecution func­
tions. In states with a high percentage of Negroes (most of 
whom are poor) and with the accompanying patterns of violent, 
personal crime, the courts are less likely to be self- 
supporting through collection of fines, and more likely to 
award sentences of imprisonment. This hypothesis is con­
sistent with our earlier proposition that high rates of vio­
lent, personal crime make it possible for fewer police to 




This final chapter smmnarizes the main findings of 
the foregoing aggregate analysis and application phases and 
then discusses the conclusion to be drawn from this study. 
Lastly, a number of questions related to law enforcement 
planning and the administration of criminal justice in the 
United States which remain unanswered are outlined.
Summarization 
The findings of Chapter VI which can be illustrated 
by the relationships among indicators of the crime environ­
ment, expenditures for criminal administration, and SPA 
block grant allocations are shown in Table 8-1. These re­
lationships indicate that:
1. Where state and local expenditures for all crim­
inal justice functions as a percent of personal income are 
above average, and where the emphasis is on expenditures for 
police versus corrections, the 1966-1969 mean rates of prop­
erty crime and forcible rape tended to be relatively high. 
The SPA's of these states emphasized support of courts and
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TABLE 8-1.— Comparison of Relationships Between Indicators of Crime Environment And Criminal Justice Expenditures and SPA Block Grant Allocations, 1970
State & Local Government Expenditures for Criminal Justice Functions
Allocations of 1970 Block Grant Funds
Police Judicial Police vs. Organized
Crime Total State- versus and Courts & Crime &
Environment Expendi­ Local Correct­ Prose­ Correct­ DisorderFactors tures Ratio ions cution ions Control
High tow High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low"
Rape and High X X X X X
Property -  -  -
Crime Rates Low X X X X X
Violent High X X X X
Personal — — “ — — —
Crime Rates Low X X X X
Rape & Prop­ High X X X X
erty Crime — — — — — —
Increases Low X X X X
Violent Pers­ High X X X
onal Crime — — — “  — — — — —
Increases Low X X X
■
to-oo
^Indicates simple correlation of 0.10 or less,
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correctional activities and the control of organized crime 
and civil disorder in their allocations of block grant funds.
2. Where state government expenditures for criminal 
justice functions were relatively high (and municipal or 
local expenditures relatively low), and where the SPA super­
visory board allocated an above-average portion of 1970 
block grant funds for police activities, the 1966-1969 mean 
rates of property crime and forcible rape were relatively low.
3. Where 1966-1969 mean rates of murder and aggra­
vated assault were above average, state and local governments 
tended to allocate a relatively high percentage of their com­
bined criminal justice expenditures to police activities, and 
relatively low amounts to correctional activities. The SPA's 
of these states emphasized allocations to control organized 
crime and civil disorders.
4. Where reported rates of murder increased most 
dramatically between 1966 and 1969, combined state and local 
expenditures emphasized police protection over correctional 
activities, while judicial and prosecution expenditures in 
these states were relatively low. The SPA's of these states 
tended to favor police-related projects in their allocation 
of 1970 block grant funds.
In addition to the foregoing, the aggregate analysis 
of Chapter VI indicates that SPA decisions on the funding of 
police activities, courts and correctional activities are 
more sensitive to variances in state crime environments than
272
to any of the other state characteristics considered. In 
contrast, SPA decisions to fund projects aimed at the con­
trol of organized crime and civil disorders are most sensi­
tive to political system differences."' The results of the 
aggregate analysis also make it clear that in addition to 
environmental variables indicators of criminal justice ex­
penditures and of income distribution must be included in 
any model which best explains the distribution of block 
grant funds to either police, courts, or correctional ac- 
tivities.
In the application phase of this study (Chapter Vll), 
operational models were developed to represent those combi­
nations of variables which appear to have the greatest in­
fluence on state and local criminal justice expenditures and 
on SPA allocation decisions. These six models include:
1 - Total Criminal Justice Expenditures, State and 
Local, as Percent of Personal Income
11 - State/Local Criminal Justice Expenditure Ratio 
111 - Police-versus-Corrections Expenditures
IV - Judicial and Prosecution Expenditure Level, as 
Percent of Personal Income
V - SPA Allocations for Police, Courts and Correc­
tional Activities, Fiscal 1970
VI - SPA Allocations for Organized Crime and Civil 
Disorder Control
^Further discussion of this important finding is 
located in the "conclusion" section of this chapter.
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The results obtained by applying each of these six 
models to the twelve states ranking highest and lowest in 
the Characteristics represented by the model are summarized 
in Table 8-2. Examination of these results indicates that 
the following state characteristics tend to be associated 
with above-average SPA allocations for police activities:
- Greater inequality in the distribution of income 
than in most states.
- Above-average rankings in Murder and Auto Theft 
rate Increases, 1966-1969*
- Below-average rankings in Affluence and in Indus­
trialization and the political system characteristics fre­
quently associated therewith: Professionalism-Local Reliance,
Competition-Turnout, Innovation, Governor's Formal Power, and 
Population Increase.
- Below-average rankings in Rape and Property Crime 
Rates, and in increases in those offense categories, in Per­
cent Prisoners Paroled, in Prison Inmate Population Increase, 
and in Expenditures for Criminal Justice as a Percent of 
Personal Income.
Table 8-2 also indicates that SPA emphasis on the 
control of organized crime and civil disorders in the alloca­
tion of 1970 block grant funds is associated with the follow­
ing state characteristics:
- Relatively high scores in Population Increase, In­
dustrialization, Professionalism-Local Reliance and Innovation.
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TABLE 8-2.— State Rankings^ in Variables Associated with 
Above-Average SPA Allocations for Police, Courts 
and Corrections, and for Control of Organized 








Affluence Low High —  —
Industrialization Low High High
Percent Negro, 1968 —  — —  — High
Population Increase, 1960-70 Low High High
Rape and Property Crime 
Rates, 1966-69 Low High High
Increases in Rape and 
Property Crime Rates Low High Low
Murder and Aggravated As­
sault Rates, 1 9 6 6 -6 9 —  — —  — High
Increases in Murders and 
Auto Thefts, 1966-69 High Low —  mm
Professionalism-Local
Reliance Low High High
Competition-Turnout Low High Low
Innovation Low High High
Governor's Formal Power Low High —  —
State/Local Criminal Justice 
Expenditure Ratio —  M mm Low
State/Local SPA Representa­
tion Ratio High Low Low
Total Criminal Justice Ex­
penditures, State & Local Low High High
Police-Versus-Corrections 
Expenditures —  —• High
Percent Prisoners Paroled Low High High
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TABLE 8-2.— Continued
V a r i a b l e P o l i c e
C o u r t s  &  
C o r r e c ­
t i o n s
O r g a n i z e d  
C r i m e  &  
D i s o r d e r s
P r i s o n  P o p u l a t i o n  I n c r e a s e L o w H i g h H i g h
H i g h w a y s - N a t u r a l  R e s o u r c e s — — — — L o w
I n c o m e  D i s t r i b u t i o n a l  I n ­
e q u a l i t y H i g h L o w H i g h
W e l f a r e - E d u c a t i o n — — — — H i g h &
S P A  A l l o c a t i o n s  f o r  C o r ­
r e c t i o n s — — — — H i g h
A high ranking, as used in this table, indicates a 
ranking between 1 and 24; a low ranking is one between 25 
and 48.
- Above-average rankings in Percent Negro, 1968, In­
come Distributional Inequality, and Welfare-Education.
- State and local government emphasis on expendi­
tures for police protection versus correctional activities, 
and SPA emphasis on courts and correctional programs.
- Above-average rates in Murder, Aggravated Assault, 
and in Forcible Rape and Property Crimes.
- Below-average rankings in Highways-Natural Re­
sources, Competition-Turnout, and in Forcible Rape and Prop­
erty Crime rate increases.
- Relatively low total state and local expenditures 
for criminal administration, and a below-average percent of 
state government representatives serving on the SPA super­
visory board.
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As applied to most of the upper- and lower-quartile 
states examined in Chapter VII, model accuracy ranges from 
70 to 80 percent. However, each model is clearly inappro­
priate for from one to three states in each group of twelve 
states examined. Inquiry into the reasons for these excep­
tions has led to two propositions:
First, that a crime environment characterized by 
high rates of violent crime against persons and low rates of 
property crime, is associated with relatively high expendi­
tures for correctional activities and relatively low expendi­
tures for police activities. The reason for this distinctive 
expenditure pattern in certain states appears to be related 
to the marked difference in clearance rates between violent 
personal crime (murder and aggravated assault) and property 
crimes. The fact that clearance rates for murder and aggra­
vated assault are several times that of clearance rates for 
most property crimes means that a state where the crime en­
vironment is characterized by high rates of murder and ag­
gravated assault, and low property crime rates, a compara­
tively few police officers are able to produce a number of 
arrests sufficient to overburden the courts and correctional 
agencies of the state. On the other hand, in areas where 
murder and aggravated assault rates are low, and where prop­
erty crime rates are high, a comparatively large police 
force is needed to produce the number of arrests which the 
courts and correctional system can handle.
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Secondly, that without a systems approach and co­
ordinated budgeting for criminal justice functions at state 
and local levels imbalances within the criminal justice sys­
tem of each state are both inevitable and predictable in an 
age of rapid social, economic and political change such as 
that experienced by most American states. These changes, 
briefly summarized, include:
- A growing economy accompanied by increasing mobil­
ity, urbanization, rising expectations, and relative depriva­
tion.
- A shift in patterns of criminal activity, especially 
in the increased property crime rates reported— related to 
conditions described above.
- White reaction to the civil rights movement, lead­
ing to the 1964 nomination of Barry Goldwater and the revival 
of law-and-order as a national political issue. Two results 
of this revival were the creation of the National Crime Com­
mission and the enactment of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act.
- Marked progress in the FBI’s voluntary program for 
the reporting of crime statistics. As the number of cooper­
ating jurisdictions has increased from 7 , 7 0 0 in I960 to 
8 , 5 0 0  in 1 9 6 9) the reporting requirements have become more 
detailed. A result has been the centralization of crime re­
porting in many large cities, which has tended to increase 
the number of "offenses known to the police" for reporting 
purposes.
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The effect of these changes in the environment within 
which all criminal justice systems operate has been to in­
crease the public demand for better police protection (more 
arrests), "tougher" prosecutors and judges (fewer dismis­
sals), and longer prison sentences (delayed parole).^ The 
cumulative impact is to reduce the flexibility of the crim­
inal justice process, which is founded on discretion in the 
arrest, prosecution, judicial and parole functions, and 
thereby to aggravate the tendency toward workload imbalsince 
among the three major components of the criminal justice sys­
tem. This is entirely at odds with one of three central 
themes of the National Crime Commission which strongly urged 
that there be a far broader range of alternatives for deal­
ing with offenders. The Commission based its premise,
. . .  On the belief that, while there are some who 
must be completely segregated from society, there are 
many instances in which segregation does more harm 
than good. Furthermore, by concentrating the resources 
of the police, the courts, and correctional agencies on 
the smaller number of offenders who really need them, 
it should be possible to give all offenders more effec­
tive treatment. 2
An interesting example of the impact of parole board 
policies on state prison inmate population trends is found in 
the recent history of the Kansas prison population. Following 
the i960 election, a new "hard line" parole board was created 
to fulfill a campaign promise of the new Governor. Subse­
quently, the inmate population rose by thirty percent in four 
years. Since about 1965 a more lenient parole policy has re­
duced the Kansas prison population to its pre-196l level.
2National Crime Commission, Challenge of Crime, on. cit., p. vii.
279
Conclusion
In Chapter I the controversy in the study of public 
policy over whether political or environmental variances are 
the more important as public policy determinants was re­
viewed. This review pointed out the importance of the 
methodology to the outcome of public policy studies. The 
use of Easton's input-output model by Dawson and Robinson, 
Hofferbert, and Dye has challenged the earlier assumptions 
about the importance of political variables. Those assump­
tions had been reinforced through the methodology of case 
studies and community power approaches which dealt with gov­
ernment structure as a key variable.
A number of recent aggregate studies point to the 
middle ground where there exists no single answer to the 
question of whether environmental or political variables of 
the American states are the more important determinants of 
policy outputs.
The conclusion to be drawn from the present investi­
gation is that law enforcement planning decisions or outputs 
related to allocations for police, courts and correctional 
activities are most sensitive to environmental variances, 
while decisions by SPA's to allocate funds for the control of 
organized crime and civil disorders are most sensitive to 
state political system differences.
This conclusion appears to be in accord with the 
"middle ground" findings of Cnudde and McCrone, Clarke, and
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Sharkansky and Hofferbert^ whose studies suggest that dif­
ferent political, social and economic characteristics have 
different relevance for policies which varies between sub­
stantive areas of policy. Although the control of organized 
crime and civil disorders falls within the law enforcement 
or criminal justice policy area, the allocation of block 
grant funds for such purposes calls for consideration of 
factors in addition to those normally dealt with when allo­
cating resources for police, courts, and correctional ac­
tivities. As illustrated in the case of Indiana, Michigan 
and Pennsylvania, organized crime and disorder control pro­
jects may involve governmental agencies other than those 
which comprise the state's criminal justice system. The 
types of criminal activity to be controlled under the "or­
ganized crime" heading--Gambling, loan sharking, narcotics, 
prostitution and bootlegging— exist because there is a market 
for the illegal goods and services dealt with. The inflated 
value of these goods and services has, in large measure, 
been created by the criminal laws which render the activities 
of organized crime illegal. While there exists a general 
consensus in the society that law related to violent personal 
crime and property crime should be enforced, the same cannot
Cnudde and McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare 
Policies in the American States," op. cit.; Clarke, "Environ­
ment, Process and Policy: a Reconsideration," op. cit.; and
Sharkansky and Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, 
Economics, and Public Policy," op. cit.
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be said with respect to the enforcement of laws which, in 
effect, make organized crime a worthwhile enterprise.
In a similar manner, the control of civil disorders 
frequently lacks a general consensus. In making a distinc­
tion between "inputs" and "withinputs," Easton argues that 
in transitional societies the counter-elites demand reform of 
the existing political structure so as to improve their 
chances of obtaining power. "To the extent that demands can 
be shown to arise out of and reflect dissatisfaction with 
the current structure of the political system, we can say 
that they are internally generated,states Easton.
In summary, law enforcement planning with regard to 
the allocation of resources to the functional areas of state 
criminal justice systems responds primarily to externally- 
generated demands which are identifiable through analysis of 
interstate socio-economic variances. In contrast, demands 
which are generated primarily within the political system 
influence those law enforcement planning decisions related to 
the more controversial areas, of which the control of organ­
ized crime and civil disorders are prime examples.
Unanswered Questions 
It is perhaps to be expected that in a study of this 
nature more questions will be raised than are answered. Our 
concentration on fiscal year 1970 law enforcement planning
^Easton (1965), op. cit., p. 55*
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outputs has virtually excluded from consideration a number 
of important questions related to law enforcement planning 
and criminal administration. These questions stem from the 
dilemma faced by all governments: how can citizens and
their property be protected while at the same time permitting 
the degree of freedom and flexibility needed to accommodate 
the changes which science and technology force upon the 
modern world? In Lincoln's terms, "Must a government of 
necessity be too strong for the liberties of its people, or 
too weak to maintain its own existence?
Remarkable advancements in science and technology 
have contributed to a society that is more affluent than any 
the world has known, but one that has seen life in America 
grow increasingly complex. This, in turn, has stimulated a 
demand for simple solutions. As James Reston has pointed 
out, the more irrational the world seems, the more the
people long for rational answers; "the more diverse every-
2thing is, the more they want it all reduced to identity."
In Chapter II several issues related to the 1968 
Safe Streets Act and the decision of the Congress to provide 
Federal financial assistance for state and local law enforce­
ment assistance were introduced. In large measure, the un­
answered questions discussed below stem from those issues.
^GayIon L. Caldwell and Robert M. Lawrence, American 
Government Today (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963), p. 12.
2Quoted by Yale Kamisar in "When the Cops Were Not 
Handcuffed," New York Times Magazine. November 7, 1965?
p. 1 0 9 .
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1. The lav-and-order issue gives rise to the ques­
tion of whether any amount of Federal assistance in the area 
of law enforcement or criminal justice administration can be 
effective when candidates for public office insist on po­
liticizing the crime problem? In the opinion of James Q. 
Wilson, it is probably too much to expect that public of­
ficials, sensitive to the popular concern about "crime in 
the streets," will encourage police administrators to do 
better those things the police can do, which is to maintain 
order, and to look to the correctional agencies for help in 
reducing the incidence of crimes committed by repeaters, 
which the police cannot do.^
2. A related question under the law-and-order issue
heading centers on Thurman Arnold's perceptive observations
2on the symbolic importance of the criminal trial, and the 
futility of expecting to "improve" this feature of the crim­
inal justice process in terms of effectiveness measured by 
the mundane criteria of case loads processed, the speedy 
trial, or the percentage of convictions "won" by the prose­
cutor.
3. Local control of law enforcement is an issue that 
appears to have been given all the rhetoric, while the de­
cision of the Congress went to "states' rights" under the
^James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior 
(Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 296.
2Arnold, op. cit.
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block grant label. One basic question which stems from the 
block grant funding method of the Safe Streets Act concerns 
its implication for nation-wide efforts to standardize crim­
inal laws and punishments. With state governments making 
the allocation decisions with regard to the block grant 
funds, it would seem that inter-state differences in crim­
inal laws and their application will tend to increase. 
Another question in this area concerns the impact of the 
block grant provision of the Safe Streets Act on the rela­
tive power of rural-dominated state governments versus the 
large municipal governments within the state. It would ap­
pear that the block grant funding method will off-set some­
what the impact of the historic Backer versus Carr^ and 
Reynolds versus Sims apportionment decisions of 1962 and 
1964 respectively. In the latter case the Supreme Court's 
decision included the statement
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. 
Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or 
cities or economic interests.3
In the judgment of George B. Merry, the impact of Reynolds
versus Sims "has proven to be even more far-reaching than
the decree handed down in Backer versus Carr.




^377 U.S. 533 (1964).
George B. Merry, "Now Your Vote May Count for More." 
Christian Science Monitor. March 26, 1966, p. 9-
28^
4. The systems approach which is stressed in the 
LEAA Guidelines for state-wide law enforcement planning 
raises a question that appears to have been largely ignored: 
whether the doctrine of separation of powers between the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches is not threatened 
when the separate criminal justice functions— police, ju­
dicial, correctional— are dealt with as a system?
5 . Of all the needs of law enforcement and the ad­
ministration of criminal justice, the National Crime Commis­
sion found that the greatest need is the need to know. As of 
1 9 6 7, the Commission reported that negligible amounts were 
being expended for the types of research "that are the ob­
vious prerequisites for a rational program of crime con­
trol . In stressing the need for research, the Commission 
was aware that final answers to many of the vexing questions 
about crime will not be provided by research:
Decisions as to the activities that should be made
criminal, as to the limits there should be on search
and seizure, or as to the proper scope of the right
to counsel, cannot be made solely on the basis of re­
search data. Those decisions involve weighting the 
importance of fairness and privacy and freedom— values 
that cannot be scientifically analyzed. But when re­
search cannot, in itself, provide final answers, it 
can provide data crucial to making informed policy 
judgments.
There is virtually no subject connected with crime 
or criminal justice into which further research is un-necessary.2
^ N a t i o n a l  C r i m e  C o m m i s s i o n ,  T h e  C h a l l e n g e  of C r i m e ,  
o p .  c i t . .  p .  2 7 3 .
^Ibid.
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To meet the need for more complete information about the op­
eration of the criminal process, the Commission recommended 
the creation of a National Criminal Justice Statistics 
Center. A major effort of the proposed Center would be to 
overcome many of the present limitations in law enforcement 
record keeping and the crime statistics based thereon.
Responding to the need for better information about 
crime and criminals, an important upgrading of the FBI's 
voluntary Uniform Crime Reporting Program recently has in­
volved the establishment of several multi-state, computerised 
criminal-intelligence systems.^ While the importance of such 
systems to more effective law enforcement is recognized, 
their creation gives rise to questions concerning invasion 
of privacy and the possible political use of criminal intel­
ligence information.
6. Recognizing that ours has always been a changing 
or transitional society, it appears that the rate at which
American society has changed since the 195^ Brown versus
2Board of Education decision is greater than ever. This 
proposition raises the question of whether there does not 
now exist a level of criminal activity that is "normal" for 
today's transitional society— a level that is higher than that 
which was "normal" for the pre-195^ or even pre-1965 American 
society? If so, then it would appear that a significant
^FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, 1969? op. cit., p. 50* 
2347 U.S. 483 (195^).
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r e d u c t i o n  i n  r e p o r t e d  c r i m e  r a t e s  m u s t  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  
D u r k h e i m ' s  i m p o r t a n t  w a r n i n g :
T h e r e  i s  n o  o c c a s i o n  f o r  s e l f - c o n g r a t u l a t i o n  w h e n  t h e  
c r i m e  r a t e  d r o p s  n o t i c e a b l y  b e l o w  t h e  a v e r a g e  l e v e l ,  
f o r  w e  m a y  b e  c e r t a i n  t h a t  t h i s  a p p a r e n t  p r o g r e s s  i s  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  s o m e  s o c i a l  d i s o r d e r . 1
T h e  i m p l i c a t i o n  h e r e ,  i n  b r o a d  t e r m s ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  
c u r r e n t  " c r i m e  w a v e "  i s  a  " n o r m a l "  l e v e l  o f  c r i m i n a l  a c t i v i t y  
f o r  t o d a y ’ s  t r a n s i t i o n a l  s o c i e t y ,  a n d  t h a t  a  m a r k e d  d r o p  i n  
r e p o r t e d  c r i m e  r a t e s  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  " i m p r o v e d "  l a w  e n f o r c e ­
m e n t  m u s t  n e c e s s a r i l y  s i g n a l  a  s l o w i n g  d o w n  o f  t h e  p a c e  a t  
w h i c h  t h e  s o c i e t y  i s  c h a n g i n g  o r  u n d e r g o i n g  t r a n s i t i o n .
E p i l o g u e
O n e  o f  t h e  p a r a d o x e s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  s o c i e t y ,  a n d  
p e r h a p s  o f  a l l  s o c i e t i e s ,  i s  t h e  a p p a r e n t  c o r r e l a t i o n  b e ­
t w e e n  c h a n g e  w h i c h  s e e k s  t o  i r r a d i c a t e  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  i n  
h o u s i n g ,  e m p l o y m e n t ,  e d u c a t i o n ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  a n d  a c c e s s  t o  
p u b l i c  f a c i l i t i e s  a n d  t h e  t h r e a t  o r  a c t u a l i t y  o f  v i o l e n c e ,  
d i s o r d e r  a n d  t h e  b r e a k i n g  o f  l a w s .  R e c e n t l y  T e d  G u r r  a d ­
v a n c e d  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  " a  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
v a r i a b l e ,  r e l a t i v e  d e p r i v a t i o n ,  i s  t h e  b a s i c  p r e c o n d i t i o n  
f o r  c i v i l  s t r i f e  o f  a n y  k i n d ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  m o r e  w i d e s p r e a d  
a n d  i n t e n s e  d e p r i v a t i o n  i s  a m o n g  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n ,  
t h e  g r e a t e r  i s  t h e  m a g n i t u d e  o f  s t r i f e  i n  o n e  o r  a n o t h e r
^Durkheim, op. cit.
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f o r m . I n  his investigation of the means employed to deter 
civil strife Gurr finds that the magnitude of civil violence 
tends to increase as the level of resources devoted to co­
ercive deterrence is escalated— up to a certain point— "and 
then only at relatively high levels of coercive force does 
strife tend to decline. Moreover at the outer limit the re­
lationship again tends to change direction: countries with -
the very largest coercive forces tend to have more strife
2than those with somewhat smaller forces."
In spite of the apparent reasonableness of those 
propositions which seek to reduce crime by attacking some of 
its underlying causes, the prospects for strong national ef­
forts in this direction are not bright for the reasons de­
scribed by Breckenridge:
Our society cannot and will not accept an enlarged 
lawlessness even if it must tolerate some of it. And 
even if it may be at fault in tolerating many of the 
basic causes of crime, it will not wait for long-range, 
time-consuming, money-consuming solutions to stop or 
reduce it. It will take the means at hand to control 
it, even abusive means, in its concern and belief that 
crime must ^e controlled and reduced, if not wholly 
eliminated.'
All considered, perhaps Tillich's judgment that
L.injustice is unavoidable in the struggle for justice," is
Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Com­
parative Analysis Using new Indices," American Political 
Science Review. LXII (December, i9 6 0),110^.
^Ibid., pp. 1123-2^. ^Breckenridge, op. cit., p. h2.
IlPaul Tillich, To Live As Men; An Anatomy of Peace 
(Santa Barbara, Calif.: The Center for the Study of Demo­
cratic Institutions, 1965), p. 15-
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the most accurate conception of the dilemma faced by all who 
seek to improve law enforcement and criminal justice in the 
American states through state-wide law enforcement planning.
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TABLE A-1.--State Rankings and Scores^: Industrialization,





iank State Score State Score state Percei
1 N.J. 2.112 NEV 2 . 3 4 0 UTAH 3.22
2 CONN 1.940 CALIF 1 . 5 2 0 ALA 2.11
3 N.Y. 1.920 WYO 1 .3 2 5 N.Y. 2 . 0 34 MASS 1 .6 0 2 COLO 1 .2 0 9 MISS 2.02
5 ILL 1 .5 6 1 OREG 0 . 9 6 6 DEL 1 . 9 5
6 PA 1 .2 3 5 WASH 0 . 9 6 4 OKLA 1.88
7 R.I. 1 .2 1 8 MONT 0 . 9 3 2 TENN 1.848 DEL 1.200 NEB 0 . 7 8 2 FLA 1 . 8 2
9 OHIO 1 .1 3 8 KANS 0 . 7 7 6 CONN 1 .8 110 CALIF 1.014 UTAH 0 .7 3 9 IDAHO 1 . 8 0
11 MICH 0.884 CONN 0 . 6 9 0 N.C. 1 . 7 9
12 M D 0.847 DEL 0.584 N . J . 1 .7 8
13 IND 0 .7 7 6 IDAHO 0 . 5 5 6 S.C. 1 .7$14 Wise 0 .5 2 6 FLA 0 . 5 1 1 PA 1 . 7 7
15 MO 0 .3 6 6 lA 0 . 4 5 3 MINN 1 . 7 4
16 N.H. 0 .2 6 3 AIRZ 0.442 MO 1.68
17 WASH 0 .0 3 6 MINN 0.405 CALIF 1 . 6 7
18 N.C. -0 .0 5 7 N.Y.' 0 . 3 9 0 ARK 1.66
19 VA -0 .0 7 9 N.J. 0 . 3 6 6 GA 1 .6 520 TENN -0 .0 8 1 MASS 0 .3 6 1 MASS 1 .6 1
21 MINN -0.145 ILL 0 . 2 6 6 ARIZ 1 . 5 8
22 GA -0.148 OHIO 0 . 2 0 7 M D 1 . 5 7
23 S.C. -0 . 1 7 0 MICH 0 .1 9 2 MICH 1 . 5 424 LA -0 .1 9 9 N.M. 0 . 1 5 3 VA 1 . 5 4
25 lA -0 .2 0 8 S.D. 0.147 LA 1 .5 3
26 ME -0 .2 1 7 OKLA 0.120 TEX 1 .5 3
27 W.VA -0 .2 3 4 TEX 0 . 0 1 7 ILL 1 . 4 7
2 8 OREG -0 .2 9 8 IND 0 . 0 0 5 COLO 1.40
29 TEX -0 .3 5 4 MD 0.001 OHIO30 VT -0 .3 6 5 N.H. -0.002 NEV 1 . 3 8
31 ALA -0 .3 9 2 N.D. -0 . 0 4 5 N.D. 1 . 3 632 FLA -0 .3 9 6 Wise -0.047 KANS 1 . 3 5
33 K Y -0 .4 5 3 P A -0.122 R.I. 1 . 3 534 KANS -0 .5 3 4 MO -0 . 1 7 0 Wise 1 . 3 4







Rank State Sc ore State Score State Percent
36 UTAH -0 . 5 9 1 R.I. -0 . 2 2 7 IND 1 . 3 2
37 NEB -0 . 7 2 0 ME -0 . 3 1 9 VT 1 .3 1
38 OKLA -0 . 7 6 5 VA -0 . 8 3 3 S.D. 1 .3 0
39 MISS -0.824 KY -1 .2 8 7 KY 1 .2 940 ARK -0.848 W.VA -1 .3 0 1 lA 1 .2 7
4l ARIZ -0.993 GA -1 .3 5 0 NEB 1 .2 7
42 NEV -1.148 TENN -1.355 OREG 1.22
43 IDAHO -1 .1 6 7 LA -1.379 WASH 1.1944 MONT -1 . 2 7 7 ARK -1.424 N.M. 1 .1 8
45 N.M. -1 . 2 9 0 ALA -1 .5 0 2 MONT 1.14
46 S.D. -1 . 3 6 0 N.C. -1 .6 2 7 ME 0 . 9 8
47 WYO -1 .4 5 6 S.C. -2 . 0 5 0 W.VA 0 .8 548 N.D. -1 .4 9 4 MISS -2 . 1 7 3 N.H. 0.84
Scores for Industrialization and Affluence are 
factor scores provided by Richard I. Hofferbert. "Percent" 
under Contributions Claimed is percent of 1968 personal 
income claimed as "contributions" on I9 6 8 individual in­
come tax return calculated from; U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Pub. 79 (9-70), Sta- 
of Income, 1 9 6 8, Individual Income Tax Returns 
(Washington,D.Ô.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970),
P • 17i•
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TABLE A-2 .— State Rankings and Percentages: 1968 Negro Pop­








Rank State Percent State Percent State Percent
1 MISS 37.0 Wise 350.0 N.H. 137.0
2 S.C. 32.0 ME 228.6 CONN 71.1
3 LA 31.0 N.D. 202.3 Wise 68.4
4 ALA 27.5 N.M. 143.9 ME 67.7
5 GA 24.5 ARK 114.3 NEV 63.0
6 N.C. 23.0 KY 109.1 COLO 52.9
7 VA 19.5 NEB 106.9 CALIF 52.7
8 ARK 18.5 MINN 104.1 N.J. 34.6
9 FIA 17.5 COLO 97.4 MASS 32.1
10 MD 17.0 MASS 92.3 N.H. 29.5
11 TENN 16.0 CONN 88 .0 WASH 28.6
12 DEL 14.0 NEV 85.9 ILL 28.3
13 ILL 13.0 ILL 75.6 MICH 27.9
14 TEX 12.0 IND 58.0 OHIO 25.6
15 MICH 10.5 PA 56.3 IND 25.4
16 MO 10.5 IDAHO 55.5 OREG 22.7
17 N.J. 10.0 MINN 55.0 VT 20.1
18 PA 9.5 N.Y. 53.5 NEB 17.5
19 N.Y. 9.5 N.J. 51.7 FLA 16.6
20 OHIO 9 . 0 MICH 51.3 DEL 14.6
21 KY 7.0 CALIF 48.7 MINN 13.8
22 IND 7 .0 MO 39.8 R.I. 13.7
23 CALIF 6 .5 OHIO 39.3 lA 12.3
24 OKLA 6 .0 UTAH 37.5 PA 12.0
25 NEV 5.0 lA 33.3 MD 9.3
26 CONN 5 .0 MONT 33.3 MO 9.3
27 W.VA 5.0 VT 33.3 UTAH 8 .0
28 KANS 4.5 OREG 31.6 IDAHO 7.1
29 Wise 3 .5 KANS 17.2 KANS 6.530 ARIZ 3.5 R.I. 13.6 TEX - 2 .7
31 NEB 3 .0 MD 3.2 N.M. - 2.9
32 COLO 3 .0 DEL 2.1 KY - 7 .6
33 MASS 3.0 KY 2 .0 VA - 9.5
34 N.M. 3 .0 ARIX 0.9 ARIZ -10.3
35 WASH 2 .0 TENN - 0.7 LA -10.4
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TABLE A-2.--Continued
1968 N e g r o  






Rank State Percent State Percent State Perce:
36 R.I. 2 .0 TEX - 5 .4 TENN -10.7
37 lA 1 .0 L A - 5.7 MONT -11.4
38 OREG 1.0 OKLA - 8 .0 OKLA -13.0
39 MINN 1 .0 N.C. -10.7 N.D. -18.3
40 WYO 0 .8 VA -11.8 WYO -18.4
41 U T A H 0 .6 W.VA -12.7 GA -19.2
42 N . D . 0 .4 ALA -14.1 N.C. -19.2
43 N.H. 0.3 WYO -14.7 S.D. -19.4
44 IDAHO 0.3 ARK -17.2 ALA -22.8
45 ME 0.3 S.C. -17.6 S . C . -26.5
46 V T 0 .2 MISS -18.3 MISS -32.7
47 S . D . 0 .2 FLA -19.6 W.VA -35.0
48 M O N T 0.1 GA -2 0 .6 ARK -35.0
Sources :
Percent Negro, I968 is taken from Table I of 
The Negro Population published by the Center for Research 
and Marketing, Inc., 1968.
Negro Increase, 195O-I968 is calculated from The 
Negro Population, op.cit., and U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Ëureau or the Census, U.S. Census of Population: i960. 
General Population Characteristics (Washington, b.c.:U.S. Government Printing Office, Ï961), Table 56,
Non-white Migration is taken from U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States, 1969 (Washington, U.C.: Ü.S. Govern­
ment Printing Office, 19&9 ), p. 3 4.
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TABLE A-3-— State Rankings and Scores®’: 196O-I97O Population 
Increase; Low Rape and Property Crime Rate ;
Low Murder-High Suicide/Homicide Ratio
1966-1969 1966-1969
1960-1970 Low Rape Low Murder-
Population and Property High Suicide/
Increase Crime Rates Homicide Ratio
Rank State Percent state Score State Score
1 NEV 71.3 MISS 1 .6 VT 1.8
2 FLA 37.1 W.VA 1 .4 N.D. 1.8
3 ARIZ 36.1 N.H. 1.2 ME 1.7
4 CALIF 27.0 ARK 1.1 lA 1.5
5 MD 26.5 N.C. 1 .0 R.I. 1.2
6 COLO 25.8 S.D. 1.0 N.H. 1.2
7 DEL 22 .8 VT 0.9 NEB 1.2
8 N.H. 21.5 N.D. 0 .8 MONT 1.1
9 CONN 19.6 NEB 0 .8 OREG 1.1
10 WASH 19.5 S.C. 0.7 Wise 1.1
11 UTAH 18.9 OHIO 0 .7 CONN 1.0
12 N.J. 18.2 ME 0.7 IDAHO
13 OREO 18.2 lA 0 .7 ' MINN 0.8
14 VA 17.2 ALA 0 .7 WASH 0.7
15 TEX 16.9 KANS 0.7 UTAH 0.6
16 GA 16.4 PA 0 .6 MASS 0.5
17 VT 14.1 KY 0.6 ARIZ 0.5
18 MICH 13.4 Wise 0.6 COLO 0.3
19 LA 11.9 IDAHO 0.5 WYO 0.2
20 Wise 11.8 VA 0.5 CALIF 0.2
21 N.C. 11.5 GA 0 .4 NEV 0.1
22 MINN 11.5 CONN 0 .4 KANS 0.1
23 IND 11.4 WYO 0 .4 DEL 0.1
24 R.I. 10.5 TENN 0.2 PA 0.1
25 MASS 10.5 MINN 0.1 IND 0.0
26 ILL 10.2 IND 0 .1 N.J. -0.1
27 TENN 10.0 TEX 0.1 N.Y. -0.1
28 OKLA 9.9 N.J. 0 .0 OKLA -0.1
29 OHIO 9.7 OKIA 0 .0 S.D. -0.1




P o p u l a t i o n
I n c r e a s e
1966-1969
L o w  R a p e  
a n d  P r o p e r t y  
C r i m e  R a t e s
1966-1969
L o w  M u r d e r -  
H i g h  S u i c i d e /  
H o m i c i d e  R a t i o
Rank State Percent State Score State Score
31 N.Y. 8 .4 DSL -0 .1 MICH -0.3
32 MO 8.3 MASS -0 .1 OHIO -0.3
33 ARK 7 .7 MONT -0 .1 MD -0.4
34 IDAHO 6.9 N.M. -0.3 N.M. -0.7
35 N.M. 6 .8 LA -0 .4 KY -0.7
36 KY 6 .0 MO -0 .4 ILL -0.8
37 ALA 5.4 UTAH -0 .4 TENN -0.8
38 NEB 5.1 WASH -0.5 MO —0.9
39 PA 4.2 COLO -0.8 VA -0.9
40 KANS 3.2 ILL -0 .8 LA -1.0
41 MONT 2.9 OREG -0.9 FLA -1.3
42 ME 2.5 FLA -1.3 TEX -1.4
43 lA 2 .4 MICH -1.7 MISS -1.4
44 MISS 1 .8 ARIZ -1.9 ARK -1.4
45 WYO 0.7 NEV -1.9 GA -1.4
46 S.D. -2 .1 N.Y. -2 .1 N.C. -1.7
47 N = D. -2 ,3 MD -2.7 ALA -1.8
48 W.VA -6 .2 CALIF -2 .8 S.C. -1.8
S c o r e s  f o r  196O-I970 P o p u l a t i o n  I n c r e a s e  a r e  p e r c e n t  
I n c r e a s e  i n  t o t a l  s t a t e  p o p u l a t i o n  a s  r e c o r d e d  b y  B u r e a u  o f  
t h e  C e n s u s ;  s c o r e s  f o r  o t h e r  t w o  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  f a c t o r  s c o r e s  
d e r i v e d  b y  f a c t o r  a n a l y s i s  t e c h n i q u e ,  w i t h  d a t a  c o m p u t e d  f r o m  
F B I ' s  U n i f o r m  C r i m e  R e p o r t s ,  I966-I969, a n d  f r o m  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  
S e r v i c e  r e p o r t s  o n  c a u s e  of d e a t h  i n  V i t a l  S t a t i s t i c s ,  1967.
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TABIÆ A-4.— State Rankings and Scores^: Rape and Property Crime Rate Increase; Murder and Auto Theft Increase; Suiclde/ïiomicide Ratio,1967
1966-1969 1966-1969
R a p e - P r o p e r t y M u r d e r  a n d 1967
C r i m e  R a t e A u t o  T h e f t S u i c i d e /
I n c r e a s e s I n c r e a s e s H o m i c i d e
R a n k  S t a t e  S c o r e S t a t e  S c o r e S t a t e  R a t i o
1 WASH 2.1 R.I. 3.6 ME 14.75
2 ARK 1.9 NEB 1.9 N.D. 12.00
3 CONN 1.8 MO 1.8 lA 7.14
4 COLO 1.6 N.J. 1.4 N.H. 6.67
5 OHIO 1.6 OHIO 1.3 VT 6.20
6 N.M. 1.5 N.Y. 1.2 Wise 5.13
7 KANS 1.5 MASS 1.0 MINN 5.08
8 Wise 1.3 MICH 1.0 WYO 4.93
9 TEX 1.0 KY 0.9 OREG 4.28
10 M A S S 0.9 CONN 0.9 WASH 3.91
11 M D 0.8 DEL 0.6 COLO 3.85
12 NEV 0.5 TENN 0.5 MONT 3.81
13 MO 0.5 VT 0.5 CONN 3.76
14 DEL 0.5 WYO 0 .4 NEB 3.49
15 MINN 0.4 N.H. 0 .2 KANS 3.00
16 IDAHO 0 .4 TEX 0.2 CALIF 2.98
17 ME 0 .4 WASH 0.2 IDAHO 2.98
18 OREG 0 .4 W.VA 0.1 UTAH 2.82
19 lA 0.3 CALIF 0 .0 R.I. 2.61
20 VT 0.3 N.C. 0 .0 S.D. 2.45
21 VA 0.1 COLO -0.1 MASS 2.36
22 N.J. 0.1 IND -0.1 P A 2.32
23 N.C. 0.1 VA -0.3 ARIZ 2.25
24 IND -0.1 S.C. -0.3 IND 2.24
25 S.D. -0.1 ILL -0 .3 NEV 2.17
26 FLA -0.2 S.D. -0 .4 W.VA 2.16
27 S.C. -0.2 OREG -0 .4 OHIO 1.98
28 ALA -0.4 N.M. -0 .4 N.M. 1.94
29 LA -0 .4 MONT -0 .4 N.J. 1.55












State Score State Score
31 PA -0.5 ALA -0 .4
32 CALIF -0 .5 GA -0 .4
33 R.I. -0.5 OKLA -0 .4
34 GA -0.5 FLA -0.5
35 KY -0.6 LA -0.5
36 MISS -0 .6 PA -0.6
37 ARIZ -0.7 UTAH -0.6
38 TENN -0 .8 ARK -0.7
39 N.Y. -0.9 MD -0 .7
40 MICH -1.0 MINN -0 .7
4l UTAH -1.1 MISS -0.8
42 ILL -1.1 lA -1.0
43 N.H. -1.1 IDAHO -1.0
44 OKIA -1.2 Wise -1 .0
45 N.D. -1.3 ARIZ -1.2
46 W.VA -1 .4 NEV -1.5
47 WYO -1.7 ME -1.6
48 MONT -1.9 N.D. -2 .1
196 7
S u i c i d e /  



































0 . 7 3
0.72
0.64
Scores for the I966-I969 crime rate are factor 
scores derived by factor analysis of 1966-I969 Uniform 
Crime Reports data on seven index crimes, plus Ëuearu of 
Rublic riealth Vital Statistics, 1967 data on suicides and 
homicides compiled from cause-of-death certificates.
A P P E N D I X  B  
P O L I T I C A L  S Y S T E M  I N D I C A T O R  D A T A
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TABLE B-1 .— State Rankings and Scores^: Professlonalism-






lank State Score State Score State Score
1 N.Y. 4.230 UTAH 1.629 N.Y. .656
2 CALIP 2.140 NEB 1.494 MASS .629
3 MASS 1.651 MINN 1.339 CALIP .604
4 PA 1.648 IDAHO 1.266 N.J. .585
5 MICH 1.354 MONT 1.235 MICH .578
6 ILL 1.154 IND 1.152 CONN .568
7 N.J. 1.010 ILL 1.034 PA .560
8 OHIO 0.619 Wise 0.949 OREG .544
9 Wise 0.558 OREG 0.913 COLO .538
10 MD 0.500 N.J. 0.843 Wise .532
11 M I N N 0.417 N . D . 0.780 OHIO .528
12 TEX 0.289 WASH 0.694 MINN .525
13 FLA 0.260 COLO 0.679 ILL .521
14 CONN 0.200 MICH 0.627 WASH .510
15 MO 0.126 CONN 0.431 R.I. .503
l6 DEL 0.116 WYO 0.413 MD .482
17 GA 0.087 CALIP 0.363 N.H. .482
18 IND 0.036 KANS 0.359 IND .464
19 lA 0.031 l A 0.326 LA .459
20 ARIZ -0.005 MO 0.305 ME .455
21 S.G. -0.013 W.VA 0.281 VA .451
22 KANS -0.159 OHIO 0.226 UTAH .447
23 WASH -0.160 PA 0.192 N.D. .444
24 N.C. -0.161 DEL 0.192 N.C. .430
25 l A -0.163 N.H. 0.191 KANS .426
26 GREG -0.207 R.I. 0.166 NEB .425
27 MISS -0.210 MASS 0.071 KY .419
28 NEV -0.221 ME 0.045 VT .414
29 VA -0.243 S.D. -0.138 lA .413
30 COLO -0.255 ARIZ -0.141 ALA .406
31 NEB -0.297 NEV -0.170 PLA .397
32 R.I. -0.328 N.C. -0.198 ARK .394
33 ALA -0.399 OKLA -0.293 IDAHO .394
34 TENN -0.582 KY -0.351 TENN .389
35 ME -0.619 MD -0.377 W.VA .386
TABLE B-1.— Continued
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Pro f0 s s i onaIi sm- 
Local Reliance
Competition-
Turnout I n n o v a t i o n
RANK State Score State Score State Score
36 KY -O.66I VT -0.483 ARIZ .384
37 N.M. -0.734 TENN -0.556 GA .381
38 W.VA -0.739 PLA -0.560 MONT .378
39 N.H. -0.752 TEX -0.566 MO .377
40 OKLA -0.799 N.M. -0.615 DEL .376
41 ARK -0.827 N.Y. -0.643 N.M.
42 N.D. -0.869 VA -0.964 OKLA .368
43 S.D. -0.976 LA -1.152 S.D. .363
44 UTAH -1.032 ARK -1.360 TEX .362
45 IDAHO -1.052 MISS -1.770 S.C. .347
46 MONT -1.095 ALA -2.504 WYO .346
47 WYO -1.421 GA -2.516 NEV .323
48 VT -1.546 S.C. -2.838 MISS .298
Scores for Professionalism-Local Reliance and Com­
petition-Turnout are from Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hoffer- 
bert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economies, and Public 
Policy," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII,
(September, 1909), p. 876.
Innovation scores are from Jack L. Walker, "The 
Diffusion of Innovation among the American States," Amer­
ican Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII (September, 1^69 ),
p.“BH3.
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TABLE B-2.— State Rankings and Scores^: Governor's Formai Powers; Centralization; State and Local Rev­enue as Percent of Personal Income, 1968
R e v e n u e  a s
G o v e r n o r ' s P e r c e n t  o f  1968
F o r m a l  P o w e r s C e n t r a l i z a t i o n P e r s o n a l  I n c o m e
R a n k S t a t e  S c o r e S t a t e  S c o r e S t a t e  P e r c e n t
1 N.Y. 19 ALA 86 N.D. 17.7
2 ILL 18 N.J. 82 WYO 17.5
3 N.J. 18 TENN 79 N.M. 15.9
4 PA 17 GA 75 IDAHO 15.0
5 VA 17 ARK 74 MINN 14.9
6 WASH 17 CONN 69 MONT 14.8
7 CALIP 17 LA 65 CALIF 14.7
8 MD 16 PA 60 S.D. 14.6
9 MO 16 Wise 60 LA 14.5
10 OREG 16 N.Y. 60 NEV 14.5
11 UTAH 16 ARIZ 58 N.Y. 14.5
12 WYO 16 KY 56 UTAH 14.2
13 MONT 16 R.I. 54 ARIZ 14.1
14 ALA 15 DEL 50 Wise 13.9
15 CONN 15 IND 50 COLO 13.6
16 OHIO 15 CALIF 50 lA 13.6
17 TENN 14 W.VA 50 VT 13.6
18 KY 14 ME 50 WASH 13.4
19 MICH 14 VA 47 MISS 13.1
20 MINN 14 ILL 46 OKLA 12.9
21 NEV 14 UTAH 45 OREG 12.9
22 COLO 14 MICH 44 NEB 12.8
23 IDAHO l4 MD 44 W.VA 12.8
24 LA 13 OHIO 42 DEL 12.7
25 OKLA 13 WASH 4o MICH 12.5
26 lA 12 COLO 38 KANS 12.3
27 NEB 12 OKLA 38 ALA 12.0
28 Wise 12 KANS 37 FIA 12.0
29 GA 12 MONT 36 GA 12.0
30 MASS 12 MASS 34 MASS 11.8
31 IND 12 MO 32 MD 11.7
32 ARK 11 MINN 31 ME 11.6
33 S.D. 11 N.D. 31 KY 11.5
34 N.M. 11 WYO 28 IND 11.3










Percent of 1968 
Personal Income 
state Percent
36 ME 11 S.D. 23 S.C. 11.2
37 N.H. 10 TEX 20 TENN 11.2
38 R.I. 10 IDAHO 19 ARK 11.0
39 N.C. 10 N.C. 19 R.I. 10.9
40 VT 10 N.M. 18 VA 10.9
41 ARIZ 10 lA 18 TEX 10.6
42 DEL 10 VT 13 N.J. 10.5
43 W.VA 8 OREG 11 PA 10.5
44 FLA 8 N.H. 9 MO 10.3
45 MISS 7 NEB 8 N.H. 10.2
46 S.C. 7 S.C. 6 OHIO 10.1
47 TEX 7 NEV 4 CONN 9 'g
48 N.D. 7 FIA 0 ILL 9 .8
^Scores for Governor's Formal Powers are from
Joseph A. Schleslnger, "The Politics of the Executive,"
In Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, eds.. Politics 
In the American States; A Comparative Analysis (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 19&6 ), p. 2 ^9 .
Centralization scores are from Wayne L. Francis, 
Legislative Issues In the Fifty States: A Comparative 
Analysis (dhlcago: Rand McNally, 19b7 ), p. 7 4.
Revenue as Percent of Personal Income, 1968 Is 
from National Education Association, Ranking of the States, 
1970 (Washlngton,D.C.: National Education Association, l970), 
p. 38.
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TABLE B-3 .— State Rankings and Scores^in Expenditures 
for Criminal Justice Functions: Police- 
versus-Corrections; Judicial and Pro­
secution; State/Local Ratio; Total 
Expenditures as Percent of I968
Personal Income
Expend's as
Police- Judicial Percent of
versus- and State/Local Personal
Corrections Prosecution Ratio Inc ome
Rank state Score state Score State Ratio State %
1 N.J. 1 .6 N.-n. 3.0 VT 4.07 NEV 1.52
2 MICH 1.4 r  0 2.5 DEL 2 .19 N.Y. 1.34
3 VA 1.3 ^  1.6 ME 1.18 MD 1.30
4 NEB 1.2 S.D. 1.6 N.C. 1.14 CALIF 1.28
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0 . 9 20.88
0 . 7 9
0 . 7 7
0 . 7 7
0.76
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ILL -0.4  


























lA -0 . 
OHIO -0 . 
W.VA -0 .
G A -0 . 
OREG -1 .0
IND -0.5 
LA -0.6  
KY -0.7 

























MINN -1 .0  
MONT -1.1  
COLO -1 .3  
WASH -1 .4  
ME -1.5




























N.C. -1 .6  

















^Scores for Police-versus-Corrections and for Judicial 
and Prosecution expenditures are factor scores derived by 
factor analysis (varimax rotation) of data from U.S. Depart­
ment of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 
Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice
System, 1968-I969 (Washington,D. 
Office, 1970), pp.4-6.
C.: U.S . Government Printing
State/Local expenditure ratios and Expenditures as 




State Rankings and Percentages^: Supervisory 
Board^ Representation of Police, Correct­
ions, Courts and State/Local Ratio
Sheriff 
& Police Corrections Courts
State/Local
Ratio
Rank State 2 State % State % State batio
1 VT 55-6 N.H. 20.0 CONN 50.0 CONN 3.502 TENN 43.8 MO 16.7 PA 42.9 R.I. 2.15q NEV 41.2 MONT 16.7 MASS 36.7 N.C. 1.604 AIA 40.0 IND 15.4 WYO 36.4 ME 1.385 MINN 37.5 ARK 14.3 N.J. 35.7 N.J. 1.30
6 ARK 35.7 GA 13.6 MICH 28.6 N.M. 1.257 FIA 34.6 AIA 13.3 KANS 28.3 ARK 1.008 MONT 33.3 IDAHO 13.3 N.D. 26.7 DEL 1.00
Q MO 33.3 lA 13.3 lA 26.7 PLA 1.0010 OKLA 31.9 N.D. 13.3 COLO 26.3 KANS 1.00
11 ME 31.6 MD 12.5 KY 25.6 S.D. 1.0012 S.D. 31.3 DEL 12.5 OKLA 25.5 IDAHO 0.88
13 N.C. 30.8 S.C. 12.5 MONT 25.0 S.C. 0.7814 MASS 30.0 S.D. 12.5 S.D. 25.0 VA 0.78
15 MISS 29.4 NEV 11.8 VA 25.0 COLO 0.73
16 UTAH 27.8 KY 116 NEB 23.8 MONT 0.72
17 ILL 26.7 N.C. 11.5 ILL 23.3 OHIO 0.6918 IDAHO 26.7 N.M. 11.1 IND 23.0 ALA 0.6719 COLO 26.3 OKLA 10.6 VT 22.2 N.D. 0.6720 KANS 25.0 CONN 10.5 MO 22.2 TEX 0.67
21 Wise 25.0 COLO 10.5 UTAH 22.2 W.VA 0.6722 S.C. 25.0 ILL 10.0 ARK 21.4 MO 0.6423 MD 25.0 MASS 10.0 ME 21.1 N.Y. 0.6424 MICH 25.0 NEB 9.5 MD 20.8 UTAH 0.64
25 W.VA 24.0 OHIO 9.1 MISS 20.6 VT 0.63
26 PA 23.8 WYO 9.1 IDAHO 20.0 MD 0.6027 N.H. 23.3 MISS 8.8 N.C. 19.2 KY 0.5928 KY 23.3 N.Y. TEX 19.0 MASS 0.5829 GA 22.7 KANS §'3 R.I. 18.2 WYO 0.5730 OHIO 22.7 Wise 8.3 OHIO 18.2 MICH 0.56


























WASH 6.9 DEL 16.7 MISS 0.48MINN 6.3 N.H. 16.7 TENN 0.45TENN 6.3 Wise 16.7 IND 0.44VA 6.3 CALIF 1 6 . 0 OKLA 0.42ARIZ 5.9 W.VA 1 6 . 0 GA 0.38
UTAH 5.6 FLA 15.4 ARIZ 0.31
VT 5.6 WASH 13.8 NEB 0.31
ME 5.3 OREG 13.6 NEV 0.31TEX 4.7 MINN 12.5 N.H. 0.30OREG 4.5 TENN 12.5 CALIF 0.25
R.I. 4.5 ALA 10.0 MINN 0.23W.VA 4.0 GA 9.1 WASH 0.21LA 2.9 S.C. 6.3 OREG 0 . 1 6
Calculated from U.S. Congress, Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations, "Making the Safe Streets Act 
Work: An Intergovernmental Challenge," June, 1970 (raimeo).
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TABLE B-5-— State Rankings, Percentages and Rate^: Percent 
Paroled, 1967; Prisoner Increase, 1964-67; 








State Percent State Percent State Rate
1 WASH 9 9 .8 NEV 35.1 CALIP 144.8
2 N.H. 99.2 R.I. 25.9 MD 138.1
3 KANS 98.4 LA 15.1 NEV 137.0
4 OHIO 94.0 N.C. 12.9 COLO 127.3
5 UTAH 92.9 N.H. 12.2 PLA 121.1
6 Wise 92.1 DEL GA 117.5
7 CALIF 91.9 PLA 8.0 TEX 113.3
8 N.Y. 87.6 CALIP 4.7 LA 112.3
9 PA 86.2 TEX 2.9 OKLA 110.5
10 NEV 84.8 S.C. 1.3 N.C. 109.7
11 N.J. 84.5 N.J. 0.0 ALA 109.6
12 MICH 83.9 UTAH -1.5 KANS 100.6
13 CONN 79.9 ARIZ -1.9 OHIO 98.7
14 ME 78.0 OKLA -1.9 ARIZ 97.7
15 IND 77.0 COLO -5.7 OREG 90.2
16 MINN 75.7 KY -6.5 S.C. 89.9
17 VT 74.5 TENN -6.5 KY 88.9
18 W.VA 73.9 MD -6.8 N.M. 88.9
19 COLO 73.5 S.D. -6.9 VA 88.920 N.D. 72.0 CONN -7.5 WASH 88.7
21 ARK 71.0 MO -7.5 ARK 83.9
22 ILL 70.6 WASH -7.5 MICH 82.0
23 MASS 69.9 MASS -7.9 WYO 80.6
24 IDAHO 64.0 Wise -8.3 IND 78.1
25 Ik 59.3 OHIO -8.8 N.Y. 76.8
26 R.I. 58.6 N.M. -9.6 TENN 76.6
27 MONT 57 .4 MINN -11.3 MONT 74.328 N.M. 57.3 OREG -12.3 S.D. 72.6
29 LA 56.9 MICH -12.4 MISS 71.0
30 OKLA 54.0 AIA -15.4 MO 70.8
31 MISS 53.5 ARK -17.1 NEB 67.7
32 ALA 52.7 VA -17.2 W.VA 67.2
33 VA 49.3 ME -17.7 lA 66.5
34 N.C. 48.7 MISS -18.9 N.J.
35 MD 46.5 lA -18.9 ILL 64.6
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TABLE B-5.— Continued
R a n k
P r i s o n e r s
P a r o l e d
P r i s o n e r
I n c r e a s e
P r i s o n e r s /
P o p u l a t i o n
S t a t e P e r c e n t S t a t e P e r c e n t S t a t e R a t e
36 A R I Z 46.4 K A N S -18.9 U T A H 63.6
37 K Y 44.1 I N D -19.1 Wise 62.2
38 F I A 42.2 I L L -19.6 M E 60.8
39 ' G A 41.4 N . Y . -20.2 D E L 58.9
40 O R E G 40.1 I D A H O -21.8 I D A H O 55.9
41 M O 38.0 V T -24.1 C O N N 54.3
42 T E N N 35.7 N . D . -24.2 V T 52.8
43 D E L 33.6 W Y O -25.0 P A 48.8
44 S . D . 33.1 P A -26.0 M I N N 46.1
45 T E X 33.1 N E B -26.8 R . I . 38.9
46 N E B 31.8 G A -27.4 M A S S 33.7
47 S . C . 27.6 M O N T -29.8 N . H . 32.4
48 W Y O 8.7 W . V A -29.8 N . D . 28.5
Prom U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 
National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin No. 44-(1967)-(Wash- 
ington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, I969)» Table 6.
A P P E N D I X  C  
P U B L I C  P O L I C Y  O U T C O M E  D A T A
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TABLE C-1.— State Rankings, Scores and Ratio^: Welfare- 





Rank State Score state Score state Ratio
1 CALIF 1.849 WYO 3.728 MASS 3.320
2 MASS 1.446 NEV 2.866 MO 2.712
3 Wise 1.445 MONT 1.847 N.Y. 2.644
4 MINN 1.316 IDAHO 1.583 OKLA 2.567
5 ILL 1.258 S.D. 1.546 CONN 2.486
6 N.Y. 1.152 VT 1.313 R.I. 2.482
7 N.H. 1.035 UTAH 0.688 COLO 2.464
8 N.J. 1.035 OREG 0.656 OREG 2.446
9 N.D. 0.901 N.D. 0 .6l4 KY 2.428
10 KANS 0.852 MINN 0.594 ILL 2.376
11 CONN 0.846 COLO 0.473 Wise 2.340
12 lA 0.845 ME 0.344 CALIF 2.322
13 WASH 0.789 NEB 0.337 MISS 2.274
14 OKLA 0.785 N.M. 0.269 ALA 2.267
15 MICH 0.761 N.H. 0.183 LA 2.252
l6 OREG 0.735 ARIZ 0.175 OHIO 2.242
17 COLO 0.711 Wise 0.095 ARK 2.212
18 NEB 0.705 WASH 0.063 IDAHO 2.205
19 R.I. 0.640 ARK 0.056 VT 2.199
20 OHIO 0.284 lA -0.059 DEL 2.190
21 WYO 0.220 KANS -0.082 N.J. 2.135
22 N.M. 0.184 TENN -0.169 GA 2.127
23 IND 0.155 MISS -0.191 PA 2.107
24 UTAH 0.124 OKLA -0.262 MINN 2.098
25 PA 0.085 MO -0.298 WASH 2.093
26 IDAHO -0.045 CALIF -0.345 ME 2.060
27 MONT -0.063 LA -0.361 TENN 2.031
28 S.D. -0.072 IND -0.399 W.VA 2.011
29 MD -0.155 ALA -0.405 lA 2.001
30 AIRZ -0.266 KY -0.420 KANS 1.998
31 MO -0.378 W.VA -0.422 MONT 1.962
32 DEL -0.390 TEX -0.493 UTAH 1.954
33 ME -0.465 GA -0.535 MD 1.923
34 NEV -0.535 MICH -0.578 MICH 1.920











Rank State Score State Score State Ratio
36 LA -0.729 VA -0.645 FIA 1.850
37 TEX -0.808 OHIO -0.756 N.D. 1.845
38 FIA -0.875 PA -0.769 N.H. 1.830
39 KY -1.041 DEL -0.779 NEV 1.826
40 VA -1.062 MD -0.787 NEB 1.813
4l N.C. -1.079 S.G. -0.808 TEX 1.800
42 ARK -1.263 CONN -0.845 IND 1.793
43 W.VA -1.360 N.C. -0.857 S.C. 1.775
44 GA -1.452 ILL -0.877 N.M. 1.720
45 S.C. -1.580 N.Y. -1.079 S.D. 1.715
46 TENN -1.738 N.J. -1.115 ARIZ 1.694
47 ALA -1.753 R.I. -1.144 WYO 1.660
48 MISS -2.432 MASS -1.363 VA 1.620
^Scores for Welfare-Educatlon and Highways-Natural 
Resources are from Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, 
"Dimensions of State Politics, Economies, and Public Policy," 
American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII (September, 
1965"), p.- 87b“ ---------------------
Redistributive Ratio is from Brian R. Fry and 
Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," 
American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIV (June, 1970), 
p. 5l5-
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TABLE C-2.— State Rankings and Scores^: Block Grants to 
Police versus Courts and Corrections; to 
Control Organized Crime and Disorders; 
and Income Distributional Inequality
Police vs. Control of Income Distri­
Courts & Org. Crime butional
Corrections & Disorders Inequality
Rank State Score State Score State Index
1 S.D. 2.3 CALIF
2 R.I. 2.0 LA
3 NEB 1.7 MISS
4 ALA 1.1 COLO
5 CONN 1.0 IND
6 MISS 1.0 NEV
7 PLA 0.8 PA
8 N.H. 0.8 NEB
9 N.J. 0.8 lA10 WYO 0.8 MASS
11 N.C. 0.7 MICH
12 S.C. 0.7 ALA
13 MONT 0.6 PLA14 ME 0.6 OHIO
15 COLO 0.6 UTAH
16 DEL 0 . 6 ARIZ
17 lA 0.5 GA
18 ARK 0.4 N.J
19 N.M. 0 . 2 KY
20 CALIP 0 . 1 KANS
21 GA 0 . 0 N.Y.
22 KY 0 . 0 S.C.
23 MO 0 . 0 Wise24 N.D. 0 . 0 ARK
25 OHIO 0 . 0 OKLA
26 ARIZ -0 . 1 TENN
27 KANS -0.1 CONN
28 TENN -0.1 W.VA
29 MASS -0.2 N.H.
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C o n t r o l  o f  
O r g .  C r i m e  
&  D i s o r d e r s  
S t a t e  S c o r e
I n c o m e  D i s t r i ­
b u t i o n a l  
I n e q u a l i t y  
s t a t e  Index
31 W . V A -0.2 N . C .
32 O K L A -0.3 V A
33 I L L -0.4 M E
34 O R E G -0.4 M O
35 N E V -0.5 R . I .
36 P A -0.5 I D A H O
37 V T -0.5 I L L
38 Wise -0.5 M D
39 I N D -0.7 N . M .40 M I C H -0.7 N . D .
41 N . H . -0.8 V T
42 L A -0.9 W Y O
43 M I N N -1.2 O R E G44 W A S H -1.2 D E L
45 I D A H O -1.3 W A S H
46 U T A H -2.2 M O N T
















R . I .
M O N T
I N D
N E V
M A S S
W A S H
P AWise
M E
O R E G
M I C H
O H I O
N . H .
C O N N
N . J .
I D A H O
W Ï O
















S c o r e s  f o r  P o l i c e - v e r s u s - C o u r t s  a n d  C o r r e c t i o n s  
a n d  f o r  C o n t r o l  o f  O r g a n i z e d  C r i m e  a n d  C i v i l  D i s o r d e r s  a r e  
f a c t o r  s c o r e s  d e r i v e d  b y  f a c t o r  a n a l y s i s  ( v a r i m a x  r o t a t i o n )  
o f  d a t a  t a k e n  f r o m  U . S .  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  J u s t i c e ,  L a w  E n f o r c e ­
m e n t  A s s i s t a n c e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  O f f i c e  o f  L a w  E n f o r c e m e n t  
P r o g r a m s ,  " P r e l i m i n a r y  P r o g r a m  A n a l y s i s , "  J u l y ,  1970.
Income Distributional Inequality is the Gini index 
computed by Thomas D. Hopkins from income distributional 
data for total families and unrelated individuals in 1959 
from U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population; 
i960 series PC (l) 1C to 530, "General Social and Economic 
Characteristics," Table 6 5 . See Thomas D. Hopkins, "Income 
Distribution in Grants-in-Aid Equity Analysis," National 
Tax Journal I8 (June, 1 9 6 5), 209-213.
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TABLE C-3.— State Rankings and Percentages^: 1970 Block







State Percent State Percent State Percent
1 S.D. 86 .4 WASH 20.9 LA 44.32 R.I. 79.9 IDAHO 20 .4 UTAH 42.5
3 NEB 72.7 UTAH 16.5 MD 41.64 DEL 72.0 MD 13.5 ARIZ 38.5
5 CONN 68.0 MINN 12.6 MASS 37.3
6 WYO 67.5 ILL 12.0 GA 34.5
7 N.C. 67.1 ME 11.9 OKLA 32.58 ALA 67.0 Wise 11.4 TENN 31.4
9 ME 66.3 IND 11.1 KANS 30.610 MONT 65.7 NEV 11.0 OHIO 30.5
11 N.H. 65.0 VA 10.5 N.J. 30.312 N.J. 64.4 N.Y. 9.7 MO 29.8
13 S.C. 63.4 N.D. 9.5 KY 29.814 PLA 63.3 MICH 8.7 IDAHO 28.6
15 MISS 61.7 MO 7 .7 IND 28.1
16 COLO 59.0 W.VA 7.5 CONN 28.0
17 ARK 58.7 TEX 7.1 W.VA 27.918 MO 58.6 N.C. 7.1 PA 27.6
19 N.M. 58.4 OREG 6.9 . WASH 26.020 N.D. 58.0 PA 6 .7 COLO 26.0
21 lA 57.8 TENN 6.5 NEV 25.522 VA 55.5 S.D. 6.2 TEX 25.2
23 GA 55.5 OKLA 6 .0 OREG 25.424 TENN 55.2 N.M. 5.5 FLA 25.425 ARIZ 54.0 KANS 5.0 N.Y. 24.7
26 W.VA 54.0 CALIF 5.0 ARK 24.7
27 KY 53.7 MONT 5 .0 N.C. 24.728 KANS 53.7 WYO 4.6 CALIF 24.529 ILL 53.6 lA 4.3 MICH 24.530 OHIO 53.6 OHIO 4.1 WYO 22.8
31 OREG 52.7 GA 4.0 VA 22.732 OKLA 52.6 N.H. 4 .0 lA 21.833
O  I t
MASS 51.0 MASS 3.2 MINN 21.734 CALIF 50.0 COLO 3.0 S.C. 21.135 Wise 49.7 VT 2 .8 MISS 20.5
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TABLE C-3.— Continued
P o l i c e
Activities C o u r t s
Correctional
Activities
R a n k S t a t e P e r c e n t S t a t e P e r c e n t s t a t e P e r c e n t
36 N E V 48.2 R . I . 2.7 N . D . 20 .0
37 W A S H 48.0 F L A 2.6 N . H . 20.0
38 V T 47.8 L A 2.5 M O N T 19.8
39 P A 46.4 A R I Z 2.5 A L A 19.5
40 I D A H O 46.3 N E B 2.3 W i s e 19.5
41 N . Y . 46.0 M I S S 2 .0 I L L 19.0
42 M I N N 45.7 A R K 2 .0 M E 18.9
43 M I C H 45.2 K Y 1.8 V T 18.2
44 I N D 45.1 S . C . 1.7 D E L 17.0
45 L A 40.2 C O N N 1.5 N . M . 16.7
46 U T A H 33.8 N . J . 1.3 N E B 12.7
47 T E X 28.6 A L A 1.0 R . I . 11.2
48 M D 23.3 D E L 1.0 S . D . 2 .6
Calculated from data in U.S. Department of Justice, 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Office of Law 
Enforcement Programs, "Preliminary Program Analysis," July, 
1970.
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TABLE C-4.— State Rankings and Percentages^: Fiscal 1970 
Block Grant Fund Allocations by SPA's for 











1 lA 8.8 CALIF 1 5 . 0 TEX 31.5
2 NEB 7.6 MISS VT 2 6 . 8
3 MISS 6.7 NEV 8.4 MD 20.4
4 N.Y. 6.2 IND 7.4 MINN 20.0
5 PA 6.1 Wise 6.8 N.M. 15.2
6 LA 6.1 ALA 6.0 OREG 14.4
7 MICH 5.7 S.C. 5.5 N.Y. 13.4
8 CALIF 5.0 COLO 5.5 ILL 11.9
9 COLO 5.0 LA 5.4 MICH 10.8
10 FLA 4.5 ARK 5.1 Wise 10.6
11 IND 4.4 MICH 5.1 DEL 10.0
12 NEV 3.4 UTAH 5.0 MONT 9.5
13 TEX 3.3 TEX 4.3 N.D. 9.514 OHIO 3.2 N.M. 4.2 KY 9.5
15 N.J. 3.2 OHIO 4.1 PA 9.3
16 KANS 3.1 PA 3.9 ARK 8.5
17 UTAH 3.0 MASS 3.4 VA 8.018 ALA 3.0 OKLA 3.4 S.C. 7.9
19 GA 2.7 KY 3.1 lA 7.320 MASS 2.6 N.D. 3.0 W.VA 7.1
21 R.I. 2.6 ME 2.9 KANS 7.0
22 ARIZ 2.5 NEB 2.6 N.H. 7.0
23 ILL 2.5 TENN 2.6 UTAH 6.4
24 VA 2.4 FLA 2.5 OKLA 5.5
25 KY 2.1 VT 2.1 WYO 5.1
26 VT 2.1 GA 2.0 WASH 4.6
27 W.VA 2.0 N.H. 2.0 AIA 4.5
28 N.H. 2.0 W.VA 1.5 OHIO 4.5
29 Wise 2.0 ARIZ 1.5 IND 3.930 CONN 1.0 N.C. 1.1 S.D. 3.7
31 IDAHO 1.0 IDAHO 1.1 MO
32 MD 1.0 ILL 1.0 NEV 3.6
33 S.D. 1.0 VA 0.9 R.I. 3.634 WASH 0.9 N.J. 0.8 TENN 3.2





Crime Control Control Miscellaneous
State Percent State Percent State Percent
36 OREG 0.1 OREG 0.6 MASS 2 . 3
37 TENN 0.1 MO 0.3 NEB 2.1
38 ARK 0.1 S.D. O.I PLA 1 . 7
39 DEL 0.0 MD 0.0 COLO 1.540 ME 0.0 NY 0.0 CONN 1.5
41 MINN 0.0 CONN 0.0 LA 1.5
42 MO 0.0 DEL 0.0 GA 1 . 3
43 MONT 0.0 lA 0.0 ARIZ 1.044 N.M. 0.0 MINN 0.0 MISS 0.6
45 N.C. 0.0 MONT 0.0 CALIF 0 . 5
46 N.D. 0.0 R.I. 0.0 ME 0.0
47 OKLA 0.0 WASH 0.0 N.J. 0.048 WYO 0.0 WYO 0.0 N.C. 0.0
^Calculated from data :in U.S. Department 1of Justici
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Office of Law 
Enforcement Programs, "Preliminary Program Analysis," July,
1 9 7 0.
